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ABSTRACT 
CRITICAL THINKING AND CEDAW: WOMEN'S RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 
June 1997 
Nancy L. Adams, B.A., New College of the University of South Florida 
M.A., University of Massachusetts Boston 
Directed by Professor John R. Murray 
The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for, among old parchments, or 
musty records. They are written, as with a sun beam in the whole volume of human 
nature, by the divinity itself; and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power. 
Alexander Hamilton, 1775 
This thesis is designed as an exercise in critical thinking which attempts to trace the 
little-known and vaguely understood international effort to address women's rights as 
human rights. Specifically, it is intended to introduce and actively engage the reader in the 
application of critical thinking processes through an analysis of the history and status of 
the Convention on the ~limination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, or 
CEDAW. Given the potential significance ofCEDAW for the United States, it is ironic 
that this human rights treaty is not commonplace in discussions regarding women's rights. 
Many associate the women's rights movement with efforts during the 1970s to 
ratify the ~qual Rights Amendment, or ERA. Some may recall that the ERA was penned 
in 1921 after the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified, or simply the efforts to secure 
voting rights for women. Few, however, associate the women's movement with 
international efforts to codify such rights into law through treaties such as CEDA W. 
CEDAW emerged as a product of the three World Conferences for Women that 
comprised the "Decade for Women" from 1975 through 1985. In 1995, a Fourth World 
Conference for Women followed. Of all of the documents produced, however, CEDAW 
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stands alone as a legally binding treaty which, under Article II, section 2 of the 
Constitution, has the potential to become " ... the supreme Law of the Land." 
CEDA W serves as a contextual framework for introducing the processes of, and 
understanding the need for, critical thinking. The central hypothesis of this study is that 
critical thinking enables the public to determine if information is accurate, reliable, relevant 
and sufficient to support or refute a given opinion. Correlated with the fundamental 
premise that a democracy requires a well-informed citizenry, is that information must be 
accessible and citizens need to think critically. Upon these premises rests the hope that the 
resultant standards will be applied in the adjudication of important social issues. 
This thesis asserts that issues of substance can easily be obscured and even 
discarded when selective emphasis is placed on secondary issues. Analyses of CED AW 
are made with respect to media presentation, US Senate proceedings, and provocative 
topics which served to prevent the public from being well-informed. The results of these 
analyses reveal an astounding degree of misinformation (in the form of omission, bias, 
digression, fragmentation, contradiction, and general confusion) that continues to obscure 
CEDA W from public consideration and debate. Although, through an in-depth critical 
analysis the status of this treaty may be tragically unclear, the flaws in the treatment of 
human rights issues, as well as paths of correction, are exposed for public consideration. 
In sum, critical thinking processes are viewed as necessary to protect the public's 
perceptions of issues. Absent critical thinking, the public may fall prey to misinformation. 
Through its use, it is hoped that a higher level of humanity, understanding, and truth will 
emerge within the process and as the product of sound and careful reasoning. 
V 
To my parents, 
Tom and Shirley Adams 
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PREFACE 
The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for, among old parchments, or 
musty records. They are written, as with a sun beam in the whole volume of human 
nature, by the divinity itself; and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power. 
Alexander Hamilton, 1775 
Women's rights is not a new issue for the American public. It is, however, viewed 
or defined differently by various segments of the populace. Generally speaking, many 
associate the women's rights movement with the efforts during the 1970s to ratify the 
Equal Rights Amendment, or ERA, as a part of the Constitution of the United States. 
Some may recall that the Equal Rights Amendment was penned in 1921 following the 
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, or simply recall the efforts of the suffiagists in 
securing the right of women to vote in the mid-1800s through the early 1900s. Few, 
however, associate the issue of women's rights with human rights or are aware of 
international efforts to codify these rights into law through treaties such as the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, or CEDAW. 
The subject of women's rights has historically been quite controversial and difficult 
to understand. The presentation of the history of the women's rights movement, for 
example, tends to lack continuity in standard history books. Further, substantive issues 
are often obscured by surrounding controversies or a failure to provide a context through 
which these issues might be readily understood. In view of such problems, it is considered 
important to develop an awareness of the history and issues of the women's movement in 
order to more fully understand the emergence of the contemporary view of women's 
rights as human rights. 
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Critical thinking is asserted to be essential to the development of such an 
awareness. In brief, the processes of thought embodied by critical thinking provide the 
skill and standards needed to formulate understandings or opinions that are sound and 
well-substantiated. Through the application of critical thinking processes it becomes 
possible to identify misconceptions, fallacies, and bias which distort core issues, as well as 
opinions or conclusions based upon insufficient, inaccurate, or unreliable evidence. 
Beyond identification, critical thinking also provides avenues to counter-balance or 
otherwise correct these problems, particularly if critical thinking is understood as including 
or interdependent with creative thinking. In sum, the application of critical thinking 
processes engenders both a clearer understanding of relevant issues and how they may 
have been distorted, as well as the reasons why this was or may be the case. 
Turning to the history of women's rights in the United States, it is necessary to 
review the circumstances under which a movement to secure certain rights for women first 
evolved. Once the context in which certain events transpired has been established, later 
developments can be examined as a possible extension of earlier attempts to secure 
various rights for women. Since the United States is still a young nation by comparison, 
there is an added advantage of being able to establish this historical context over the span 
ofless than two hundred and fifty years. 
The social and cultural norms which existed when the United States underwent a 
transformation from its original colonial status, through the establishment of thirteen 
independent states, and ultimately to the formation of a new nation, are far removed from 
those which exist today. Slavery and the second class position of women were widely 
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accepted norms in the nation's formative years. The inequity inherent in such views, 
however, similar to the perceived mistreatment of the colonists by the British Empire, 
planted the seeds for future rebellion and change. 
For the original colonists, rebellion was formally initiated through the Declaration 
oflndependence in 1776. At that time, however, the colonists had yet to create their own 
national form of government or code oflaws. Indeed, it was not until 1787 that the 
United States of America became a nation, with the drafting and subsequent acceptance of 
the Constitution. The Constitution established the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches of the nation's government, as well as a system of checks and balances to 
prevent the abuse of authority which remain in place to this day. 
In this respect, the Constitution of the United States of America is undoubtedly the 
cornerstone document of our national unity. Its survival over the course of more than two 
centuries in America's history speaks not only to its power and importance, but also to its 
flexibility. Indeed, the United States has continued to define itself through an ongoing 
interpretation of this document, whether in the face of civil war or such national uprisings 
as occurred during the course of both the civil rights and women's movements. 
The disputes which have arisen that have caused the Constitution to be subject to 
evaluation and reinterpretation have involved issues of rights. The questions concerning 
rights include everything from the degree of authority extended to the president to the 
right of individuals to vote. In each case, the answers to these questions have been 
determined by the procedures established by the Constitution, although at times these 
procedures were deemed to be inherent or implied as opposed to specifically stated. 
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The intention of this brief summation is not to ignore or otherwise discount the 
fact that the Constitution itself has historically been subject to criticism. From a 
contemporary point of view, one need only recall the renewed allegations (e.g. arising 
from the current emphasis on multiculturalism) that the Constitution is a document which 
was designed by and for wealthy white males. As true this allegation may be, the 
reinterpretation of this document over the years has gradually eroded the relevance or 
force of this criticism as it relates to contemporary society. 
Certainly, one cannot negate the factual realities of slavery or the limited status 
assigned to women, minorities, and the economically disadvantaged which persisted 
beyond the adoption of the Constitution. Nor can one ignore the fact that the Constitution 
did not address the role or rights of women as US citizens, just as it failed to address the 
institution of slavery. However, the resultant abrogation of rights continue to be subject 
to correction by virtue of the very processes established by this document. 
Specifically, the Constitution of the United States contains a self-correcting 
mechanism, namely the allowance for amendment. Just as is the case in developing a 
critical thinking perspective, interpretations of the Constitution must be self-correcting in 
order to adjust to new and constantly changing circumstances and social conditions. 
Daniel J. Boorstin acknowledges this succinctly in his essay entitled "Printing and the 
Constitution." He writes: 
What men had made, they could improve. The explicit provision for amendment, 
a characteristically American feature, proved essential to the longevity of our 
Constitution. (Boorstin 1994, 72-73) 
xii 
Unfortunately, the process of constitutional self-correction for disenfranchised groups has 
historically been both divisive and painfully slow. 
Key issues of national debate are reflected in the amendments to the Constitution, 
beginning with the Bill of Rights incorporated on December 15, 1791. Currently, 
amendments to the Constitution are twenty-seven in number. Included among them are 
amendments directed toward abolishing slavery and determining the right to vote. With 
respect to voting, several amendments were needed to guarantee and protect this 1ight from 
discrimination based on race, prior conditions of servitude, sex, payment of taxes, or against 
citizens eighteen years of age or older. The periods in history reflected by these amendments 
include the Civil War, the continued attempts on the part of individual states to maintain 
racially prohibitive or "Jim Crow" legislation, the struggle of the suffragists to secure the 
right to vote for women, the civil rights movement, and the Vietnam War. What is not 
reflected clearly as a comprehensive period in history is the effort to ratify the Equal Rights 
Amendment which lasted over a half-century, then seemed to all but disappear. 
It is interesting that in a democracy, so many amendments have been needed to 
guarantee American citizens the right to vote. Without the right to vote, individuals have no 
voice in deciding who should represent them in their government. As Mortimer J. Adler has 
noted, however, "[a]t no time are the people as a collectivity coextensive with the 
population" and he holds up various members of the population such as children, resident 
aliens, and the mentally handicapped as examples of this claim. (Adler 1987, 73) Adler 
concludes that the government is empowered by the consent of "enfranchised citizens" and 
points out that "[i]n earlier centuries there were other disenfranchised groups in the 
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population who were among the governed but without suffrage-- for example women, blacks, 
individuals without sufficient property" who could not (by law) give such consent. (ibid.) 
Early reform efforts often overlapped, however, crossing boundaries of race, gender, 
and class. Of great historical significance was the connection between race and gender, 
which would again emerge within the civil rights movement and a rejuvenated attempt to 
ratify the Equal Rights Amendment. The overlap in the 1840s occurred in the case of 
individuals seeking the abolition of slavery and those seeking to advance the status of women. 
It was precisely within this social climate to which the roots of the "women's movement" can 
be traced. 
Specifically, the Seneca Falls Convention of 1848 stands out as a crucial point in 
American history in the formal organization of the women's movement. This unprecedented 
gathering resulted from the work of two female abolitionists and focused on securing rights 
for women. The participants of the Seneca Falls Convention issued forth a document entitled 
the "Declaration of Sentiments." Patterned after the Declaration of Independence, it speaks 
directly to the inequity and injustice of the station to which women were assigned under the 
laws and customs of the growing new nation and offered twelve resolutions for change. 
The Declaration of Sentiments cites several laws which served to disenfranchise 
women socially, economically, and politically. The attached resolutions petitioned that 
women not be subjugated by laws which denied them a voice in government, religious 
assemblies, and in public, as well as access to education and employment. Summarizing the 
ultimate goal of the Seneca Falls Convention, the Declaration insisted that women " ... have 
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immediate admission to all the rights and privileges which belong to them as citizens of the 
United States." (The Annals of America: 1841-1849 1976, 439-440) 
Slavery was prohibited by the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865. The 
Fourteenth Amendment of 1868, twenty years after the Seneca Falls Convention, established 
the right of adult males to vote. The Fifteenth Amendment of 1870 protected that right from 
racial, but not gender, discrimination. Ironically, of all of the disenfranchised citizens, women 
were the last to be granted the right to vote and it took an additional fifty years to attain this 
goal. 
It is significant that women were not included in prior amendments which served to 
enfranchise African Americans and former slaves with voting rights. Sandra Lipsitz Bern 
summarizes this omission as follows: 
... when the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments to the Constitution were ratified in 
1868 and 1870, the former merely specified that the states could not deny the right to 
vote to any "male" citizen over the age of twenty-one, and the latter merely specified 
that no citizen could be denied the right to vote on account of"race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude." In other words, there was no mention of sex 
discrimination. (Bern 1993, 65) 
Bern continues by noting that despite the persistence of individuals and groups that sought to 
delete the word "male" from the Fourteenth Amendment and to include sex as a category 
enumerated by the Fifteenth Amendment, the tide of history ran against such efforts of the 
women's movement. (ibid.) 
In 1920 women were finally, after many decades of protest, guaranteed the right to 
vote under the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The ratification of the Nineteenth 
Amendment ended a half-century old quest to delete the word male from the Fourteenth or 
include gender under the protections of the Fifteenth Amendment. Instead, the Nineteenth 
xv 
Amendment introduced the word "sex" into the Constitution for the first time. Ratified on 
August 18, 1920, it reads as follows: 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by 
the United States or by any State on account of sex. 
By specifying sex as a distinct category it is possible to raise the question as to whether the 
Constitution or any of its subsequent amendments should be viewed as being applicable to 
women unless their inclusion is explicitly stated as it is in the Nineteenth Amendment. 
Indeed, such a question is not as extreme as it may initially appear. In fact, history 
tends to partially support its legitimacy. Ironically, during the formative years of the nation, 
many women actually lost previously granted rights after the Declaration of Independence in 
1777 and beyond the adoption of the Constitution in 1788. As Malvina Halberstam and 
Elizabeth F. Defeis point out, " .. . the Constitution was silent with respect to the rights of 
women" and that " ... the political rights enjoyed by women were either specifically denied or 
implicitly discouraged under the new state constitutions then being drafted." (Halberstam and 
Defeis 1987, 6) 
It should be stressed, however, that the rights sought by and for women were not 
limited to obtaining voting rights. Halberstam and Defeis, for example, are among the 
authors who note the effects of the hardships of colonial life on the lives of women. By 
necessity, as has since occurred in times of war, women had access to a vast number of 
opportunities outside of the home, many of which were stereotypically considered to be male 
professions. As these hardships lessened, however, so did society's tolerance for women 
stepping outside of traditionally defined roles. 
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Halberstam and Defeis point to a "reversion to traditional sex roles," emphasizing the 
popularity of defining the "proper role for women" both in Europe and America and citing 
various factors which contributed to the acceptance of a quite limited role in society. (ibid., 
7) The authors (in concurrence with Bern) assert that, "The codification of American law 
was patterned on Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, as well as on the 
English common law." (ibid.) They state: 
After the American Revolution, Blackstone's view that upon marriage a woman had 
no legal rights separate from her husband's prevailed .. .. Thus a woman lost all her 
social, political, and economic rights as an individual upon entering marriage. In the 
eyes of the law marriage was the "civil Death" of a woman. As a result of the 
codification oflaw, married women could no longer own property, enter into 
contracts, or bring law suits in their own names and without their husband's 
permission. (ibid.) 
In addition, Halberstam and Defeis stress the importance of women's involvement in 
the social reform efforts of the 1820s and 1830s occurring within the context of religious 
revivalism. They note that given this social context, women were provided an opportunity to 
overcome " ... one of the most severe and dehumanizing limitations enforced against women 
during the 1820s ... the restriction that women could not speak in public." (ibid., 8) By the 
1840s, women were seeking reform in a wide variety of areas and speaking out on issues 
ranging from health, education, and working conditions to "greater legal rights for all 
women," including laws relating to divorce and the custody of their children. (ibid., 9) 
While attaining the right to vote took precedence as a unified goal of the women's 
movement, the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment did not guarantee the broader 
reforms sought to enhance the legal and social status of women. As Halberstam and 
Defeis write: 
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Unfo1tunately, the Nineteenth Amendment was not a panacea for correcting all 
economic, political, and social discriminations against women, and a handful of 
militants in the 1920s saw that the vote was at best an incomplete solution. 
Inequalities in laws pertaining to jury service, property rights, marriage, divorce, 
and work opportunities had to be eradicated before women could truly exercise the 
right to vote in any meaningful manner. (ibid., 15) 
Further, as the movement to grant women the right to vote was gathering strength, several 
rulings were issued by the Supreme Court on landmark cases which effectively blocked 
such additional reform efforts by establishing new legal precedents. 
With the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, the women's movement was 
no longer unified in its objectives or strategies. Opposing factions soon emerged, perhaps 
primarily divided between those who sought to engender reforms through exercising the 
right to vote and those supporting the National Women's Party which sought to end 
discriminatory practices against women through the ratification of an equal rights 
amendment. Regardless of the cause, whether attributable to dissension within the 
movement itself, the new legal precedents of the Supreme Court which blocked the 
advancement of women in several areas, a sense of triumph and completion resulting from 
the attainment of suffrage or a combination of such factors, the women's movement was 
severely, if not irrevocably weakened. 
Of the years following the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, little if any 
mention is made of the women's movement in standard history books. The United States 
faced a series of domestic and international crises, ranging from the Great Depression and 
World War II to the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and the emergence of the civil rights 
movement. Though many women ( and men) remained politically active, seeking reforms 
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and advancements in areas such as employment, education, and law, these efforts and their 
results were more cumulative than cohesive. 
In recent years, legislation has passed which has aided reform and begun to close, 
but not eliminate, the disparities between men and women under the laws of the United 
States. Initially, redress was sought through judicial avenues. When brought before the 
Supreme Court, these cases often tested the racial limits of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
established by such precedents as Slaughter-House, 1873. 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides for more than the right of male citizens to vote. 
It also provides for the equal protection of all citizens born or naturalized in the United 
States. The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution states as follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws [emphasis added]. 
The aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment emphasized is known as the "equal protection 
clause." Lacking specific application to a particular sex, this clause provided an avenue for 
cases to be brought before the Supreme Court in challenging gender-based discrimination. 
The Supreme Court, however, did not deem this clause to be applicable to women until 1971, 
and then, only narrowly. (Bern 1993, 66) 
Briefly summarized, Bern points out that, for over a century the Supreme Court 
repeatedly ruled that the equal protection clause did not apply to discrimination against 
women. The day after the landmark decision was rendered in the Slaughter-House Cases, 
for example, the Supreme Court used the ruling to uphold an Illinois law that excluded 
XIX 
women from the practice oflaw in the case of Bradwell v. Illinois, 1873. (ibid.) This, in 
turn, was followed by rulings such as upholding a Missouri law which denied women the 
right to vote (Minor v. Happersett, 1875) and overturning a law of West Virginia which 
excluded minorities from jury selection with the caveat, however, that the state could still 
exclude women (Struader v. West Virginia, 1879). (ibid.) 
The view that women represented a separate "class" of citizens was clearly shown 
in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Muller v. Oregon, (1908). 
This ruling upheld the right of the state (on the basis ofbiological difference) to restrict 
the number of hours that a woman could work in order to protect her health and 
reproductive function in society, despite the Court's ruling in 1905 that such restrictions 
imposed by a state interfered with the contractual "rights of individuals." (ibid., 68-69) 
The separate and unequal treatment of women continued to be upheld through their 
exclusion from the protections offered under the Fourteenth Amendment. Even when the 
Supreme Court finally did apply these protections to women in Reed v. Reed, 1971 (i.e. in 
ruling that the administration of an estate should not automatically be granted to males in 
the absence of a will), the Court, to this day, has not subjected discrimination on the basis 
of sex to the same level of "strict scrutiny" that is applied in cases of racial discrimination. 
(ibid., 70-71) 
In the absence of such a precedent, under the current laws of the United States 
discrimination on the basis of sex is allowed, provided that "such classification serves 
important government objectives and is substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives." (Halberstam and Defeis 1987, 92) As Halberstam and Defeis note, however, 
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The Court has not satisfactorily articulated the criteria either for determining what 
constitutes an "important government objective" or whether "the classification by 
gender is substantially related" to that objective. (ibid.) 
Of interest, in arguing that the ratification of international treaties such as CED AW would 
serve as an alternative to the ERA to prevent the continuation of discriminatory practices, 
the authors note: 
The most appropriate way to prohibit gender-based discrimination would have 
been the application of the Equal Protection Clause to bar gender-based 
discrimination, as it has been applied to bar racial discrimination. (ibid.) 
Bearing this in mind, it is difficult to accept the characterization of the Equal Rights 
Amendment as a "radical" attempt to secure equal protection for women under the laws of 
the United States. 
Attempts to ratify an equal rights amendment began in 1923, when Alice Paul's 
1921 version was first submitted to the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of 
Representatives. (ibid., 16) Halberstam and Defeis cite the original version as having read 
as follows: 
Men and women shall have equal rights throughout the United States and every 
place subject to its jurisdiction. (ibid.) 
The authors go on to note, as does Bern, that the Equal Rights Amendment (subject to 
slight revision) " ... was reintroduced into Congress every year between 1923 and 1970." 
(ibid.) 
Within the context of the civil rights movement and against the backdrop of the 
Vietnam War, there emerged renewed interest in securing rights for women. Legislation 
was passed which enhanced women's rights such as Title VII and Title IX of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, and support for the Equal Rights Amendment became widespread. 
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By 1970, the ERA was passed by the House of Representatives and was favorably 
released from the Senate in 1972. (The Annals of America:1969-1973 1976, 109). The 
final version stated the following: 
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of sex. (ibid.) 
Although many states quickly ratified this amendment to the Constitution, over 
time opposition grew and targeted states which had not yet ratified. The positive effects 
of ratifying the ERA were soon overshadowed by heated ( and often misinformed or 
irrational) controversy. Supporters came to be characterized as radical, overly-liberal, and 
even militant or men-hating feminists who posed a threat to the very fabric of traditional 
social customs and values. For example, opponents often used appeals to popular 
prejudice to distort the effects of ratifying the ERA, as shown by the perception that 
"unisex toilets" would be mandated under the law. In brief, the basic view that the ERA 
would simply function as a substitute for the failure to recognize sex discrimination (i.e. to 
the same degree as racial discrimination) under the Fourteenth Amendment seemed to be 
completely obscured. 
In the midst of intense emotional and political debate, the momentum for the 
ratification slowed and some states reportedly ''voided" prior ratifications. (ibid.) In the 
end, after the seven-year deadline and three-year presidential extension expired, the Equal 
Rights Amendment fell three shy of the thirty-eight states (or three-fourths) needed for 
ratification. (Halberstam and Defeis 1987, 93) Of note, the ERA was resubmitted for the 
approval of Congress, and most recently it was announced (but not widely reported) that 
this was also the case in 1997. 
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Though interest in securing rights for women has waxed and waned on the national 
level over the past one hundred and fifty years, a parallel movement began to form 
internationally. When World War II drew to a close, the United Nations was conceived 
and, despite numerous political, economic, and cultural differences, began to thrive. 
Within the Charter of the United Nations itself, equality between men and women was 
formally recognized in 1945. Shortly thereafter, the Commission on Human Rights was 
created and resolutions, declarations, and international treaties gradually began to address 
women's rights as human rights. 
From the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Human Rights 
Covenants, through the 1952 Convention on the Political Rights of Women and the 1967 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Farms of Discrimination Against Women, the rights 
of women have been recognized as an international human rights concern. Over the 
course of the decade following 1967, efforts began focusing on the development of a 
human rights treaty that would embody, and codify into law, the principles contained in 
the declaration. In the interim, the women's movement began to thrive on an international 
level. The United Nations designated 1975 "International Women's Year" which 
coincided with the first World Conference for Women held in Mexico City that summer. 
In addition, 1975 marked the beginning of the United Nations "Decade for 
Women: Equality, Development, and Peace." By 1979, prior to the second World 
Conference for Women of 1980, the efforts to codify the 1967 UN declaration were finally 
realized. The result was a comprehensive multilateral human rights treaty bearing the 
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official title, "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women," or CEDAW. 
To this day, CEDAW is a document that stands unparalleled in its guarantees of 
rights for women around the world. Unfortunately, it is also a document which, in a very 
short period of time, was rendered into obscurity. Currently, the general public is largely 
unaware that CEDAW even exists, let alone understands its potential significance for the 
people and laws of the United States. It is hoped that, through the application of critical 
thinking processes in the pages which follow, the reader will come to recognize the 
importance and relevance of this treaty and develop, not only a deeper understanding of 
women's rights as human rights, but also the need for careful and skilled reasoning. 
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CHAPTER I 
INFORMATION, TECHNOLOGY, A.i'ID UNDERSTANDING 
In recent years, the world has heralded in a new era of technological advancement 
of unparalleled complexity and significance which directly impacts the information 
available to the public. Through increasingly sophisticated modes of communication it is 
now possible to access information from around the world within seconds. The mass 
media now provides ''on the spot" coverage of international and national events via 
networks and satellites. This information is transmitted to television stations and news 
services across the globe, then transformed into headlines or newscasts and reported if 
deemed to be of public interest or import. 
Within the framework of these advancements, the public has become accustomed 
to various concepts affecting information with respect to its flow, scope, and form. These 
concepts range from information superhighways and the new world order to sound bites 
and spin doctors. As Aldous Huxley cautioned in his foreword to Brave New World 
Revisited, " ... brevity can never, in the nature of things, do justice to all the facts of a 
complex situation." (Huxley 1960, vii) 
While acknowledging the necessity of brevity when discussing broad and complex 
social themes, Huxley continues by stating: 
Omission and simplification help us to understand-~ but help us, in many cases, to 
understand the wrong thing; for our comprehension may be only of the 
abbreviator's neatly formulated notions, not of the vast, ramifying reality from 
which these notions have been so arbitrarily abstracted. (ibid.) 
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Such warnings are by no means unique. Statements of caution in accepting information as 
having merit without critical analysis have been issued by philosophers and theorists 
throughout history. Indeed, critical thinking as a discipline has often been linked to the 
Socratic Method of questioning the basis of one's beliefs and the soundness of one's 
conclusions. 
Contemporary theorists have also expressed concern regarding the form 
information assumes and the skills required to identify problems associated with more 
modem forms such as televised images. Neil Postman is among the educational theorists 
who have voiced concern on this issue. In his article, "Critical Thinking in the Electronic 
Era," Postman focuses on the impact of technological advancements and speaks to the 
need for educators to prepare students accordingly with the requisit~ skills of critical 
thinking. 
One of the most salient conclusions made by Postman concerns the degradation of 
information by the mass media into what he terms "disinformation." Postman defines this 
concept as follows: 
Disinformation does not mean false information. It means misleading 
information-- misplaced, fragmented~ irrelevant, or superficial information--
information that creates the illusion of knowing something, but which, in fact, 
leads one away from knowing. (Postman 1985, 6) 
Of equal importance is Postman's acknowledgment that in the past, one of the primary 
concerns of theorists and philosophers has been focused upon the accessibility of 
information to the public. While Postman admits that in the modem world such access has 
been increased by technological advancement, the form this information assumes tends to 
limit comprehension when the audience lacks the requisite skills to identify, analyze, and 
thereby, counter ~balance the occurrence of "disinformation." (ibid.) 
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Economic Considerations 
While Postman predominantly addresses the problems generated by fo~ Ben 
Bagdikian emphasizes the need for economic awareness with respect to the flow of 
information within the mass media. In his article entitled "Global Media Corporations 
Control What We Watch (and Read)," Bagdikian suggests the public must also be aware 
of the almost invisible com1ection between large corporate interests and information which 
ultimately becomes accessible. Bagdikian notes the corporate trend of consolidation and 
alleged announcements that, 
... by the mid-1990s they-- five to ten corporate giants-- will control most of the 
world's important newspapers, magazines, books, broadcast stations, movies, 
recordings, and videocassettes. (Bagdikian 1990, 84) 
Bagdikian continues his opening statements with the following assertion: 
Moreover, each of these planetary corporations plans to gather under its control 
every step in the information process, from creation of"the product" to all the 
various means by which modem technology delivers media messages to the public. 
"The product" is news, info1mation, ideas, entertainment, and popular culture; the 
public is the whole world. (ibid.) 
Although some might argue that this position is extreme (if not conspiratorial) in nature, 
one cannot ignore facts such as media consolidation and the potential for bias and 
censorship that this creates. One should also not dismiss the notion that the individuals 
who control the multinational media corporations have political and economic agendas 
which may supersede their assumed "duty to inform" the public. 
Once such facts and possibilities (e.g. the potential for bias and censorship) are 
recognized, it is virtually impossible to ignore the economic and political roles that 
corporations play in influencing the dissemination of information, especially when conflicts 
of interests arise. As Bagdikian points out, when information adversely affects corporate 
interests, the support that provides the economic base for the release of such 
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infonnation can be, and often is, quickly withdrawn. Bagdikian illustrates this point by 
example, including such occurrences as the cancellation of accounts by two cigarette 
companies (R. J. Reynolds and Brown & Williamson) with a firm which also produced 
anti-smoking advertisements. (ibid., 88~89) 
Citizenship in a Global Village 
A combination of the issues raised by both Postman and Bagdikian can be seen in 
an article concerning public policy and education entitled, "Steal this TV: How Media 
Literacy can Change the World." Don Adams and Arlene Golbard begin this article with 
the simple statement, "Democracy requires critical thinking." (Adams and Goldbard 1990, 
68) The article initially echoes Postman, citing the need for literacy within a democracy 
and claiming that literacy in the modern world must include media awareness "[t]o enter 
social and political debates as a full participant." (ibid.) Adams and Goldbard then 
connect this to Bagdikian's concerns with a brief swnmation of the problem as they see it. 
They state: 
The massive interlocking complex of business interests that make up the 
mainstream media have been allowed to develop pretty much as they wish, in the 
pursuit of commercial success. Meanwhile, the essential public issu~- the media 
role as our primary public forum, its tendency to erode democratic life-- has been 
pushed further and further into the background. (ibid.) 
There is no doubt that global communication has dramatically changed the way we view 
the world. \\'hat is perhaps less obvious is how such communication affects our society as 
a whole. While the present thesis addresses women's rights, one should remember the 
broad implications that the mass media holds for democracy and the world in general, 
whether in the realm of politics, education, and culture, or personal relations, attitudes and 
beliefs. 
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Making Decisions: Based on Fact or Fiction? 
Equally if not more alarming then the limited public awareness regarding world 
events is the knowledge that elected representatives may lack in forming opinions and 
making decisions which affect public interest. One example of such lack of knowledge, as 
well as reluctance to admit ignorance, was revealed by the hoax of Spy magazine in 
interviewing twenty new members to the United States House of Representatives in 1993 
about the role of the United States in the fictitious nation of''Freedonia." Under the guise 
ofbeing a New York radio talk show host, full,: reportedly "a series of innocuous 
questions" which then led to one of the following two questions: 
1) Do you approve of what we're doing to stop what's going on in Freedonia? 
2) Do you approve of what we're doing to stop ethnic cleansing in Freedonia? 
( Associated Press 13 January 1993, 3 [A]) 
Answers from the newly elected members of the House of Representatives ranged from 
voiced approval to evasiveness (e.g. "It's a different situation than the Middle East.") with 
one admission of not being "familiar" with the situation but that " ... a blind eye to it for the 
next 10 years is not the answer." (ibid.) 
What is truly unfortunate about such responses to questions about Freedonia, the 
media-created nation of the Marx Brothers' film Duck Soup, was perhaps summarized 
best by Jamie Malanowski, national editor of full,: magazine. He is quoted as saying: 
In talking to 20 people, not one of them said, 'Where?" or "What country?" or 
expressed irritation at a silly question. (ibid.) 
Under the conditions arranged by fun:, most individuals undoubtedly would not wish to be 
embarrassed by lacking knowledge of alleged world events. At the same time, however, 
our elected representatives have a duty to be informed in order to make decisions on state, 
national, and international matters which reflect the views and interests of the public. 
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Perceptions versus Realities 
John Y emma, foreign editor for the Boston Globe, provides some insight into 
these matters and the issue of the limited scope of information presented by the mass 
media in an article entitled, "Crisis of the Week." Emphasizing the brevity and intensity of 
the media's coverage of worldwide crises as they occur, Yemma draws a distinction 
between a crisis "as seen on TV" and an actual crisis. (Yemma 5 Februaiy 1995, 5[A]) 
He labels the former a ''virtual" crisis which dominates the media (and, thereby, public 
attention and concern) for approximately a week and then seems to disappear. Yemma 
describes a "real" crisis as follows: 
A real crisis is when real people starve and bleed for excmciatingly long periods of 
time and often without a hope or a prayer. A real crisis is ugly, intractable and 
hard to describe in a 20-second voice-over. You can find real crises in books and 
documentaries. It's pretty much what history has been about, at least up to the 
mid-1980s. (ibid., l[A]) 
Multiple examples such as Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, and Iraq are used to 
illustrate how the real crisis is forgotten once the vittual crisis (i.e. media attention) ends. 
Yemma notes that despite the intense coverage that these events received, in reality 
nothing ultimately changed. He observed in the beginning of 1995 that, 
... Somalia is still in the hands of warlords, ethnic cleansing grinds on in Bosnia, 
Saddam Hussein is still able to threaten Kuwait and his own people. (ibid., 5[A]) 
While Y emma applies his assertion that "TV News Enlarges Events, Then Shrinks Their 
Consequences" to wars or conflicts, this assertion also finds support in times of peace. 
Such support can be evidenced, for example, by examining the history of the women's 
rights movement, particularly when viewed as a quest for human rights. 
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It is one intention of the present analysis to reveal support for this hypothesis 
through an examination of the women's rights movement in the United States as including 
human rights. Specific emphasis is placed on one of the most significant yet obscure 
human rights documents designed to address a broad spectrum of women's issues which 
has been virtually excluded from public awareness and debate. Based on the findings of 
this analysis, Yemma's assertion concerning the impact of television on public awareness 
is thus expanded to include how the mass media, reference materials, and even certain 
"official" documents also can "enlarge events then shrink their consequences." (ibid.) 
Human Rights and the United Nations 
In beginning an analysis of women's rights as a human rights concern, it is helpful 
to provide a frame of reference through which such rights can be more fully understood. 
The principal body or organization which addresses human rights concerns and laws is the 
United Nations, formed dming the summer of 1945 in the wake of World War Il. The 
Charter of the United Nations was signed on June 26th of 1945 in San Francisco, with the 
expressed determination "to save succeeding generations from the scourge ofwar, .. . to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, .. . to establish conditions under which respect 
for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be 
maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." 
(United Nations 1978, 3) The Charter of the United Nations was ratified by the United 
States, having been passed by an oveIWhelming majority vote of the US Senate. 
Included among the stated pwvoses of the United Nations that relate to fostering 
and maintaining universal peace and security, is the third purpose which reads as follows: 
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To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. {ibid., 5) 
In the years following the creation of the United Nations, a variety of resolutions, 
declarations, and treaties were developed in order to achieve the humanitarian goals as 
stated above, beginning with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948. Subsequent treaties produced by the United Nations address a broad spectrum of 
global concerns, including slavery, racism, traffic in persons and prostitution, the rights of 
women and children, torture, the status of refugees, which grew out of the initial concerns 
to promote and protect international economic, social, cultural, civil, and political rights. 
The United States, however, has failed to become an official party to the majority 
of the human rights treaties produced by the United Nations despite active participation 
and the fact that the treaties address such pressing national concerns as the rights of 
women and children. Perhaps because treaties are classified as instruments of international 
law, domestic implications are minimized, not readily accessible to the public, ignored, or 
even misconstrued. Before accepting such a conclusion as to the embarrassing fate which 
human rights treaties historically have faced on the national level, however, it is necessary 
to assess the accuracy of this claim and the evidence upon which it may be based from a 
critical thinking perspective. 
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Women's Rights as Human Rights 
A strong argument can be made that the United States has failed to adequately 
address the issue of the rights of women both domestically and abroad by its failure to 
ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
also known as CEDAW and, at times, as simply the Women's Convention. CEDAW is a 
multilateral treaty of the United Nations which attempts to define the legal rights of 
women within the framework of universal human rights. As a binding international 
agreement, the ratification of this treaty could have substantive and far .. reaching impacts 
on the direction of law, particularly on the national level. 
The Constitution of the United States vests the President with the following 
authority with respect to treaties such as CEDAW: 
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur. (Constitution Article 
IT, section 2) 
In addition, Article VI of this cornerstone document of national law provides that: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. (ibid., Article VI) 
Briefly stated, the ratification of CED AW would necessarily lead to consideration of the 
principles and standards created by this treaty in the assessment of current ( as well as the 
potential implementation of future) domestic legislation and its constitutional validity as 
determined by the United States Supreme Court. 
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In conducting an analysis of the status of CED AW, few individuals seem 
knowledgeable and few references adequately explore this treaty, its history, or potential 
impacts on the rights of women in the United States. The treaty (included as Appendix A) 
consists of thirty articles divided into five parts. It is designed to address numerous social 
concerns ranging from conditions of poverty, education, and employment to guarantees of 
access to health services, childcare and other social guarantees, as well as protection 
against discrimination based on age, marital s-tatus, or maternity. 
The Fowth World Conference for Women 
In September of 1995, the United States joined a host of other countries in attending 
the United Nations World Conference for Women held in Beijing, China. This event 
marked the fomth official United Nations meeting on this topic in twenty years. For a brief 
period, this conference and the consideration of women's rights as human rights were in the 
spotlight of the mass media and topics of national interest. 
Unlike the conferences held before, the Beijing World Conference received front-
page headlines and was among the top-ranking stories in television newscasts. In the past, 
with rare exception, the UN Conferences for Women were placed among the accent pages 
of newspapers, such as in the "Style" section of the New York Times. As a result, prior 
patticipants increasingly understood the need to attract mainstream versus fringe or solely 
female-oriented media coverage. 
Although global communication technology existed which allowed access to 
mainstream coverage, past experience had shown that mere access was not enough to 
generate headline placement which might lead to serious public consideration of the issues. 
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In order for the issues addressed by the conference to reach a mainstream audience in the 
United States, attention needed to be drawn to both the national and international 
significance of human rights and the inclusion of women's rights as human rights. 
Significance is often conveyed symbolically in the realm of world politics, for example, by 
the attendance of high-ranking officials representing the United States. In the case of 
human rights, the most notable work in the field was performed by Eleanor Roosevelt who 
undertook the task of shaping "The Universal Declaration on Human Rights" of 1948 and 
served on the United Nations Commission during its formative years. 
Symbolism and Controversy 
Part of the attention given to the 1995 World Conference for Women can 
undoubtedly be attributed to the fact that for the first time, since the days of Eleanor 
Roosevelt, the United States delegation was to include the First Lady, Hillary Rodham 
Clinton. Prior to the opening of the Fourth World Conference for Women, however, 
China's arrest and detention of a Chinese-American citizen engendered an unanticipated 
national controversy. This event propelled the Fourth World Conference for Women into 
the headlines and provided a mainstream focus. 
In light of China's detention of an American citizen, participation in the World 
Conference by the United States and the First Lady were subject to uncertainty. Like the 
Iran hostage crisis more than fifteen years earlier, the detention of an American citizen by a 
foreign countty was widely reported and generated a national public outcry. Simply stated, 
this situation could well have precluded the United States from sending an official 
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delegation to Beijing, despite a remarkable interest in attending this World Conference 
expressed by numerous non-governmental human rights, social, and religious organizations. 
Harry Wu, the American citizen being held by China, was desc1ibed as a human 
rights activist " ... convicted of spying, posing as a government worker and illegally 
obtaining, buying and providing state secrets to foreigners" according to a quote from the 
Xinhua news agency. (Farrell 24 August 1995, 1) The article also noted that: 
House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole .. .led 
unsuccessful efforts by congressional Republicans to block Mrs. Clinton's trip, citing 
Wu's arrest and China's dismal human rights record. (ibid., 28) 
China expelled Wu before the conference began, however, and he returned to the United 
States without serving the imposed 15-year sentence. Wu's release prior to the start of the 
Fourth World Conference for Women removed the most immediate major obstacle to 
participation by the United States. 
Later John Farrell would report of Hillary Clinton: 
Though she had publicly announced her desire to go, she agreed with US foreign 
policymakers that she would not make the trip until after dissident Harry Wu had 
been released by the Chinese government. (Farrell 4 February 1996, 24) 
Despite continued political objections concerning China's human rights record, a delegation 
was sent to the Fourth World Conference for Women which, for the first time, included the 
First Lady. 
The Mass Media and Fragmentation of Issues 
A factor of mass media coverage is that it focuses on events occurring almost 
instantaneously. As a result, coverage of events is fragmented in such a way that potential 
significance is often missed. During the conference most of the mainstream media focused 
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on socio-cultural differences between the United States and China. This may account for 
the intense scrutiny of China's domestic policies as the host country, giving rise to specific 
allegations under the guise of general criticisms. 
Particular attention was paid to speeches made by Hillary Clinton which 
condemned practices such as forced abortion, sterilization, bride-burning and the 
devaluation of female children as associated with women's human rights. When viewed 
within a socio-cultural framework, however, some of her remarks tended to be interpreted 
as targeting China. The Boston Globe printed a response to Hillary Clinton's speech 
which was attributed to Chen Jian, described as a "spokesman" for China. ("Quotes of 
Note" 9 September 1995, 11) The statement read as follows: 
Some people from some countries made unwarranted remarks or criticism of other 
countries. We would like to caution these people to pay more attention to their 
own countries. (ibid.) 
Unfortunately, the controversy that resulted tended to mute significant issues and distract 
public attention away from factors that may be linked to such identified concerns. 
Media reports at the time failed, for example, to review events such as the delinking 
of human rights with United States economic policies toward China in the past. This policy 
decision was made in May of 1994 under reported pressure from American businesses. In 
brief, it allowed China to retain its Most Favored Nation trade status with the United States, 
according to a quote attributed to President Clinton, in so far as it "divorced the human 
rights dialogue from the trade issue with China." (Los Angeles Times 22 December 1995, 
17) In sum, without timely review, events which may have substantive impacts in areas 
such as domestic and international law or policy can be easily overlooked. It should also be 
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emphasized that even subsequent review neither guarantees the transmission of important 
information to the public nor that the factors which may have adversely affected such issues 
will be examined. 
The Problem of Omission 
Mrs. Clinton received substantial praise for her role in representing the United 
States at the Fourth World Conference for Women. A few repo1ters, however, were critical 
of the speeches she made while attending the conference. One author noted, for example: 
She might have admitted she comes from the only industrialized nation that has 
refused to ratify the 16-year-old lJN treaty on women's rights ... (Ehrenreich 18 
September 1995, 130) 
The Time magazine essay cited above, however, fails to even name or otherwise identify the 
United Nations treaty in question. 
This information is omitted is despite the fact that the ratification of this treaty could 
have broad social and legal implications for the domestic rights of American women. Thus, 
essayist Barbara Elu·enreich falls prey to her own criticism of omission on the part of Hillary 
Clinton. Despite the fact that Elu·enreich was one of the only commentators to note the 
existence of a treaty which addresses the rights of women, she neither informs the public of 
its identity nor does she discuss its potential significance if ratified by the United States. 
The treaty is the none other than the United Nations Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination Against Women, otherwise known as CEDAW 
to those familiar with the parlance of international human tights law. Over a twenty-year 
span of time and of all the documents produced by each of the four of the United Nations 
World Conferences for Women, however, CEDAW is the only document produced 
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bestowed with the power to bind member nations to fulfill its provisions in accordance 
with international law. CED AW is also currently the sole document in the form of a 
binding international treaty that addresses a broad spectrum of women's issues with 
potentially far-reaching domestic impacts. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE UNITED NATIONS DECADE FOR WOMEN 
Three International World Conferences for Women: Equality, Development, and 
Peace preceded the 1995 World Conference for Women held in Beijing. Each of the three 
conferences was a part of what was officially designated by the United Nations as the 
Decade for Women. Each was also disrupted to varying degrees by foreign policy issues. 
The first, held in Mexico City in 1975, signaled the official observance of the United 
Nations International Women's Year and the beginning of United Nations Decade for 
Women. 
In The Annals of America, the issue of women's constitutional and international 
rights during the mid-1970s received special consideration, consisting of an overview of 
the Equal Rights Amendment as a domestic concern and the address given by the US 
delegate to participants at the First World Conference for Women. The text provided by 
this historical series is comprised of two selections and a pictorial insert with editorial 
commentary. The first selection is entitled ''Pros and Cons of the Equal Rights 
Amendment" and consists of a debate, argued in favor by Elaine Gordon as a member of 
the Florida House of Representatives in 1975 and opposed by Trudy Camping, a former 
state senator of Arizona. (The Annals of America: 1974-1976 1977, 150) 
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The second selection is an address by Patricia Hutar as a United States delegate 
and member of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women which was read 
to participants to the First World Conference For Women in Mexico City, 1975. It is 
entitled "International Women's Year" and was originally published in the Department of 
State Bulletin of August 18, 1975. (ibid., 159) After offering a greeting from First Lady 
Betty Ford, Hutar spoke both to national and irtternational incentives of the United States 
with respect to the conference goals of equality, development, and peace. She also made 
note that the United States introduced a resolution to the United Nations calling for a 
World Conference and promised the commitment of the United States in support of the 
conference document entitled "World Plan of Action." (ibid., 159-163) 
The third component included in the series is called ''Women's World." It consists 
of a collection of photographs with commentary summarizing the interest in women's 
rights during the 1970s. The United Nations World Conference of 1975 is included in 
both, designated at the time as the ''World Conference for International Women's Year" 
and special mention is made of the "World Plan of Action." (ibid., 155) 
While the pictorial commentary notes that there was an '<upsurge of interest in 
women's rights" around the globe, the summary of the conference itself is primarily based in 
the conflicts which arose between member states of the United Nations. (ibid.) The editors 
report and conclude: 
There was little unanimity at the conference, however, because Communist and 
''third world" countries were intent upon making a "new international economic 
order" and liberation from "capitalist imperialism" the leading priorities. The 
condition and needs of women thus took second place to these issues. (ibid.) 
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Though the introductory note to Patricia Hutar's address to the First World 
Conference for Women sheds some light on the outcome of the event for the United States, 
nevertheless, it remains ambiguous. In brief, no mention is made as to whether the United 
States ultimately supported the "World Plan of Action" as promised, but only that it was 
adopted. As a result, if one fails to distinguish the ''World Plan of Action" from the United 
Nations declaration also voted upon at the conference, one might conclude that the United 
States voted against the ten-year plan. Such confusion may result simply from the closing 
sentence of the introductory note which omits referring to the ''World Plan of Action" 
conference document and offers the following summation: 
Because of numerous disagreements the United States delegation voted against the 
conference declaration. (ibid., 159) 
No mention is made of the United Nations International Decade for Women, despite the 
fact that this would provide a context of continuity to an otherwise fragmented presentation 
of the history of women's rights over the course of twenty years. 
Although a brief and partly inaccurate description of the United Nations Decade for 
Women appears within a pictorial commentary in the subsequent volume of The Annals of 
America: 1977-1986, only the Third World Conference for Women of 1985 is mentioned. 
(The Annals of America 1987, following page 208) This overview, entitled "The New 
Women," entirely omits any reference to the Second World Conference for Women of 1980 
held in Copenhagen which, as a result, is not identified as being a part of the Decade for 
Women. Thus, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (despite its potential impact on both domestic and international law and policy) and 
any discussion as to its content is conspicuously absent. 
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The 1977 National Women's Conference 
In the United States, International Women's Year of 1975 and the First World 
Conference for Women in Mexico City was followed by the National Women's Conference 
of 1977 in Houston, Texas. This precedent-setting domestic event was later described by 
Gloria Steinem as a "belated Constitutional Convention for women." (Steinem 1994, 202) 
The description continued: 
Inspired by the United Nations' International Women's Year in 1975, it was funded 
by congressional legislation written by Congresswomen Bella Abzug and Patsy 
Mink, and was made up of conferences in each state and territory, some with as 
many as twenty thousand participants each. Out of those deliberations came 
proposals for a National Plan of Action, a list of core issues and actions crucial to 
equality for women, as well as two thousand delegates who were elected to decide 
on its form in Houston. That final three-day conference turned out to be the most 
economically, racially, and geographically representative gathering this country had 
ever seen. (ibid.) 
The Houston Comerence was the first national forum of its kind, having been 
mandated and funded by Congress. The conference's resultant National Plan of Action 
proved quite ambitious, addressing a broad spectrum of issues confronting American 
women. The National Plan of Action noted that the conference included delegates from the 
fifty states (as well as from the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, 
American Samoa, and the Trust Territories). In addition, the National Plan attempted to 
connect the history of American women by issuing a broad and inclusive ''Declaration of 
American Women" which, for example, linked the 1977 Houston event to the first national 
gathering of women at the Seneca Falls Convention of 1848 held more than a century 
before. (National Plan of Action 1977, 1-3) 
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The National Plan of Action 
As needed and welcomed as the 1977 Houston Conference may have been, 
however, many of its aspirations were never fully realized. Indeed, one important mandate 
of the National Plan of Action was the formation of a committee which would "take steps 
to provide for the convening of a Second National Women's Conference to assess the 
progress made toward achieving the recommendations of this 1977 conference.'' (ibid.) 
Although Steinem notes that a National Advisory Committee for Women was established, 
she asserts it soon faced political pressures, such that members " .. . found themselves 
operating under a new executive order, with a limited mandate that prevented them from 
advocating the plan in Congress." (Steinem 1994, 202-203) 
Although a Second National Conference was never organized, not all of the 
recommendations of 1977 were ignored. Regarding events of the United Nations, the 
National Plan of Action recommended that the United States: 
... give vigorous support to the goals of the UN Decade for Women, Equality, 
Development, and Peace ... give financial support to Decade activities 
and ... participate fully in the 1980 mid-Decade World Conference to review progress 
toward targets set in the World Plan of Action adopted unanimously by the World 
Conference oflnternational Women's Year, 1975. (National Plan of Action, 18-9) 
Indeed, the second World Conference for Women of 1980 listed the United States among 
more then one-hundred registered delegations to the event. 
The Mid-Decade World Conference for Women 
The second World Conference of the Decade for Women opened in Copenhagen 
in 1980, during a presidential election year in the United States and amidst heightened 
political controversy at home and abroad. According to an article by Georgia Dullea in 
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the New York Times, the mid-Decade Conference for Women was originally scheduled to 
be held in Iran but this offer was withdrawn after the Shah was overthrown. (Dullea 14 
July 1980, 12(B]) Reporter Frank J. Prial supports this describing, 
About 1,000 delegates from 118 countries have gathered here, including groups 
from Iran, where the conference originally was to be held. Iran withdrew its bid to 
hold the conference after the Islamic revolution of February 1979. (Prial 15 July 
1980, IO[A]) 
Prial goes on to note: 
The conference is officially discussing politics for the first time. The United Nations 
General Assembly, which sponsored the meeting, asked the delegates to consider 
three specific situations: the effect of apartheid on the women of Southern Africa; 
the situation of Palestinian women inside and outside the occupied territories, and 
the plight of women refugees all over the world. (ibid.) 
Later, political analysts would point to such upheavals as occurred in Iran as 
significant events, not only regarding the level of controversy during the Copenhagen 
Conference, but as events that even affected the presidential election in the US. In 
particular, the failure to rescue American hostages held at the time can be asserted to have 
been a notable factor in President Carter's defeat in his 1980 bid for re-election. With 
respect to apartheid as a situation submitted for formal consideration, the United States 
continued under subsequent Administrations to refuse to apply economic trade sanctions 
against South Africa. In addition, regarding the outcome of the Second World 
Conference for Women of 1980, the equation of Zionism with racism proved to be an 
insurmountable obstacle for the United States. 
As was discussed in the case of Harry Wu's detention prior to the Fourth World 
Conference for Women, the timing, location, and nature of world events contribute heavily 
to the tone and content of media reports concerning such meetings. One need only recall 
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the relationship between the United States and Iran in 1980 and how this was presented in 
the mass media. The mid-decade World Conference for Women would have taken place in 
Iran during the American hostage crisis. Relocating the World Conference to Copenhagen 
in 1980 effectively avoided increased media focus on the hostage situation, though tensions 
with the Middle East were still widely reported. This crisis, which remained dominant in 
domestic news for over a year, most likely would have precluded participation by the 
United States entirely if Iran had served as the host country. 
Dullea's report explained how Copenhagen was chosen as the alternative site after 
Iran withdrew. In fact, Denmark was reported to be the sole volunteer offering to host the 
events of the mid-Decade World Conference for Women. It was also noted that the cost to 
the new host country was "an estimated $3 million to sponsor the two-and-a-half week 
conference." (Dullea 14 July 1980, 12 [B]) 
Indeed, this expense, coupled with additional political tensions and an apparent 
reluctance of other member states of the United Nations to serve as the host country, makes 
the fact that the conference was held at all somewhat remarkable. Despite such 
unanticipated obstacles, the conference was held on schedule and a delegation was sent to 
represent the interests of the United States. Indeed, participation by the United States may 
reflect an unparalleled level of commitment of under the Carter Administration to maintain 
an international dialogue on the human rights of women. It is unfortunate that this dialogue 
was to be virtually silenced for the duration of the United Nations Decade for Women and 
its themes of Equality, Development, and Peace. 
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Official Foreign Policy 
Foreign policy is an ongoing process which provides a general context for 
addressing international events and vice versa. It is inevitable that conflicts between 
countries will occur which can define the official stance taken by a delegation to a world 
conference and how this is presented by the media. This seems particularly evident when 
the issues to be addressed are related to actions or practices associated with human rights. 
The most prevalent official foreign policy issues confronting the United States 
throughout the Decade for Women were apartheid and the equation of Zionism with racism. 
Under mounting tension during the Mexico City World Conference for Women in 1975, 
specific references to these issues were successfully removed from the official "World Plan 
of Action" conference document. (Sciolino 10 July 19851 lO[C]) As mentioned previously, 
however, according to The Annals of Americ~ these issues were incorporated into the 
United Nations conference declaration. Compounding the problem, soon after the First 
World Conference for Women came to a close, the United Nations formally adopted a 
resolution equating Zionism with racism. 
Georgia Dullea offered a retrospective account of the 1975 First World Conference 
for Women at the opening of the 1980 United Nations World Conference of the 
International Decade for Women: Equality, Development, and Peace. Dullea wrote of the 
prior conference and its declaration: 
It was also in Mexico that Zionism was first linked to racism, in the Declaration of 
Mexico Document, signed by most delegations there over the protest of the Zionist 
states and Israel. (Dullea 14 July 1980, 12[B]) 
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Dullea continued her contemporaneous report in 1980 by noting of the Zionism issue that, 
At a news conference today, Lucille M. Mair, the secretary general of the 
conference, was asked to comment on "fears" that the time devoted to the agenda 
item would "overshadow" the conference. (ibid.) 
Dullea observed that the United States was one of a few nations that publicly 
objected to the agenda item. Dullea also described Sarah Weddington, who was one of the 
two presiding delegates, as "stressing the country's commitment against any resolution" 
which would condemn Israel. (ibid.) Needless to say, the result of this general foreign 
policy stance played an unanticipated role for the United States in the Decade for Women. 
The 1980 World Conference for Women in Copenhagen produced a conference 
document entitled ''Programme of Action" and was reported to have been approved by a 
vote of94 to 4, with 22 nations abstaining. (UN Monthly Chronicle 1980, 54) The political 
tensions, though similar to those previously encountered in Mexico City, were intensified in 
1980 by the United Nations resolution which officially equated Zionism with racism. Thus, 
the final outcome of the second World Conference for Women proved to be ambiguous for 
the United States. 
Contrary to outcome of the first World Conference for Women of 1975 held in 
Mexico City, the 1980 United Nations World Conference produced a global agenda 
addressing the status and rights of women which did not include participation by the United 
States. In brief, the United States found itself in the awkward position of being among the 
four nations voting against the endorsement of the plan produced by the second World 
Conference for Women. The United States, along with Israel, Canada, and Australia, were 
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the only four countries in 1980 which failed to join the majority of the United Nations 
participants supporting the plan. (ibid.) 
In different article entitled, ''UN Decade for Women: Can US Save Its Role?" 
Georgia Dullea quoted the following reaction: 
''This is the first time," said Sarah Weddington, co-chairman of the United States 
delegation to the United Nations World Conference of the Decade for Women, "that 
we have had a decade in which we started out participating and then, at mid-decade, 
we have had to vote against the entire program. We didn't expect that this was 
going to happen." (Dullea 9 August 1980, 44) 
The issues of both apartheid and the equation of Zionism with racism were incorporated 
into the official document produced by the Second World Conference for Women. This 
inclusion effectively blocked the United States in the middle of the International UN Decade 
for Women from participating in any event regarding women's issues worldwide ifit was 
associated with the 1980 conference document, ''Programme of Action." 
This "limited role" was acknowledged by Dullea in a description attributed to 
Koryne Horbal, the representative of United States to the United Nations Commission on 
the Status of Women in 1980. Dullea wrote: 
Whenever a document referring to the Copenhagen plan of action appears, [Horbal] 
said, the United States must either have the reference removed or disassociate itself 
from the program in question. (ibid.) 
Under such conditions, which might be likened to removing select pages from a history 
book, it is easy to understand why American women would be uniformed, both to the 
historical context of what was simply labeled by the mass media in 1995 as the ''Fourth 
World Conference for Women" as well as the existence ofCEDAW as an international 
treaty designed to address women's rights as human rights. 
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Ending the Decade for Women 
In 1985, the International UN Decade for Women came to a close in Nairobi, Kenya 
with the completion of the Third World Conference for Women. The United States 
delegation to the Nairobi World Conference included Alan Keyes as Ambassador to the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1985. Keyes was appointed to the 
delegation by former President Ronald Reagan, as was Reagan's daughter Maureen. 
Maureen Reagan was reported to be the "head" of the delegation. She was also described 
in relation to Keyes, however, as merely the ''titular head" of the United States emissaries. 
(Loye 1985, 27) 
Like the conferences before it, the event was riddled with political strife and 
controversy, once again faltering over the foreign policy issues of apartheid and the 
equation of Zionism with racism. Perhaps the most significant difference, however, was 
that Americans attending the ''unofficial" conference called "Forum '85" found themselves 
at odds with their own official delegation from the United States. This was particularly true 
with respect to three domestic (as opposed to international) issues: 1) the 1977 National 
Plan of Action, 2) the failure of the United States to ratify the ERA, and 3) legalized 
abortion, each of which engendered intense disagreement, at times within the delegation 
itself (Sciolino 20 July 1985, 48 [Al]) 
The United States and the National Plan of Action 
A day after the opening of the Nairobi World Conference Ambassador Keyes 
publicly criticized the domestic agenda of the United States as established in Houston by the 
1977 National Conference. According to the article by Elaine Sciolino, Keyes distressed 
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American participants of the corresponding ''unofficial" conference called "Forum '85" 
with his criticism of the 1977 National Plan of Action. During a press conference Keyes 
was reported to have said, 
Well, you know, one would have to raise some questions about how much the 
Houston Plan of Action represented the women of the United States. (Sciolino 20 
July 1985, 48 (Al]) 
Reactions from the Forum '85 participants cited by Sciolino included two women of 
particular note. The first was from Bella Abzug, who was described by Sciolino as a former 
Representative from New York and presiding officer of the 1977 National Women's 
Conference in Houston. Abzug was quoted as saying of the conference, "It was one of the 
most representative meetings ever held in our country," and, noted of the document it 
produced that, ''The Plan of Action was voted in by the democratically assembled 
delegates." (ibid.) 
The second was from Arvonne S. Fraser, who Sciolino depicted as a senior fellow at 
the University of Minnesota's Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs and a delegate to both of 
the two prior UN World Conferences of the Decade for Women. Fraser was quoted as 
having stated: 
The Plan of Action was the cumulative efforts [sic] of 50 states. American women 
at the state, national and local level have been proceeding to carry it out and have 
even moved beyond it. Has Ambassador Keyes read it? (ibid.) 
As an outgrowth of the Nairobi Conference, Fraser would move on to direct the then 
newly-founded International Women's Rights Action Watch (or IWRAW). In the next 
decade, Fraser would also testify before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 
support of international women's rights as an area of human rights concern and, later, would 
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become a United States representative to the United Nations as a member of the 
Commission on the Status of Women. 
Sciolino observed in her report, that to the Forum' 85 participants, "the United 
States delegation represented the views of the Reagan Administration on women's issues" 
and made specific mention legal, political and moral issues of debate. (ibid.) Speaking in 
general to these issues, Keyes allegedly remarked: 
I think that the American people have made it pretty clear that their support of 
President Reagan and his policies is fairly strong, and despite the usual efforts that 
have gone on within our constitutional system to get them to change their minds, 
they were rather resounding in their lack of desire to do so. (ibid.) 
Certainly this position can be interpreted, in part, as a comment on the failure of the United 
States to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment, a hope that was expressed five years earlier 
by President Carter and the delegation to the 1980 mid-Decade World Conference for 
Women held in Copenhagen. It should not, however, be construed as a statement reflecting 
public opinion concerning the ratification ofCEDAW, particularly in light of the absence of 
presidential endorsement needed to facilitate public testimony and Senate action. 
The Failure of the Equal Rights Amendment 
It is of note that the circumstances of the women's rights movement at the time of 
the Copenhagen World Conference in 1980 were quite different from those of 1985 with 
respect to the Equal Rights Amendment, or ERA. After a half of a century of being 
introduced into Congress every year since 1923, the ERA was passed by both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate in 1970. In 1980, as a result of an extension of the deadline 
for ratification by Congress signed by President Carter, the fate of the Equal Rights 
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Amendment rested in the hands of a minority of states which had not yet voted in favor of 
its passage. 
By the time of the Nairobi World Conference in 1985, however, the deadline for 
ratification had expired and the ERA had fallen three states shy of becoming national law. 
Therefore, in 1985 supporters of the ERA faced not simply its passage by a few states but, 
rather, initiating the entire process of congressional and state approval all over again. In 
contrast, as the Second World Conference for Women began in July of 1980, the domestic 
politics of the United States were in the midst of heated controversy concerning the Equal 
Rights Amendment, in addition to the issue of legalized abortion. 
In this respect, the view expressed by Alan Keyes in 1985 that the American people 
were "rather resounding in their lack of desire" to amend the Constitution is open to 
question. The same would be true of his rejection of the 1977 National Plan of Action 
based upon the generalization that it might not represent the women of the United States. 
At the same time Maureen Reagan, acting in her capacity as the officially designated head of 
the 1985 United States delegation to Nairobi, rather ironically contended that "all legal 
barriers to political equality [had] long since been eliminated in the United States." (ibid.) 
The Abortion Controversy and Domestic Rights 
Over the years, concepts traditionally included in the quest for women's rights, 
such as affordable child care, maternity leave, and equal pay for equal work, among 
countless others, were largely overshadowed by the issue of legalized abortion. In 1973, 
the US Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision in the case of Roe v. Wade which, 
for the first time in the history of the United States, granted the legal right to abortion 
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under the rights of privacy recognized by the Supreme Court. In the wake of this 
decision, the abortion controversy grew to unprecedented heights in national debate. 
This controversy has continued to grow to the extent that from 1980 to the 
present, abortion has served as a dividing line between political parties, as evidenced by 
the pro-life Republican and pro-choice Democratic election platforms. Since that time, 
our nation has had to come to grips with events such as the bombing of family planning 
clinics that also provided abortion as a health care service, the harassment of patients, 
employees, and ultimately, the vigilante-style wounding or deaths of individuals working 
as receptionists, security guards, and physicians. While these extreme acts were generally 
committed by individuals proclaiming a pro-life ideology, publicly these actions have been 
denounced by official pro-life organizations. 
Although within the context of the World Conferences for Women the abortion 
controversy did not erupt on the international level until 1985, it can be asserted that in 
1980 the United States symbolically portrayed a pro-choice position in Copenhagen. This 
assertion is supported by the fact that Sarah Weddington, who was selected to head the 
United States delegation with Donald McHenry, was none other than the lawyer who had 
successfully argued the case of Roe v. Wade of 1973. Later, Weddington personally 
documented the growth of the abortion controversy in the years following Roe v. Wade 
and made note of the 1980 Republican platform pledge which she described as including, 
'the appointment of new justices to the Supreme Court who respect traditional 
family values and the sanctity of all innocent human life.' (Weddington 1992, 197) 
If commitment to this platform pledge is sustained, nothing less than a broader view in the 
evaluation of jurisprudence and, ultimately, the balance of power within the United States 
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Supreme Court is at issue. In essence, abortion would be an issue with the power to 'lip 
the balance" in Senate confirmation proceedings for nominees seeking appointment to the 
US Supreme Court, based soley upon their views as to whether or not abortion should be 
allowed under federal law. 
International Pro-Life Politics 
In 1985, the End of the Decade World Conference for Women in Nairobi was 
attended by a United States delegation representing the Reagan Administration. In 
keeping with the Republican party platform, Reagan continued to espouse a pro-life 
position throughout the two terms of his presidency. Unfortunately, to the preclusion of a 
variety of other important issues related to the rights of women, such as the rights 
included in CEDAW, the national debate over legalized abortion was raised to an 
international level in such a way that it engendered division instead of constructive 
discussion. 
For the official delegation to Nairobi, Sciolino reported that the division over the 
issue of abortion occurred in a "late-breaking" fashion, with wire services informing some 
of the delegates ( well after the fact), of a move taken by the Reagan Administration to 
criminalize abortion on the opening day of the Third World Conference for Women. 
Despite divisions created between the '\inofficial" Forum '85 participants and the official 
United States delegation (resulting from incidents such as the criticism voiced by 
Ambassador Keyes concerning the 1977 National Plan of Action and the Equal Rights 
Amendment), Sciolino reported the reaction to the Reagan Administration's request to 
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the Supreme Court concerning abortion as one possible source of "common ground" 
between the two groups. She characterized this reaction as being: 
... distress at the decision of the Reagan Administration to ask the Supreme Court 
to overrule its 1973 decision on abortion on the grounds that its principles are so 
sweeping as to block state and local efforts to limit abortion. (Sciolino 20 July 
1985, 48 [AI]) 
At the non-governmental Forum '85 conference, heated exchanges were reported 
in an earlier article by Elaine Sciolino, entitled "A Clash on Family Planning At Kenya 
Parley on Women" and dated July 16, 1985, the second day of the official End of the 
Decade World Conference. (Sciolino 17 July 1985, l[C]) Briefly summarized, during a 
family planning workshop offered at the Forum '8 5 gathering, the "unofficial" World 
Conference participants found themselves forced into one of two categories, described by 
Sciolino as: 
... those at the conference who assert that women must control their own bodies 
and a small but well-organized group that calls abortion murder and any artificial 
method of contraception "abortiofacienf' -- "abortion-making." (ibid.) 
Sciolino additionally pointed to parallel conflicts between "industrialized" and 
"developing" nations with respect to both accessibility as well as opposing cultural views 
regarding both abortion and birth control measures. Sciolino further reported that the 
"primary target" of the pro-life group was the "International Planned Parenthood 
Federation." (ibid., 1,1 l[C]) 
Based on Scio lino's description, the tone and content of the exchanges between 
the pro-life and pro-choice groups were oppositional versus constructive in nature. For 
example, Sciolino quoted an official of the American Life League, James L. Deger, 
denouncing Planned Parenthood as "racist" and ''bigoted." (ibid., 1 l[C]) Deger was 
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reported to allege further that, "Basically, all their activities very easily fall within the 
definition of genocide." (ibid., l l[C]) 
Of particular note, the only mention of CEDA W made in all of the reports 
provided by the New York Times in 1985 was in the article addressing abortion. Sciolino 
wrote at the time: 
The antiabortion groups also oppose the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination in All Forms [sic] Against Women, which the United States has 
signed, asserting that it concentrates on placing women in the work force and fails 
to recognize men's role in procreation. (ibid.) 
It would seem that as a result of omission and selective reporting that the significance of 
CEDAW, as a binding international treaty specifically designed to address a multitude of 
women's issues as human rights, was successfully diminished in 1985 within the context of 
pro-life politics. This is particularly distressing, not only because CED AW was designed 
to be "abortion neutral," but also because such characterizations tend to distort public 
perceptions of issues through the use of fallacy. In sum, employing inflammatory 
emotional appeals, with total disregard to standards of critical thinking, serves only to 
prevent the public from being informed and precludes rational debate of the actual issues. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 
On July 17, 1980, at the mid-decade World Conference for Women in Copenhagen, 
the United States was reported to have signed the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women. This multi-lateral human rights treaty of the 
United Nations, also known as CEDAW, is composed ofa comprehensive series of 
resolutions which, in the case of the United States, has the potential to legally define and 
enhance the rights of American women. Such definition, grounded in the constitutional 
powers of the President and Senate, would essentially mandate the assessment of women as 
a disenfranchised group and provide potential avenues for redress if discrimination is found 
to exist. 
The United States played a key role in drafting this document, the foundation of 
which dates back to the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women of 1967 and beyond. Despite years of active participation, however, the 
United States has never become a,n official party to CED AW under the guidelines 
established by the United Nations. As is the case for all treaties transmitted by a President, 
two-thirds of the Senate must give its advice and consent before CED AW can be ratified 
and incorporated into national law. In addition, in order for the United States to be 
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recognized by the United Nations as an official party to this treaty, it must be submitted to 
the UN Secretary-General. 
As the delegation for the United States departed for the Second World Conference 
for Women, President Carter issued a statement on July 11, 1980 which read, in part, as 
follows: 
I am proud to authorize Sarah Weddington to sign, on behalf of the United States, 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
Following the signing ceremony in Copenhagen on July 17, the Convention will be 
subjected to the normal constitutional processes of the United States. (US President 
1980, 1336) 
Weddington's role was that of''Presidential Assistant." She co-chaired the delegation to 
Copenhagen together with the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Donald F. 
McHenry. (ibid.) 
CEDA W and the Equal Rights Amendment 
The day before CED AW was to be signed, the New York Times carried a report 
which listed an additional qualification regarding signature by the United States. The article 
stated: 
Sarah Weddington, co-chairman of the American delegation, said the United States 
could not sign the United Nations convention on the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women until at least 3 8 states had approved the equal rights 
amendment to the constitution. (Prial 16 July 1980, 3 [A]) 
Two days later, however, the New York Times carried another article by the same reporter 
which covered the historic July 17th ceremony. It read as follows: 
The United States joined 52 other nations tonight in signing the United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women .... Signing for the United States was Sarah Weddington .. .. (Prial 18 July 
1980, 4 [B]) 
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Compounding the confusion generated by these two articles, was a letter to the New 
York Times regarding CEDAW. It was dated July 16, 1980, and published on July 23, 
1980. Citing the article of July 16, the letter reiterated the alleged ERA "qualification" and 
was printed without editorial comment or clarification. It began by stating: 
Probably few realized the United States cannot sign the United Nations 
convention ... until 3 8 states have approved the Equal Rights Amendment to the 
Constitution. (McDermott 23 July 1980, 20[A]) 
Critical Thinking versus Logic 
In the first 1980 newspaper item cited above, it is asserted that the United States 
was unable to sign CEDA W because the Equal Rights Amendment had not been ratified. 
From the standpoint oflogic, since the United States had not ratified the ERA, one might 
conclude that Weddington could not have signed the convention as was subsequently 
reported. On the basis of the first report, the principles oflogic can be employed to reduce 
the argument into a causal, if-then form of reasoning which might read as follows: 
If the US signed CEDAW, then the ERA was ratified. 
The ERA was not ratified. 
Therefore, CEDAW was not signed. 
This argument is most clearly reflected in the letter to the editor of the New York 
Times. Although this argument is clearly valid, it is not necessarily sound because it may 
contain a false premise. Whereas logic assists in structuring arguments and detecting 
fallacies, it is not interchangeable with critical thinking. While from the standpoint of logic 
the identification of a false premise is sufficient to complete one's analysis, this is not the 
case with respect to critical thinking. 
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Exploring the realm of logic, three possible conclusions can be formulated. They 
are as follows: 
1) The United States could not and, therefore, did not sign the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
2) The United States could and did indeed sign CEDA W. 
3) The United States could have signed CEDAW but did not. 
Of all of these possible conclusions, however, none resolve the inconsistencies between the 
accounts found in the New York Times. 
Unlike logic, critical thinking goes beyond identifying false premises and seeks 
explanations when inconsistencies are encountered. In this respect, the identification of a 
false premise might be viewed as the starting point for critical analysis. Thus, in order to 
meet the demands of both logic and critical thinking it is necessary to determine whether or 
not CEDAW was or was not signed. Beyond making this determination, from a critical 
thinking perspective questions of why, to what end, and on the basis of what evidence guide 
one's analysis and interpretation of inconsistencies encountered. 
Exploring the Problem Space 
Before moving on to determining whether CEDAW was signed, it may be helpful to 
examine some of the questions that would arise in beginning a critical thinking analysis. In 
each case, observations and judgments relevant to these questions should be clearly noted. 
For example, one might begin with the observation that the statement attributed to 
Weddington does not appear as a direct quotation. Is it possible then that Weddington was 
simply misquoted? Did either Weddington or the reporter have a reason to distort the 
facts? Could there be problem with the reliability of the source of information, in this case 
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being newspaper articles, when used as definitive, factual evidence? Is it possible, for 
example, that Weddington, the reporter, or perhaps the editor mistakenly identified 
CEDAW instead of the Programme of Action as the conference document that the United 
States was compelled to reject? 
Working from the assumption that CEDAW was signed, it would indeed seem 
possible that the reporter may have misinterpreted and subsequently misrepresented 
Weddington's statement about CEDAW. Such an error could result from either a simple 
misidentification or could have resulted from a more complex misunderstanding of the law. 
It is doubtful that the reporter would have reason to distort the facts, particularly since the 
same individual wrote the subsequent article stating that CEDAW had been signed by Sarah 
Weddington on behalf of the United States. The reporter, however, may have lacked the 
legal knowledge of the process by which the United States becomes an official party to a 
multilateral treaty. If this was the case, the statement regarding the inability to sign 
CED AW may have been intended to encompass its transmission to and approval by the 
Senate as well as its submission by the President to the United Nations Secretary•General. 
Any error may well thus have been simply linguistic or hermeneutic in nature or lacking in 
scope with respect to explaining a domain-specific, legal, or official process. 
On the one hand, ifWeddington's statement was accurately reported, one would 
need to assess whether Weddington had reason to distort the truth, ifin fact the truth was 
distorted. As a delegate for the United States and prominent lawyer concerned with the 
rights of women, it would be highly improbable that Weddington was not thoroughly 
briefed regarding President Carter's position and intent with respect to CEDAW. While it 
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may be possible that Weddington's statement was an eleventh hour appeal for the 
ratification of the ERA, a misrepresentation of such magnitude would undoubtedly be at 
great cost, both to her career and personal reputation. 
On the other hand, it may have been the case that Weddington was informed that the 
President would not seek the advice and consent or the Senate unless the ERA was ratified. 
President Carter made no mention of such a condition when he authorized Weddington to 
sign CEDAW on the behalf of the United States. It must be remembered, however, that the 
absence of evidence cannot be used as proof that this was or was not the case. (Weddle 
1978, 27) 
Missing Pages 
In the fall of 1992, Sarah Weddington published a book about her career entitled A 
Question of Choice. Included in this book is Weddington's personal account of her 1977 
transition to Washington and appointment within the Carter Administration. Weddington 
recalled the thoughts which led her to accept a position in the United States Department of 
Agriculture as follows: 
I began to think of that wider world I had always wanted to explore and the bigger 
levers of power in Washington, levers that I thought could be used to advance the 
position of women. (Weddington 1992, 187) 
Weddington briefly discusses her first meeting with the President in 1977 and the 
subsequent offer she received a few months later to join the White House staff. 
Weddington describes her appointment with enthusiasm and writes, 
My White House job, as special assistant and then assistant to the president, was the 
most exciting I have ever had. (ibid., 193) 
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Weddington also described herself as "the point person for any issue of special 
interest to women" and writes of her excitement when the President extended the deadline 
for the Equal Rights Amendment, as well as of her disappointment when it failed to be 
ratified. (ibid., 194) Almost inexplicably, however, Weddington makes no mention of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, or of her 
role in 1980 at the United Nations mid-Decade World Conference for Women held in 
Copenhagen. In brief, Weddington's book fails to offer direct testimony in 1992 to 
corroborate or refute any claim that CEDAW was or was not signed. 
Broadening the Search Parameters 
In order to adequately answer the questions raised regarding the status of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1980, it is 
necessary to broaden the search parameters in order to reasonably support or refute the 
accuracy of any conclusions that might be drawn. This extension is necessary both in logic 
and the critical thinking process, especially in light ofWeddington's subsequent omission of 
relevant information concerning this issue. Of note is that any attempt to draw a conclusion 
on the basis of the limited information presented would be purely speculative. 
The directions from which a critical thinking analysis can proceed are variable, 
particularly when contending with complex and ill-defined problems. One might begin 
expanding the data base, for example, by gathering more information from additional 
newspaper reports, writing to government offices, or writing to individuals such as Sarah 
Weddington herself In this particular instance, such directional choices rendered 
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interesting results. This can be shown in the examination of other accounts regarding the 
status of this comprehensive human rights treaty. 
At the time of the 1980 United Nations mid-Decade World Conference for Women, 
one newspaper report clearly distinguished the Programme of Action from CEDAW. In 
addition, the article explained the rejection of the Programme of Action by the United 
States and three other member states of the United Nations. Offering the following 
description ofCEDAW, which lends support to the assertion that this document was indeed 
signed, Georgia Dullea wrote: 
Mrs. Weddington and others are more sanguine on the chances for Senate 
ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, which has been signed by 65 nations and which was 
viewed by many American delegates as the only positive achievement of the fiercely 
politicized conference. Since the convention is a separate document, not part of the 
plan that includes the anti-Zionist language, a good argument could be made for its 
ratification, they said. (Dullea 9 August 1980, 44) 
Unfortunately, despite being offered by a different reporter, this description does not 
resolve the problem of the reliability of information since it leads directly back to statements 
made by Sarah Weddington and anonymous "others." 
A Decade Later 
In 1990, an article entitled, "UN Women's Rights Convention, 10 Years Old, Gets 
Mixed Review" appeared in the New York Times as a "special report" from the United 
Nations. The report highlights three specific points. The first addresses the status of 
CEDA W within the body of the United Nations. Second, the report makes note of a three-
day seminar as an event designed to evaluate and increase public awareness as to the 
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existence of this treaty. Lastly, the report offers a description of the domestic status of 
CEDAW in 1990 with respect to the United States. 
Accordingly, it is related that, the ''United Nations Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, was adopted by the General Assembly in 
December 1979" and that "101 countries had ratified the treaty" as of January 22, 1990. 
(''UN Women's Rights Convention, 10 Years Old, Gets Mixed Review" 24 January 1990, 
2[A]) While offering a description of this document as "an international bill of rights for 
women" the report notes of its signatories that "few had made any significant efforts to 
eliminate discrimination against women." (ibid.) This being the case, the committee 
established to monitor the impacts of the treaty was reported to call for greater emphasis to 
be placed on establishing and protecting the rights of women. (ibid.) 
Next, the article mentions a seminar arranged by a non-governmental organization, 
International Women's Rights Action Watch, which was reported to have been working on 
an analysis of interests of the United States with respect to CEDAW. This event was held 
in conjunction with the opening of the 1990 annual session of the United Nations and 
marked the tenth anniversary of this treaty. Arvonne Fraser, co-director and founder of the 
organization was quoted as saying of the seminar, 
The world does not recognize that there is a women's human rights document and 
this is an effort to broaden that recognition. (ibid.) 
From a critical thinking perspective, Fraser's expertise serves to lend support to the 
general accuracy of the New York Times report. It is only possible, however, to weigh 
expertise upon knowing or learning more about an individual's history, experience, or 
qualifications. It is helpful to remember, for example, that during the 1985 World 
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Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women in Nairobi, Fraser was described as 
follows: 
... [a] senior fellow at the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the 
University of Minnesota, who was a delegate to both the international Decade for 
Women conferences at Mexico City and Copenhagen and to the Houston 
conference. (Sciolino 20 July 1985~ 48 [Al]) 
In addition, on August 2, 1990, Fraser testified before the United States Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations in support ofCEDAW. Joining numerous individuals and 
prominent organizations, Fraser included a statement of support for CED AW from 
International Women's Rights Action Watch (which she describes as having been 
"originated or founded at the Nairobi Conference") to the Congressional Record. (US 
Congress, Senate Hearing 1990, 71-79) Eloquently ending her personal testimony, Fraser 
thanked the Committee and its members, urging the Senators with the words, "Let us no 
longer apologize. Let us just ratify." (ibid., 73) 
Unfortunately, in most instances, knowledge of this extent about an individual cited 
in a newspaper report is not immediately available. For the average reader, the likely 
tendency would be to simply finish the article and either take it as fact or look for other 
means of corroboration. Following this approach, one finds that, beyond citing a need for 
legal guarantees to combat discrimination and the hopes that CEDA W may serve as the 
"Magna Carta'~ for women's rights, the New York Times report asserts: 
While the United States joined the General Assembly consensus in adopting the 
convention, the Senate has not approved it. ("UN Women's Rights Convention, 10 
Years Old, Gets Mixed Review" 24 January 1990, 2[A]) 
The final section of this report, carrying the sub-heading "Treaty Before Senate," 
addressed the domestic status ofCEDAW in the beginning of 1990. The report cited two 
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sources, Fran Westner of the State Department and an unidentified spokesman for the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. According to the report, Westner indicated that 
CEDAW was ''before the Senate" and the unidentified Senate spokesman said, 
Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d had classified it as ''under review, which 
means this Administration is not pushing it." (ibid.) 
Another Perspective 
While the above article supports the conclusion that CEDA W must have been 
signed by the President and transmitted to the United States Senate for its advice and 
consent, a seemingly different view was presented nearly two years later in the Boston 
Globe. In a December 15, 1991 essay commemorating the bicentennial anniversary of the 
Bill of Rights, Robert Drinan cited a need for the United States to broaden constitutional 
guarantees to protect the rights of women, minorities, and the economically disadvantaged. 
One means by which such guarantees may be extended to citizens, Drinan asserted, would 
be to ratify internationally recognized human rights treaties which address such issues. 
Speaking to the rights of women as human rights, Drinan specifically centered on 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women as a 
means to guarantee constitutional protection from discrimination. Drinan wrote under the 
sub-heading ''Equality for Women," copied in its entirety: 
One hundred and nine nations-- more than two-thirds of the world-- have ratified 
the United Nations Covenant on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 
No US president has ever proposed that the US ratify this compelling document 
the guarantees of which are now a part of customary international law. The US 
failed to even ratify the equal rights amendment, which is arguably less sweeping in 
its commitment to equality for women; Congress gave two-thirds approval to the 
ERA, but only 3 5 of the necessary 3 8 states approved the measure. 
The US consequently offers less constitutional protection for the rights of 
women than all of the other major powers of the earth-- all of whom have ratified 
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CEDAW. Indeed, neither the Constitution or its Bill of Rights even mentions 
gender or sex; women did not even have the right to vote until 1920; and the 14th 
Amendment, which guarantees "equal protection of the laws," provides no specific 
protection against discrimination based on sex or gender. 
The bicentennial of the Bill of Rights has to be a sober reminder that the US may 
have been a leader in proclaiming such political rights as free speech and religious 
freedom. But as in 1 791-- more so in 1991-- the US lags behind the collective 
consensus and conscience of the world in fulfilling the rights of women. (Drinan 15 
December 1991 29[A]) 
In light of the assertion that "[n]o US president has ever proposed that the US ratify this 
compelling document" it is possible to draw the reasonable inference that, lacking 
presidential endorsement, CEDAW was either not signed or was not sent to the Senate for 
its advice and consent. 
Drinan's expertise in the field of international human rights law is not easily 
dismissed. As a well-respected legal scholar and member of the US House of 
Representatives from 1970 through 1980, it is unlikely that he would have been unaware 
of the role played by the United States in the United Nations Decade for Women or of the 
outcome of the Copenhagen World Conference of 1980. Furthermore, it would be 
doubtful in light ofDrinan's interest in and support for human rights, that he would 
intentionally misrepresent the status of CED AW in his 1991 essay. In fact, less than three 
years later, Drinan also personally testified in support of CEDA W before the Senate on 
behalf of the American Bar Association. (US Congress, Senate Hearing 1994, 20~32, 55) 
Irreconcilable Differences? 
From the standpoint of a critical and creative thinking analysis, one is faced with 
questions in 1990 and 1991 as to the reliability of information regarding the status of 
CEDAW similar to those raised in 1980 and left unanswered by Sarah Weddington in 1992. 
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If one chooses to assert that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women was signed and sent to the Senate for its advice and 
consent, how is it possible to reconcile this opinion with Drinan's claim that no President 
had ever proposed that CED AW be ratified? In turn, if one chooses to assert that CED AW 
had neither been signed nor transmitted to the Senate, how is it possible to reconcile this 
view with the 1990 New York Times report from the United Nations? Alternatively, could 
it be the case that neither article conflicts with the other? 
It is only through a balanced analysis that some degree of certainty can be attained 
as to veracity of a particular individual's statements. It is necessary, for example, to pose 
the same questions concerning the statements of others as were raised with respect to 
Weddington. One such question might be whether Drinan in 1991 or the unidentified 1990 
UN reporter had reason to distort the facts as to the status of CED AW, ifindeed they were 
distorted. Additionally, if the articles do not conflict, what information needs to be brought 
to light to resolve the appearance of contradiction? 
It should be recalled that the issue of ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment was 
rendered virtually moot prior to the 1990 and 1991 newspaper articles cited. In brief: the 
ERA would again have to be subject to congressional approval and be returned to the 
ballots of individual states. As a result, one is faced with the question as to what other 
factors or issues might explain the later confusion encountered regarding the status of 
CEDAW. Could it be the case, for example, that Drinan had a greater understanding of 
what is entailed in proposing that a human rights treaty such as CEDAW be ratified? 
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Other Sources and the Problem of Reliability 
Based on the review of reports cited thus far, it is possible only to state that by the 
end of 1991, the ambiguity of the status of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women had not been resolved. Under the circumstances, the 
importance of using simultaneous and diverse searches to obtain reliable information to 
corroborate or refute a given conclusion can not be over-emphasized in performing a critical 
thinking analysis. This being the case, the need to pursue alternative avenues of inquiry 
regarding the status of CEDA W once again becomes evident. 
To this end, one might shift the focus of inquiry to books, reference materials, or 
official records of the United Nations or federal government. From the standpoint of 
critical thinking, it is important to assess where accurate information is more likely to be 
found. Weighing information presented in relevant books or reference materials versus 
official records, for example, the latter would generally be more desirable to utilize. The 
reason supporting this choice rests with the principle of employing primary, as opposed to 
secondary, sources of information. In brief, where official records might be viewed as 
primary sources carrying the official weight oflaw and policy, relevant books and articles 
would tend to be considered secondary sources ultimately carrying only the weight of 
opinion. Viewed along a spectrum of reliability, reference materials would tend to fall in the 
middle as sources providing mostly accurate, albeit secondary, information. Although one 
can turn to secondary sources for answers, regardless of their placement on the spectrum of 
reliability, they may not provide accurate, clear, or complete information as was 
demonstrated by reviewing various newspaper reports. 
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This is further evidenced by comparing two reference sources covering United 
Nations treaties. The first is Parry and Grant's 1986 Encyclopedic Dictionary of 
International Law which cites the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women in its entirety and provides documentation of relevant 
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions. (Parry and Grant 1986, 437-8) It also 
notes that a Committee was established under the terms of this treaty, " ... to examine 
reports from States Party (art. 18) and to report annually, through ECOSOC, to the UN 
General Assembly (art. 21)." (ibid., 438) In brief, this source indicates that CEDAW was 
adopted by the General Assembly on December 18, 1979 and entered into force on 
September 3, 1981. (ibid., 437) 
The second source is Osmanczyk's 1985 Encyclopedia of the United Nations and 
International Agreements which provides information on five topics, including a section 
under the broad heading of"Women's Rights." (Osmanczyk 1985, 929-31) The other 
four topics listed are as follows: 1) ''Women's International Year, 1975," 2) ''Women's 
Labour," 3) ''Women's Political Rights Convention, 1952" and, 4) ''Women's Rights, UN 
Declaration, 1967," the latter two of which include full texts and descriptions. (ibid.) 
Both sources discuss the United Nations 1967 Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women. Only the summary offered in the first source, however, 
links this declaration directly to CEDAW. Unfortunately, neither source provides 
information as to the status of CEDA W with respect to the United States. 
What is offered under the heading of''Women's Rights" in the Encyclopedia of the 
United Nations and International Agreements, seemingly provides a comprehensive 
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summary of international conventions, declarations, and actions addressing the rights of 
women over the span of nearly one hundred years. The framework employed for covering 
more recent events appears to be that of the 1970-1980 Second United Nations 
Development Decade as opposed to the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, 
Development, and Peace. Nonetheless, it is almost inexplicable that CEDA W, as a 
binding international treaty, is completely excluded from this 1985 encylopedia. Rather, 
the period in history pertinent to CEDAW and the UN Decade for Women is reduced 
under the section entitled ''Women's Rights" as follows: 
In 1980 the UN General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions related to the 
protection of women's rights. (ibid., 930) 
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CHAPTERIV 
OFFICIAL RECORDS AS RELIABLE SOURCES 
In the Government Documents section of major public libraries, one can access 
official records from a variety of offices and departments which may clarify the status of 
CEDAW. For example, the Department of State Bulletin was a monthly publication by 
1980, the year in which CEDAW was reportedly signed. The preface of this publication 
states: 
The Department of State Bulletin, published by the Office of Public Communication 
in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of US foreign policy .... The 
Bulletin's contents include ... the US Mission to the United Nations: and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party. (US 
Department of State 1980, i) 
In the December 1980 issue, the Department of State Bulletin carried a report 
entitled ''World Conference on the UN Decade for Women Held in Copenhagen." (ibid. , 
62-86) The report begins with the following statements: 
The world conference of the UN Decade for Women was held in Copenhagen July 
14-30, 1980. The US delegation was co-chaired by Donald F. McHenry, US 
Ambassador to the United Nations, and Sarah Weddington, Assistant to the 
President. Following are statements made by Ms. Weddington in plenary sessions 
on July 16 and July 30, the text of the Programme of action adopted by the 
conference on July 30, a review and assessment of US participation, and a list of the 
resolutions adopted at the conference. (ibid., 62) 
50 
Despite the twenty-four page bulk and seeming completeness of this government report, the 
only mention of CED AW is, once again, made by Sarah Weddington. On July 16, 1980, 
she is quoted as stating: 
The President of the United States, who has made equality of women before the law 
a personal commitment, has instructed me to sign the Convention Eliminating [sic] 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. (ibid.) 
In addition, Weddington's July 30, 1980 statement offers the conclusion, ''We return to 
pursue ratification of the convention that the US delegation signed here." (ibid., 64) 
These statements, although ultimately attributable to Weddington, lend support to 
the view that CED AW was indeed signed under direction of President Carter during the 
1980 United Nations World for Conference for Women in Copenhagen. This support is 
grounded in the fact that the statements are presented in an official report from the 
Department of State. Since this agency bears responsibility for overseeing treaty affairs, it 
is highly unlikely that a misstatement concerning the signing of CEDA W would escape 
editorial review by Department of State officials. Unfortunately, however, no independent 
corroboration is presented within the body of this particular report which would either 
support or refute the President Carter's subsequent endorsement and transmission of 
CEDAW to the Senate for its advice and consent. 
It is of note, however, that the timetable of events is narrowed with respect to the 
possibility that President Carter transmitted CED AW to the United States Senate. James 
Earl Carter was defeated in his bid for re~election in November of 1980 and Ronald Reagan 
assumed the presidency in January of 1981. Through an examination of State Department 
records or other official sources, one should be able to determine more readily whether 
CEDAW was in fact transmitted to the Senate prior to Carter leaving the Office of the 
President. IfCEDAW was not transmitted to the Senate, in order for the 1990 New York 
Times report from the United Nations to be correct, this treaty would have to have been 
sent to the Senate for ratification by either Ronald Reagan or his 1988 successor, George 
Herbert Walker Bush. 
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Conflict versus Corroboration 
The Department of State, in addition to publishing its monthly Bulletin, also issues 
an annual publication entitled Treaties in Force, compiled by the Office of Treaty Affairs 
under the authority of the Office of the Legal Advisor. Upon checking the issue published 
closest to the date of Robert Drinan's 1991 essay, one finds that CEDAW is omitted from 
the list of treaties provided. Furthermore, the criteria for inclusion is such that, if this treaty 
had been signed and transmitted to the Senate, CEDAW would appear to merit being listed. 
This, in apparent conflict with the New York Times 1990 report, lends support to Drinan's 
claim that CEDAW, as of December 15, 1991, had not received presidential endorsement 
necessary for ratification by the Senate. 
In brief, Treaties in Force purports to use the term treaty in " ... the generic sense as 
defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties" which, for the United States, 
"denotes international agreements made by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate in accordance with Article II, section 2 of the Constitution." (US Department of 
State September 1991 / February 1992, i) This document, however, also claims to expand 
its listings as follows: 
In addition to such "'treaties," this publication covers international agreements in 
force for the United States which have been concluded by the Executive (a) 
pursuant to or in accordance with existing legislation or a prior treaty, (b) subject to 
congressional approval or implementation, and/or (c) under and in accordance with 
the President's Constitutional powers. (ibid.) 
In the event that one believes an omission has occurred, for example by reason of it being 
classified as a certain type of agreement, one is instructed to contact the Office of Treaty 
Affairs at the Department of State. 
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It is truly unfortunate that following this instruction (as was done by this writer) 
apparently does not require that the Treaty Affairs staff respond to individuals who may be 
inquiring about the status or omission of a treaty such as CEDAW. It has been stressed that 
an absence of evidence cannot be used to support or refute a given claim. A lack of 
response from public officials, however, certainly points to matters of grave concern for the 
survival of a democracy and the need for an informed citizenry. 
Corroboration of Official Records 
From the standpoint of critical thinking, a lack of reliable information does not allow 
one to make reasonable determinations about the veracity of a given claim. One aspect of 
establishing reliability is corroboration. Though employed in the present analysis, the 
importance of corroboration has not been fully addressed. In brief, the utilization of a single 
source of information is generally insufficient in performing a comprehensive critical 
thinking analysis, whether the source be newspaper articles or Department of State reports. 
Potentially conflicting information is not always encountered. In fact, it may be 
more rare than common to discover apparent contradictions, especially to the extent as was 
found in attempting to determine the status ofCEDAW. When differing views are 
encountered, the need for corroboration becomes an obvious step in the process of 
resolving disparities. 
The need for corroboration is less obvious in the absence of conflict. Corroboration 
is nonetheless essential to the process of critical thinking as a means for eliminating bias as 
well as error. Equally as important, as has already been mentioned, is the need to assess 
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what additional data will yield accurate information when seeking corroboration between 
reliable, authoritative sources. 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
is a multilateral human rights treaty of the United Nations. As such, it would be reasonable 
to turn to the official records of the United Nations as one avenue for inquiry which might 
clarify the status ofCEDAW with respect to the United States. At the very least, one could 
expect to determine on the international level whether or not the United States ever became 
an official party to this treaty. 
Upon reviewing a wide variety of reports and indexes relating to CED AW (and the 
majority of other human rights treaties) available from the United Nations, one finds the 
United States to be conspicuously absent. While such sources indicate that the United 
States did not become an official party to CEDAW, only one of the sources reviewed 
specifically confirms this. In a chart of ratification as of March 31, 1991 entitled Human 
Rights: Status of International Instruments, one finds CEDAW listed as signed but not yet 
ratified by the United States. (United Nations 1991, 10) 
Such confirmation is helpful in resolving the question as to whether or not CEDAW 
was signed. Nonetheless it fails to shed light on the domestic fate of this treaty with respect 
to its possible transmission to the United States Senate by President Carter or his 
successors. Being an international entity, however, the United Nations would not be the 
most reliable or informative source for pursuing domestic occurrences within the political 
history of the United States. Rather, the most obvious records to research would be those 
specifically related to actions of the Senate and President of the United States. 
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Reliability, Corroboration and Public Records 
Upon reviewing multiple official records it is indeed possible to establish an 
acceptable level of corroboration regarding the actions of this Senate, President, and, to 
some degree even the Department of State with respect to the fate of CED AW. In brief, 
the official records cited thus far do reveal a consistent chronology of events related to 
CEDAW through 1991. However, since these records do not fully answer questions as to 
the status of this human rights treaty, additional information is needed. 
From the standpoint of critical thinking, information that is to be taken as fact must 
be subject to the "acid test" of strict and multiple standards of reasoning. Beyond 
corroboration and reliability based on authority (e.g. official records or reference materials 
versus newspaper accounts), lie other factors which potentially affect both. Perhaps the 
most significant is the issue of to what extent secondary sources, even in the form of 
"official" records, are utilized and ultimately deemed authoritative. 
As has been revealed in the preceding pages, apparent conflict as opposed to 
corroboration resulted in the internal analyses of both newspaper and Department of State 
accounts as to the domestic status of CEDA W. One need only recall it was reported in 
the New York Times both that the United States could not and did sign the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, creating ambiguity not 
only at the time of the Copenhagen Conference, but also ten years later. In turn, "official" 
publications of the Department of State point to similar, disparate conclusions which have 
been rectified by neither time nor history. 
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Indeed, the inclusion of the United States in the United Nations list Human Rights: 
Status of International Instruments as an independent official record adds weight to the 
view that CEDAW was signed. The omission ofCEDAW from the Department of State's 
official list of Treaties in Force cannot, however, be simply dismissed. As in logic, valid 
conclusions may be may be drawn from the corroboration of premises, yet such 
conclusions may not be sound if one or more of the premises is/ alse. Thus, corroboration 
must be considered concurrently with the issue of reliability as an interdependent factor in 
determining the veracity of one's conclusions. 
Record of Initial Actions and Possibilities 
The Congressional Record reveals that the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women was received by the Senate as "Executive R" on 
November 12, 1980 and was subjected (along with three unrelated international treaties) 
to a vote calling for four actions to be taken by the full Senate. (US Congress, Senate 12 
November 1980, 29358) The first action was the ''Removal of Injunctions of Secrecy" 
obtained by unanimous consent. (ibid.) The other actions offered by Senator Robert Byrd 
and accepted by the Senate were as follows: 
[T]hat the treaties be considered as having been read for the first time; that they be 
referred, with accompanying papers, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
ordered to be printed; and that the President's message be printed in the Record. 
(ibid.) 
Initial corroboration is established by the inclusion of President Carter's November 
12, 1980 letter transmitting CED AW "[ w ]ith a view to receiving the advice and consent of 
the Senate to ratification" in the Congressional Record as requested. (ibid.) This is further 
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supported by the subsequent printing of this treaty and accompanying papers as 
''Executive R" by the US Government Printing Office in 1980. (US Congress, Senate 
1980, Senate Executive Documents: Letters A-Z, iii-ix, 1-19) This subsequent printing 
includes: 1) President Carter' s "Letter of Transmittal" addressed to the Senate (ibid., iii-
iv-iv), 2) The Department of State "Letter of Submittal" dated October 23, 1980 and 
addressed to The President from Edmund S. Muskie (ibid., v-ix) accompanied by the State 
Department report, "Memorandum of Law" (ibid. , 1-9) and, 3) The "Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women" (ibid., 9-19). 
The information gained by President Carter's letter to the Senate of the United 
States includes points of substantial note. Corroborating newspaper and Department of 
State reports of Sarah Weddington' s signing of CED AW the President wrote: 
The Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 
December 18, 1979 and signed on behalf of the United States of America on July 
17, 1980. (ibid., iii) 
The question raised but left unanswered is what significance this signature has with respect 
to the United States commitment to upholding ( or conforming to) the provisions 
established by this convention. 
Contradicting the view that the United States was unable to sign or otherwise 
ratify CED AW without prior passage of the Equal Rights Amendment are statements put 
forth both in the Department of State "Memorandum of Law" and by President Carter. 
The Department of State notes the extension granted for the ratification of the ERA under 
comments concerning Article 2 of the Convention, regarding the "obligation to eliminate 
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discrimination." However, citing Craigv. Boren, 429 US 190 (1976), the Memorandum 
also points out that for the United States: 
Regardless of whether the ERA is ratified, the 14th and 5th Amendments to the 
Constitution provide a basis to invalidate any federal or state classification or 
distinction based on sex if it is not substantially related to an important government 
objective. (ibid., 1) 
In tum, President Carter offers support to this legal opinion of the Department of 
State in his letter of transmittal. He writes: 
The great majority of the substantive provisions of the Convention are consistent 
with the letter and spirit of the United States Constitution and existing laws. 
However, certain provisions of the Convention raise questions of conformity to 
current United States law. Nevertheless, the Departments of State and Justice and 
other interested agencies of the Federal Government concur in the judgment that, 
with the adoption of certain qualifications and, possibly, appropriate implementing 
legislation, there are no constitutional or other legal obstacles to United States 
ratification [ emphasis added]. (ibid., iii-iv) 
As previously cited, the Department of State "Memorandum of Law" specifically 
addressed the question of whether the adoption of CED AW would be contingent upon the 
ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment and found that it was not. 
In arriving at this conclusion, it is important to take into consideration the 
Department of State's reliance upon the ruling of the Supreme Court in determining the 
compatibility of CED AW with the laws of the United States. In brief, the case of Craig v. 
Boren (1976) takes into account that the Supreme Court view that sex discrimination is 
subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
However, the level of scrutiny applied in sex discrmination cases is "middle~tier'' as 
opposed to the "strict" level of scrutiny which is applied in cases involving racial 
discrimination. (Halberstam and Defeis 1987, 92) 
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Yet another potential dimension of debate is added by the view of the Department 
of State in 1980 that CEDAW should not be considered "self-executing" and proposed a 
declaration to this effect be offered by the United States. If this proposal were to be 
followed, legislation on the level of individual states and the inclusion of the House of 
Representatives would be a required preliminary step in attempting to achieve the goals 
put forth under CEDA W. Perhaps to this end, the Congressional Staff Advisors to the US 
Delegation submitted a report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US House of 
Representatives, entitled ''UN World Conference of the UN Decade for Women: 
Copenhagen, Denmark, July 14-30, 1980." (US Congress, House 1980) 
Lingering Questions and Subsequent Senate Action 
Upon reaching the conclusion that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women was signed and transmitted to the Senate by President 
Carter, who recommended " ... that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to 
this Convention," the question as to the status ofCEDAW in 1980, as well as in the 
present, remains. (US Congress, Senate 1980, Senate Executive Documents: Letters A-Z, 
iv) In the decade following the President's November 12, 1980 transmittal and reception 
of CED AW by the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Convention was 
the subject of three congressional hearings. The first was a field hearing before the US 
Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, held in 
Boston on December 5, 1988 under the initiative of Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts. 
The second consisted of a two-day hearing held before the US House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations on March 21, 1990 and 
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July 26, 1990. A few months after the hearing before the House of Representatives 
Subcommittee, the first hearing on CEDAW was held before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations on August 2, 1990. 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee shares jointly in the responsibility (in 
conjunction with the Departments of State, Justice, and other affected agencies) for 
reviewing the status of international treaties and proposing recommendations regarding 
the laws and policies of United States. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
however, bears the responsibility of returning such treaties and any recommendations for 
ratification to the full Senate for approval or rejection. This being the case, the August 2, 
1990 Senate Committee Hearing can be viewed as carrying more official weight than 
either the 1988 Senate Subcommittee Field Hearing or the 1990 hearing before the US 
House of Representatives Subcommittee. 
This is particularly true since the record of the 1990 Foreign Relations Committee 
Hearing includes official testimony from the Office of the Legal Adviser for the 
Department of State. As noted previously, the Department of State bears a great deal of 
responsibility in the process of analyzing international treaties with a view toward 
ratification and the Office of the Legal Adviser is directly responsible for providing this 
review. Unfortunately, the Department of State representatives were ill-prepared to offer 
any substantive answers before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding the 
status ofCEDAW in 1990. 
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The Senate versus the Department of State? 
Upon reviewing the Department of State testimony provided in the hearing of 
August 2, 1990 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, several key issues and 
potential conflicts were revealed. This testimony was provided by Alan Kreczko in his 
capacity as Deputy Legal Adviser for the Department of State. Under direct questioning 
by Chairman Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island and Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland, these 
issues and potential conflicts were both identified and largely clarified 
The first issue addressed was the attempt by the Bush Administration to link the 
completion of any review of the human rights treaties pending before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations to the favorable passage of the Torture Convention, which had already 
been transmitted from the Committee back to the full Senate for its advice and consent. 
Senator Sarbanes pointed out that Mr. Kreczko's written statement, submitted for the 
record, included this condition which Senator Sarbanes found to be ''totally unacceptable" 
and in contradiction to Kreczko's oral testimony. (US Congress, Senate Hearing 1990, 
43) While Mr. Kreczko amended his official testimony, he did not entirely eliminate the 
condition that the Torture Convention be passed by the Senate prior to initiating reviews 
for any of the unratified human rights treaties pending before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations. (ibid., 44) 
Subsequently, Senator Sarbanes questioned why such a condition was being 
established and whether or not it was possible for the Department of State to review more 
than "one convention at a time." (ibid.) Mr. Kreczko responded that in working with the 
Committee and other concerned parties on the Torture Convention, 
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... no one suggested to us that we should b~ trying to do another human rights 
convention simultaneously ... . No one in that consultative process took issue with 
that process. (ibid.) 
From the standpoint of critical thinking, this response is obviously inadequate since it 
avoids answering the question as to whether or not it is in fact possible for the Department 
of State to review treaties simultaneously. Although continuing to raise the issue, Senator 
Sarbanes did not pursue a line of questioning which might have shed some light as to the 
existence of any precedent which might support or discount the legitimacy of establishing 
such conditions for reviewing human rights treaties. 
Identifying Contradictions: CEDA W and the Process of Review 
Senator Sarbanes pointed out that Secretary of State James A. Baker III had 
written to Senator Pell, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, in May of 1989 
and had indicated that the Department of State was "reviewing the Women's Convention." 
(ibid.) Mr. Kreczko was questioned about this in comparison to his own written statement 
which reportedly read, before being stricken, 
As soon as the Torture Convention passes the Senate, we will review the other 
conventions. (ibid.) 
Under further examination, Mr. Kreczko admitted that the review of CED AW had not 
been done. (ibid.) This admission stands in apparent contradiction to Secretary Baker's 
claim more than a year earlier that CEDAW was in fact ''under review" by the Bush 
Administration. 
The central question raised by this seeming contradiction is what it means for a 
treaty to be ''under review." This issue was repeatedly raised during the 1990 hearing on 
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CEDA W and the use of this designation was highlighted on the basis of its ambiguity. 
Upon calling the hearing to order, Chairman Pell provided the following observation in his 
opening remarks on CEDA W: 
For the last decade, the convention has been pending before the Senate because the 
Reagan and Bush administrations have had it "under review." For the Reagan 
administration, "under review" was a euphemism for "no action." (ibid., 1) 
As the hearing progressed, Senator Sarbanes became more sharply critical 
concerning the lack of action on CED AW, characterizing the treaty as being placed "in 
cold storage" and "put into deep freeze within the Reagan administration." (ibid. , 53-54) 
While such characterizations may indeed reflect the facts, they nonetheless fall into the 
category of pejorative language. Weddle acknowledges that the use of pejoratives (and 
honorifics) can be justifiable in the conclusion of an argument or debate, but that generally 
pejorative language tends to "trigger aversion or avoidance." (Weddle 1978, 51) 
Speaking to these effects, Mr. Kreczko's responses became noticeably defensive 
and departed from the issues posed by Senator Sarbanes. In asking about whether the 
preparatory work on CED AW had been done by the Department of State under the Bush 
Administration, Senator Sarbanes received the following response from Mr. Krezcko: 
I don't think it is fair to characterize this administration as inattentive to human 
rights treaties. (US Congress, Senate Hearing 1990, 46) 
Similarly, Sarbanes' questioning concerning the Reagan administration's failure to address 
CEDAW led Kreczko to defend the executive branch by accusing the Senate of 
"antipathy'' or resentment. He asserted: 
Senator, I think it is not fair to basically point the finger exclusively at the 
executive branch on action on these treaties. The executive branch tried for 30 
years on the Genocide Convention; the Reagan administration did work on the 
Genocide Convention. It took us a long time to get that through the Senate. One 
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of the things we have to bear in mind is that there has been a certain antipathy in 
the Senate to human rights conventions as a method of affecting domestic law. 
(ibid., 53-54) 
Defining "Under Review" 
Avoiding pejorative language, Chairman Pell noted simply that CEDAW had been 
''under review" during the two tenns of Reagan's presidency. He then asked the 
Department of State representative whether " .. . any analysis or recommendation [came] 
out of the Reagan administration for consideration by the Bush administration." (ibid., 53) 
Mr. Kreczko replied, "Not that I am aware of, Senator." (ibid.) In addition to obtaining 
an answer as to whether the Reagan administration had taken any action in preparing 
CEDAW for ratification, the Chairman also attempted to elicit a definition from the State 
Department of the designation ' 'under review." 
Although this would appear to be a rather basic concept to explain, Mr. Kreczko 
testified in response to a question posed by Senator Sarbanes that, in his opinion, 
.. .it means different things with respect to different treaties. In the case of a 
particular treaty, it may mean that we are actually reviewing the text of the treaty; 
in the case of another treaty, it may mean that we are reviewing whether to move 
the treaty forward at all. (ibid., 57) 
This is a clear example of equivocation which Weddle identifies in logic as the "illegitimate 
switching of meanings in midargument.'' (Weddle 1978, 57) In keeping with this fallacy, 
Mr. Kreczko failed to offer any clarification as to the status of CEDA W with respect to 
these different meanings. 
Chairman Pell later returned to the definition of the tenn ~'under review" in light of 
the letter he had received from the Secretary of State, in which Secretary Baker ''talked 
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about the treaties cuttently under review." (US Congress, Senate Hearing 1990, 62) Mr. 
Kreczko responded, 
Senator, if this is an important point, it might be better that I get you an answer to 
that in writing. (ibid.) 
As a result, the following definition of ''under review" with respect to pending treaties 
(including CEDAW) was later added to the official record of the Senate: 
The Department of State annually advises the Senate of the priority the executive 
branch accords to treaties currently pending before the Senate for advice and 
consent to ratification. Treaties are placed in one of six categories, namely: ( 1) 
treaties for which there is an urgent need for Senate approval; (2) treaties which 
should be given very high priority; (3) treaties which the administration believes 
are generally desirable and should be approved; (5) treaties currently under review; 
and ( 6) treaties not yet before the committee which may require action prior to the 
adjournment of the current session of Congress. When a treaty is classified as 
''under review," it indicates that a new administration has not yet determined 
whether to support the treaty or that, in the case of an administration in office, it is 
reassessing its position, for example, in light of subsequent developments. (ibid.) 
From a critical thinking perspective, several observations are important to note 
regarding this definition. First, the reader will again note the problem of equivocation or, 
perhaps more clearly, the use of a "smokescreen," i.e. avoiding the question while 
attempting to give the appearance of providing an answer. (Weddle 1978, 32) Senator 
Pell specifically asked for a definition regarding the treaties Secretary of State James A. 
Baker III had described as currently under review. If a definition was indeed provided, it 
is tautological ( or circular) in that the fifth potential designation for a treaty under review 
is that it is "currently under review." 
In view of this tautology and/or the failure to specify whether the review of 
CEDAW was current, it is impossible to arrive at a meaningful or substantive definition of 
this designation. Furthermore, the six designations for treaties provided in response to the 
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question of defirting ''under review" were unavailable and thus not subject to discussion at 
the time of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. As a result, no information 
was provided in the testimony as to which category CEDAW was placed at the time. 
Similarly, no information regarding the Bush Administration's stance on CEDAW was 
provided in the course of the testimony offered by the Department of State. Briefly 
summarized, no attempt was made to eliminate the problems of equivocation or 
obfuscation in order to arrive at a reasonable understanding of the review status of 
CEDAW. 
Review and Responsibility 
Mr. Kreczk:o stated of the review process that inconsistencies between CEDA W 
and existent US laws would be identified. Further, he testified that proposed resolutions 
would be presented, although the Department of State was " ... not in a position to do that 
at [that] point" due to the fact that the review had not been completed. (US Congress, 
Senate Hearing 1990, 62) When pressed on the issues of how far the review ofCEDAW 
had actually progressed and how long a review would take to complete, Mr. Kreczko 
provided evasive or, at best, confusing responses. For example, Mr. Kreczko attested 
under oath to the Committee that the Department of State had ''begun its review of the 
Women's Convention." Sworn under oath, Mr. Kreczko also told the Committee: 
The Justice Department has conducted a preliminary review of potential conflicts 
between the convention and current law, the results of which are indicated in the 
testimony that I have submitted for the record. (ibid., 47) 
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Mr. Kreczko further stated that, "This preliminary review confirms the major areas of 
concern identified in the original transmittal package" sent by the Carter Administration. 
(ibid., 47) 
With respect to this review, Mr. Kreczko later added that the Department State 
had "solicited the views of the Justice Department" approximately "three weeks" prior to 
the hearing but that he was unsure of the "exact date." (ibid., 57) No corroboration was 
provided from either the Department of State or the Justice Department that such a 
preliminary review had indeed occurred, despite requests made to both agencies under the 
Freedom of Information Act. Once again research attempts resulted in an absence of 
relevant data which, as hl:l.S been noted previously, cannot be used as evidence that a 
review did not in fact take place. 
In completing his testimony, Mr. Kreczko admitted under questioning that he 
would in fact be the "operative person" responsible for completing a review of CED AW if 
the Department of State was so directed. (ibid. , 60) He continued by identifying three 
aspects of the review process that would be considered by the Department of State as 
significant factors. The first was described as "consistency with law" in the assessment of 
human rights conventions. (ibid., 61) The second element was identified as the interest 
expressed by "human rights groups." (ibid.) Lastly, Mr. Kreczko identified "receptivity in 
the Senate." (ibid.) 
Of the three factors cited by Mr. Kreczko, questions focused repeatedly on the 
first step of determining consistency with domestic law. Senator Sarbanes presented a 
hypothetical situation where a convention assumed priority "at a very high level" and had 
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receptive support in the Senate, but where "the basic analysis of its consistency" had not 
been done. (ibid., 63) Senator Sarbanes concluded by speculating that, under such 
conditions, Mr. Kreczko would become "a roadblock that completely upsets the possibility 
of moving forward" due to the fact that the Department of State and Mr. Kreczko had not 
fulfilled the responsibility of performing the required legal analysis. (ibid.) 
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CHAPTER V 
THE US GOVERNMENT: A HURDLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS? 
In the preceding pages, a great deal of emphasis was placed upon the responsibility 
of the Department of State for clarifying the status of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Indeed if one were to take the record of 
the 1990 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on CEDA W at face value, one 
might conclude that the Department of State ( or perhaps even Mr. Kreczko alone) bore 
sole responsibility for the failure of the United States to move forward toward its 
ratification. From a critical thinking perspective, however, such a conclusion would be 
premature, being based neither on sufficient evidence and not subject to the standards of 
" ... reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do." (Ennis 
1987, 10) 
Upon re-examination of the testimony provided and the questions raised during the 
1990 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, one particularly salient aspect should 
not be overlooked. Mr. Kreczko provided testimony acknowledging that the review of 
CEDA W was indeed the responsibility of the Office of the Legal Adviser and that he 
personally would be expected " ... to do the work." (US Congress, Senate Hearing 1990, 
60-61) In speaking to the issue of responsibility and the failure to complete a basic 
analysis of the consistency of CEDAW with respect to existing law appeared, at the very 
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least, embarrassing for the Department of State. Is, however, embarrassment of a United 
States government official and the corresponding agency the ultimate goal in discussing 
the fate of a human rights treaty before the United States Senate? Additionally, it should 
be emphasized from a critical thinking perspective that Senator Sarbanes' characterization 
of the Deputy Legal Adviser being a "roadblock" with respect to moving CEDAW toward 
possible ratification was based on a hypothetical situation. 
Theories of Responsibility 
The hypothetical situation in question consisted of three factors. Only one of the 
three, however, namely the failure of the Department of State to complete its review of 
CEDAW, was subject to scrutiny. The other factors were the hypothetical conditions of 
1) CEDAW being designated as a high priority by the President or executive branch, and 
2) the Senate being "receptive" to moving the treaty forward . (ibid., 63) Since both of 
these additional factors would be considered essential to the process of ratification, it is 
almost incomprehensible that they were neither discussed nor analyzed at any length. 
In addressing the factor of the designation of a treaty as a high priority issue 
several points should be made. The first is that the importance of executive support was 
duly noted by Chairman Claiborne Pell. In commencing the Committee's hearing on 
CEDAW, Senator Pell stated as follows: 
Obviously, without administration support, a treaty stands almost no chance of 
being approved by the Senate. Moreover, even with the Senate's advice and 
consent, the treaty would not go into effect without presidential action in the form 
of ratification. (ibid., 1) 
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Secondly, the Department of State is part of the executive branch of government. 
This being the case, it would be reasonable to assert, based on Mr. Kreczko's testimony in 
his capacity as Deputy Legal Adviser, that President Bush did not support CEDA W to the 
extent needed to move it forward toward possible ratification. If President Bush indeed 
supported the ratification ofCEDAW, why did he not direct the Department of State to 
complete the review of CED AW for consideration by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee? Does this indicate that the President was responsible for the ill-preparedness 
of the Department of State and the resultant inaction of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee or, perhaps, the entire United States Senate with respect to the possible 
ratification ofCEDAW? 
Position of the Department of State? 
It should be recalled that there was a fifteen month period following the letter of 
May 8, 1989 from Secretary of State James A. Baker Ill to Chairman Pell indicating that 
CEDAW was "currently under review." Yet the Department of State, according to Mr. 
Kreczko's sworn testimony, waited until only " ... about three weeks" prior to the 
Committee hearing to solicit a "preliminary review" from the Department of Justice. 
(ibid., 57) Despite sending several letters to the Department of State, including Mr. 
Kreczko, and even filing a Freedom oflnformation Act request [Case no. 9205245] to 
substantiate that a preliminary review had been conducted, the information received was 
non-responsive to this aspect of the inquiry. 
During the course of the Senate Committee hearing, Mr. Kreczko never once 
claimed that CEDA W did not have the endorsement or support of President Bush. 
71 
Rather, he repeatedly (if not evasively) contended that it had not yet been decided 
" ... which of the other human rights treaties ought to come next" for consideration by the 
Senate. (ibid., 52) Moreover, with respect to CEDAW, Mr. Kreczko also testified that, 
"The administration has not formulated a position on the convention." (ibid., 58) 
The last statement of Mr. Kreczko cited above would be questionable for at least 
three reasons. The first is the fact that President Bush had served eight years as Vice-
President under the previous two terms of the Reagan Administration. Over the course of 
these eight years preceding his subsequent election to the Office of the President, it is 
extremely difficult to accept the notion that President Bush was not or should not have 
been familiar with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women. This is especially difficult to accept in view of the fact that the 1985 End 
of the Decade World Conference for Women was held during the Reagan years when 
George Bush held the Office of the Vice-President, President Bush's prior service to the 
United Nations and international role as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
("George Herbert Walker Bush" 2 February 1992, 6) 
Secondly, there is the letter of May 8, 1989 from Secretary of State James A. 
Baker III to Chairman Claiborne Pell of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
indicating to him that CEDAW and the other human rights treaties pending before the 
Committee were "currently under review" fifteen months prior to the 1990 hearing. (US 
Congress, Senate Hearing 1990, 62) Relevant to this letter is the opening sentence 
regarding the definition of"under review" provided by the State Department and added to 
the Congressional Record after the fact. It reads: 
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The Department of State annually advises the Senate of the priority the executive 
branch accords to treaties currently pending before the Senate for advice and 
consent to ratification. (ibid.) 
In sum, it seems quite unlikely that President Bush, after nearly a decade of exposure and 
having had to twice accord priority to the treaties pending before the Senate, that he 
would not have formed an opinion as to whether or not he supported the ratification of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
Support of the United States Congress? 
The last factor which draws into question Mr. Kreczko's sworn statement that the 
President had " ... not formulated a position on the convention" is by far the most 
intriguing. (ibid., 58) It also would seem to be only a matter of chance that such relevant 
information was entered into evidence in the Congressional Record. Briefly summarized, 
a letter dated June 11, 1990 was sent to President Bush in support of CEDA W by thirteen 
Republican Members of Congress. The group consisted of twelve female members of the 
House of Representatives a one male Senator who was then a current member of the 
Foreign Relations Committee. Collectively, they urged " ... administration support for the 
United States ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women." (ibid., 38) The letter cited the lack of constitutional 
barriers to ratification, two legal studies by the American Bar Association concurring with 
this opinion, and the need to further address the issue of discrimination against women in 
the United States. The letter concluded by pointing to "difficulty" faced by US diplomatic 
representatives in international forums addressing human rights in light of the failure of the 
United States to ratify the instruments such forums have produced. (ibid., 38-39) In 
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addition, the letter requested that " ... this convention be given priority status by the 
administration and that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee be urged to hold hearings 
on US ratification." (ibid., 38) At the time of the 1990 Senate Committee hearing on 
CEDAW, however, three of the original thirteen members of Congress went on record as 
having withdrawn their support for the ratification of this treaty. (ibid. , 95-97) 
Position of the President? 
The response to the letter discussed above came from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant 
Secretary for Legislative Affairs of the Department of State, reportedly at the request of 
President Bush in June of 1990. While this letter of response foreshadowed much of the 
testimony of Mr. Kreczko with respect to the passage of the Torture Convention and 
indecision as to which of the human rights treaties should be considered next as a priority, 
three sentences are worthy of note. They read as follows: 
As you know, this administration is committed to promoting and protecting the 
human rights of all individuals, and we are particularly concerned about the rights 
of women. Five human rights conventions drafted under UN auspices-- including 
CEDAW-- are currently pending Senate approval. This administration,.Jike its 
predecessor, has urged approval. (ibid. , 39) 
Contrary to Mr. Kreczko's sworn testimony, this letter would appear to indicate that 
President Bush had indeed ''formulated a position" regarding CEDA W and that it was, in 
fact, one of support. 
Before accepting the notion that President Bush ( or, for that matter, President 
Reagan) truly supported or ''urged approval" ofCEDAW, any such conclusion must be 
subject to critical analysis. The questions to be raised include: On the basis of what 
evidence can this claim be supported? Is there evidence that either Mr. Kreczko or Ms. 
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Mullins may have been biased, distorted the truth, or simply misspoke? Is it possible for 
the President to have ''urged approval" when a position allegedly had not been 
formulated? 
Speaking to the position of the President, is it possible that he (like the three 
individuals who were members of the House ofRepresentatives) changed his mind? If so, 
what were the reasons for this sudden withdrawal of support in less than two months? 
Could this apparent change of heart have occurred either in view of the reasons given by 
the three members of Congress or further reassessment on the part of the President? If 
either were the case, would these reasons, when subject to the standards of critical 
analysis, be based upon "reasonable reflective thinking focused on what to believe or do," 
in this instance, whether or not to seek the ratification of the CEDAW as a human rights 
treaty formally supported by the United States? Is it possible to determine the whether 
each could be said to have acted in the best interests of their constituents and the general 
public by reassessing and/or withdrawing support for the ratification of CED AW? 
The Power and Receptivity of the Senate 
Based on the 1990 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, it can be 
reasonably asserted the executive branch was ill-prepared or, perhaps, even disinclined to 
address CEDAW as a human rights treaty to be moved forward through the Committee 
for the advice and potential consent of the Senate for ratification. As Chairman Claiborne 
Pell opined in commencing the August, 2 1990 hearing on the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: 
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This administration has had more than 18 months to review [CEDAW]. That is 
more than enough time to determine whether and under what conditions the 
United States should ratify this treaty. (ibid., 1) 
While this again speaks to the need of presidential endorsement in order for the Senate 
move toward the ratification of any given human rights treaty, it does not fully address the 
issue of review. Rather ironically, for example, Senator Sarbanes indicated earlier in the 
hearing that, contrary to his own characterization of there being a "roadblock," a review 
by the Department of State was not actually needed for the Committee to take action on 
CEDAW. 
When first recognized by Chairman Pell to speak during the Foreign Relations 
Committee hearing on CEDAW, Senator Sarbanes began with the following statement: 
First I want to commend you very strongly for holding this hearing and seeking to 
move this convention on the agenda. This administration, successive 
administrations, have now had this matter "under review," and, while we are 
always interested in what the administrations think, it seems to me if they cannot 
bring that review to a speedy close, we may need to move ahead without it, 
frankly. (ibid., 40) 
In addition, during his questioning of Mr. Krezcko, Senator Sarbanes indicated that it was 
within the scope of the Committee's power to vote to have the Department of State 
complete its review of CEDAW. (ibid., 60) 
This view is substantiated by Rule XXVI concerning Committee Procedure. 
Section 8 (a) of this rule reads in part as follows: 
.. . Committees may carry out the required analysis, appraisal, and evaluation 
themselves, or by contract, or may require a Government agency to do so 
[emphasis added, rule in effect 1990]. (US Congress, Senate 1993, 46) 
From the above, one will note that not only does the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
appear to possess the power to direct the Department of State accordingly, but also that 
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the Committee can petfonn the review independently, either by themselves as a body or 
even by contracting the work outside of the federal government. 
It is understandable that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would not seek 
to move CEDA W forward if it did not have the active support of the President. It is 
difficult to understand, however, why the Committee would not pursue having the review 
ofCEDAW completed, especially since this was one of the major points discussed during 
the 1990 hearing on CEDAW. This is particularly perplexing in light of the fact that the 
American Bar Association, or ABA, had petfonned three separate and "extensive" legal 
analyses of CED AW, each in support of the ratification with the final conclusion " ... that 
US law is compatible with the convention." (US Congress, Senate Hearing 1990, 68) 
Further, it is reflected in the Congressional Record that several analyses of 
CEDAW were offered for review by the government without apparent cost or restriction. 
Catherine Bocskor, Vice-Chair of the Section of International Law and Practice of the 
ABA, appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1990 to testify in 
support ofCEDAW " ... at the request ofL. Stanley Chauvin, Jr., President of the 
American Bar Association." (ibid., 69) The relevant aspect of Ms. Bocskor's oral 
testimony reads as follows: 
Let me also offer the assistance of the various bar associations that have been 
studying this convention and other international human rights conventions for 
many years, that is, not only the ABA but the Federal Bar Association, the 
American Society of International Law, and the Women's Bar Association of 
Washington, DC. We will all be happy to give the State Department and Justice 
Department the benefit of our legal studies. (ibid., 88-89) 
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A History of Senate Opposition 
One author speaks directly to the difficulties human rights treaties have historically 
faced with respect to receiving the advice and consent to ratification by the United States 
Senate. In a book entitled, Human Rights Treaties and the Senate: A History of 
Opposition, Natalie Hevener Kaufinan undertakes a study of the history and fate of human 
rights conventions in the hands of the Senate from the late 1940s to the mid-1980s. 
Kaufman identifies a typology of arguments which have been utilized over time to oppose 
the ratification of human rights instruments and examines the "future prospects" of the 
ratification of human rights treaties by the United States. 
In Part I, entitled "Politics of Fear," Kaufman describes the historical context of 
the Cold War and the civil rights movement and how this socio-political environment 
helped shape the initial opposition to ratifying human rights treaties. Interestingly enough, 
the analysis begins with an examination of the role and influence of the American Bar 
Association in opposing human rights treaties when this issue first emerged before the 
Senate in the late 1940s and early 1950s. (Kaufinan 1990, 9) Kaufinan observes that the 
basis of" ... conservative fears and the rationale behind them were most elaborately 
developed and articulated by Frank Holman, president of the American Bar Association in 
1948-49." (ibid. , 16) 
Kaufinan begins by reviewing the history of the first post-World War II treaty, the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Genocide 
Convention, emerging in response to the atrocities of the war, was described as having 
substantial broad-based support from a variety of organizations, collectively representing 
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"approximately 100 million people." (ibid., 37) In contrast, the ABA Special Committee 
on Peace and Law Through the United Nations was described as testifying before the 
Senate " .. . as almost the lone opposition to ratification." (ibid.) The Special Committee 
succeeded in its opposition, despite the fact that the Association was itself divided and 
"[ t ]he organ of the ABA that normally addressed international legal issues was 
outmaneuvered and outvoted." (ibid., 9) 
Noting that the Genocide Convention was "strategic starting point for the 
opposition," Kaufinan asserts: 
The major arguments enunciated against all human rights treaties were first 
articulated against the Genocide Convention. (ibid., 3 7) 
Kaufman identifies three distinct '1:hemes" (which she later uses to formulate a typology of 
arguments) that were integral to the initial and subsequent ABA opposition arguments, as 
follows: 
.. . that these treaties would result in (1) violation of domestic jurisdiction resulting 
in loss of sovereignty and curtailing of rights, (2) expansion of the powers of the 
federal government in violation of states' rights, and (3) enhancement of 
Communist influence and the transformation of the American system to socialism. 
(ibid., 17) 
One important purpose ofKaufinan' s historical analysis of the Genocide 
Convention (and the Human Rights Covenants which followed shortly thereafter) was to 
" ... draw attention to the legalism that pervaded the discussion" of human rights issues 
before the Senate. (ibid. , 38) She asserts, "Political arguments were minimized or ignored 
as legalistic reasoning took center stage" and that, as a result, the basic question of 'Why 
not ratify human rights treaties?" was reversed, shifting the burden of proof under the 
prevailing view of the 1950s that such instruments were "defective and dangerous." (ibid.) 
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The United States Senate, like the American Bar Association, rapidly became 
divided over the issue of ratifying human rights treaties. Indeed, the division proved to be 
so great that it resulted in a series of Senate proposals during the 1950s "to amend the 
treaty-making provisions of the Constitution" and/or otherwise curtail "the president's 
power to conclude executive agreements." (ibid., 94) Kaufinan states that collectively 
these proposals are now referred to as falling under the "Bricker Amendment" which was 
only narrowly defeated in the Senate. (ibid., 95, 105) After presenting a refined version of 
the original "themes" of opposition as a typology of arguments, Kaufinan concludes: 
The short-term effect of the Bricker Amendment hearings, and of the public debate 
surrounding them, was the defeat of efforts to ratify human rights treaties .... even 
though the Bricker Amendment did not pass .... The long-term effect was also 
executive and legislative resistance to action on human rights treaties. The 
proponents of the Bricker Amendment, with official ABA sanction, successfully 
branded human rights treaties as dangerous and, perhaps more important, as 
controversial-- labels most likely to deter consideration by the United States 
Senate .. (ibid., 116) 
Fear of Human Rights: An Acceptable US Legacy? 
Part II ofKaufinan's study entitled, "Legacy of Fear," undertakes an analysis of 
the fate of human rights treaties which unfolded in the years following the Bricker 
Amendment controversy of the 1950s. Kaufman begins with President John F. Kennedy's 
attempt to resurrect discussions of human rights issues in 1963 by sending three treaties to 
the Senate, " ... the contents of which were in complete harmony with state and federal 
law." (ibid., 119) In what is described as a "trial balloon," this action was interpreted by 
Kaufman as a means to determine whether "uncontroversial agreements," sent without 
reservations and just one understanding, would also face opposition in the Senate. (ibid.) 
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Kaufinan notes, "The Senate responded by not holding hearings on these treaties until 
1967." (ibid.) Two of the three treaties ultimately gained Senate approval, despite the fact 
that points of intense controversy during the 1950s, namely "questions of domestic 
jurisdiction, federal-state conflict, and international adjudication," were equally applicable 
to the two treaties that received advice and consent to ratification. (ibid., 120) 
A Sign of Hope or Hasty Acceptance? 
The first of the human rights treaties transmitted by President Kennedy in 1963 
gained consent to ratification by the Senate in 1967. A compilation of human rights 
instruments affecting the rights of women and children, cited as "Appendix 4: United 
Nations Instruments Pertinent to Elimination of Discrimination and Violence Against 
Women and Children" by Gordon R. Chapman, was offered into evidence to the House of 
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs during its 1990 hearings. Entitled, 
"International Human Rights Abuses Against Women," these hearings also specifically 
addressed CEDAW. (US Congress, House 1990, 1, 174-187). The formal title of this 
human rights document is recorded in Appendix 4 as the "Supplementary Convention on 
the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery" 
of 1956, included in the record of the 1990 House hearings with the belief that the subject 
matter was pertinent to the rights of women and children. (ibid., 182) 
It is difficult to understand how an international agreement designed to protect 
individuals from slavery worldwide would be ignored or considered controversial and 
then, after a decade, be embraced by the Senate for ratification. Kaufinan seeks to explain 
this sudden and somewhat remarkable reversal of the Senate by emphasizing two factors 
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of particular note. One was that the Supplementary Slavery Convention was an extension 
of a treaty to which the United States was already a party. As a result, Kaufinan asserts, it 
"gained acceptability as an extension of a former, quite popular treaty rather than as a new 
human rights treaty." (Kaufinanl990, 143) She continues by stating: 
Second, the treaty was presented as a desirable way for the United States to 
celebrate the United Nations Human Rights Year.. .. [and] US commemoration of 
the year [1968} was mentioned many times during the hearings as a reason for 
ratification. (ibid., 144) 
Kaufinan writes that the Supplementary Slavery Convention was " ... ratified with 
no reservations or understandings and no threats of filibuster or cries of imminent 
destruction of the nation." (ibid., 143) Yet, this treaty nevertheless fit the typology of 
dangers espoused by previous opposition arguments. Kaufinan offers the observation, 
There was, then, a major inconsistency in voting to approve this treaty while 
continuing to give these reasons as the basis for opposing other human rights 
treaties. (ibid.) 
The First Human Rights Convention for Women? 
The second treaty sent to the Senate in 1963 was the Convention on the Political 
Rights of Women, which was entered into force for the ratifying or acceding member 
states of the United Nations on July 7, 1954. (ibid., 122) Ironically, with respect to the 
issue of domestic jurisdiction, this treaty " .. . was twice rejected by the [United Nations] 
Economic and Social Council on the grounds that its subject was not appropriate for 
international legal formulation" before finally gaining the acceptance of the UN General 
Assembly in 1952. (ibid.) Indeed, addressing women's rights as human rights was also the 
"newest topic" to be addressed by the United Nations through a formal and binding 
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multilateral treaty. (ibid.) Speaking indirectly to the issues of Senate opposition to 
ratifying international human rights instruments and the reluctance of the President to 
transmit such treaties after the Bricker Amendment hearings, Kaufinan notes that " ... the 
Eisenhower administration's withdrawal of support for UN treaty-making on human rights 
explicitly included [the Convention on the Political Rights of Women]." (ibid., 120) 
As for the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee and special Committee hearings 
on this and the other two treaties considered in 1967, Kaufinan states that the Convention 
on the Political Rights of Women received the support of the Subcommittee for 
ratification but was strongly rejected by the American Bar Association. Kaufinan notes 
that the treaty was not only rejected by the ABA Committee on Peace and Law through 
the United Nations (which led the opposition against human rights in the 1950s), but also 
the ABA Section on International and Comparative Law and even the ABA House of 
Delegates by a 115-92 vote. (ibid., 125-126) 
The repeated and predominant ABA argument against ratification of this treaty 
was that the issues addressed by the Convention on the Political Rights of Women were 
matters of domestic as opposed to international concern and jurisdiction. (ibid.) Kaufman 
emphasizes the special status of the ABA and the influence on the action taken by the 
Senate. She reports that, 
After the subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee had completed its 
hearings on these three treaties, the full committee delayed consideration of the 
subcommittee report at the request ofthe ABA. (ibid., 126-127) 
The result was that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee followed the "compromise" 
of the ABA House of Delegates. Thus in 1967, the Supplemental Slavery Convention was 
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approved for ratification, and the UN Commission on the Status of Women's Convention 
on the Political Rights of Women, along with the UN International Labor Organization' s 
Convention Concerning Forced Labor, were indefinitely "delayed" for consideration by 
the Senate. (ibid.) 
The Triumph of the Senate Over ABA Opposition? 
In 1975, the Senate held hearings on the Convention on the Political Rights of 
Women for the second time to determine whether or not to give advice and consent to the 
United States ratification of this human rights treaty which offers three fundamental 
guarantees to women around the globe. They are as follows: 
Art. I. Women shall be entitled to vote in all elections on equal terms with men, 
without any discrimination. 
Art. II. Women shall be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies, 
established by national law, on equal terms with men, without any discrimination. 
Art. III. Women shall be entitled to hold public office and to exercise all public 
functions, established by national law, on equal terms with men, without any 
discrimination. (Osmanczyk 1985, 929) 
For the general public, these guarantees would hardly seem controversial in 1975, 
especially in light of the Nineteenth Amendment of 1920 which granted women of the 
United States the right to vote and subsequent rulings of the Supreme Court which 
protected the rights of women to hold public offices. Why, then, were these guarantees 
considered controversial, radical, or dangerous when viewed as international human 
rights? 
Of particular note is the fact that in 1975 the opinion of the American Bar 
Association remained unaltered. It was reported that the ABA was "specially contacted 
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for its position on the treaty" and that, "The response was that the stand of the 
organization had not changed, but no one was sent to testify against the convention." 
(Kaufinan 1990, 144) Kaufman asserts that this response was one among at least three 
factors which contributed to the ratification of the Convention on the Political Rights of 
Women, which Kaufman characterized as being the "most severely criticized as being 
domestic in nature" by the ABA. (ibid., 139) 
The second factor pointed out by Kaufinan was the symbolic influence of 1975 
being designated International Woman's Year by the United Nations, which also marked 
the beginning of the World Conferences for Women. Kaufinan states that "the treaty's 
passage had been identified as a significant symbol for US observance." (ibid.) A 
movement evolved across "numerous women's groups" and Senator Charles Percy was 
reported to have "led the move to tie the treaty to the International Women's Year 
celebration." (ibid., 144-14 5) 
Kaufinan also notes that advocates for the ratification of this human rights treaty 
pointed to its consistency with United States law and that its ratification ''would cost 
nothing." (ibid., 145) Additionally, Kaufman confers the judgment that, 
Proponents wisely introduced the proposal during the closing days of the 
congressional session, a busy time when more weighty matters of state were likely 
to hold the attention and energy of the members. (ibid.) 
It cannot be definitively established as to why, how, and to what extent these combined 
factors influenced the Senate decision to give unanimous consent to ratification despite 
the stated resistance of the American Bar Association. Kaufinan describes this unlikely 
scenario as follows: 
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For twenty-one years [the Convention on the Political Rights of Women] awaited 
Senate floor consideration and approval, until 1975 when the Senate deliberated 
less than a month and unanimously voted for ratification with no reservations. 
(ibid., 120) 
Kaufman correctly raises the question as to how, in light of the ratification of the 
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, "the argument of domestic jurisdiction 
could effectively be applied" in future human rights deliberations before the Senate. 
Indeed, this point would seem particularly relevant to the ratification of highly "domestic" 
.-human rights treaties, as is true of-CEDAW. 
Reservations: Senate Opposition to Human Rights Revitalized? 
Kaufman continues her analysis of the fate of human rights treaties before the 
Senate in the years following the 1975 passage of the Convention on the Political Rights 
of Women in two chapters entitled "The Reservations Game" and "Current Situation and 
Future Prospects." In the former, Kaufman examines the Human Rights Covenants as a 
case study. In the latter, Kaufman examines four additional human rights instruments 
transmitted by President Carter to the Senate in 1978 for advice and consent. In addition, 
Kaufman examines the typology of arguments against the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which was ultimately gained the consent of the 
Senate for ratification in 1986. 
Throughout the course of these closing chapters, it is asserted that the fears, which 
provided the impetus in the 1950s for the Bricker Amendment and the basis for Kaufman's 
typology of opposition arguments, have become a deeply rooted legacy in human rights 
debates. Instead of taking shape as a proposed amendment, however, it is suggested that 
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the practice of making extensive reservations or attachments to human rights instruments 
emerged as an alternative strategy. Kaufinan describes this as "a strange sort of meeting 
ground," utilized by opponents as well as proponents of human rights treaties. (ibid., 148) 
Kaufinan attempts to "demystify" the role that reservations or attachments have 
come to play in more recent attempts to ratify human rights treaties. First, Kaufinan 
expresses her intent to examine the recommendations of the Carter administration with 
respect to the UN Human Rights Covenants, which "formally codified the principles in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights," and to provide a "drafting history .. . for each 
treaty provision for which an attachment was recommended." (ibid., 64,150) Second, 
Kaufinan proposes to individually assess these provisions for incompatibility with the 
Constitution and to attempt to determine ''whether a need exists for the particular 
recommended attachment." (ibid.) Lastly, Kaufinan projects reaching conclusions "as to 
what the reservations game reveals about the underlying assumptions that guide executive 
and legislative consideration of human rights treaties." (ibid.) 
One ofKaufinan's stated purposes is to again expose how political issues of debate 
(which she asserts lie at the heart of opposition arguments) have been repeatedly cast in 
terms oflegal arguments and concerns. (ibid., 149) Kaufinan argues that the effect of the 
legitimization of a "legalistic framework for debate" has not only "effectively disqualified 
nonlegal players," but has also masked the political core of opposition arguments in such a 
way that political debate has been "effectively excluded or minimized." (ibid.) Kaufinan 
claims that this legalistic "reservations game" reached new heights under President Carter, 
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not only during Senate debates, but also in the Administration's preparation of the human 
rights treaties for Senate consideration. (ibid. , 150-151) 
In the conclusion of ''The Reservations Game" chapter, Kaufinan discusses how 
advocates for the ratification of human rights treaties, including the Carter Administration, 
fell prey to the opposition arguments assertion which stressed an alleged need for 
reservations, understandings, and declarations. She writes that, 
Proponents, attempting to gain acceptance for the treaties, designed legally correct 
attachments, which they claimed met the oppositions objections. Yet in adopting 
the legal framework, they yielded major ground, implying that the opposition's 
stated arguments were legitimate and nonpolitical. (ibid. , 173) 
Speaking to the impact of this practice, Kaufinan continues with the assertion: 
The effect of this concession was to cast future debates in legal terms, with the 
designing of ever more elaborate and detailed attachments becoming the routine 
method of addressing actual and potential opposition. (ibid.) 
As for Kaufinan's review of the reservations and attachments proposed by the Carter 
Administration to the Human Rights Covenants, the conclusion is reached that, ''With one 
exception, the attachments are unnecessary." (ibid.) This exception is none other than one 
designed to protect the First Amendment right of free speech, a guarantee that Eleanor 
Roosevelt had also deemed essential during earlier Human Rights Commission debates. 
(ibid., 164-170) 
Reasonable Assumptions or Fallacy of Fear? 
Turning to the "fundamental assumptions" which Kaufinan claims have come to 
" ... guide executive and legislative consideration of human rights treaties," two are 
identified in her case study of the Human Rights Covenants. Kaufinan covers the 
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exchanges which took place with respect to the Human Rights Covenants between the 
executive branch, the Senate, and the United Nations, from the time of Eleanor Roosevelt 
to President Carter. The first assumption, Kaufman describes as an "ethnocentric notion" 
that the United States system of government is either perfect or superior to all others in 
the world, with the obvious inclusion of the United Nations. (ibid., 173) Kaufman notes: 
The United States could, as many other ratifying states have, accept the obligation 
to bring its legal system into compliance .. .. There is no constitutional or other legal 
bar to this option. (ibid., 173) 
Kaufman briefly discusses how the reservations game undermines the intent of human 
rights treaties and serves to "highlight US reluctance to accept international human rights 
standards and contradict any claim the nation might have to leadership" on these issues. 
(ibid.) She then offers the speculation that, 
US government officials in both the legislative and executive branches appear to 
believe that under no circumstances could an international formulation of human 
rights hold the potential for any improvement in the human rights of US citizens. 
(ibid. , 174) 
Another related assumption guiding the government's consideration of human 
rights instruments is identified by Kaufman as follows: 
... that no political objective, however strong, could outweigh the need to resist any 
possible legal alteration, however small, however unlikely. (ibid.) 
Kaufman asserts that it is only through knowledge of such assumptions that we are able 
" ... to understand otherwise incomprehensible reservations such as the need to reserve the 
right to execute [children and] pregnant women." (ibid., 159, 174) Kaufman concludes, in 
light of the findings of her analysis, that "one can see the assumption of controversy and 
opposition that is the legacy of the 1950s." (ibid., 174) 
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In Kaufman's view, it is undoubtedly a legacy of fear as opposed to reasonable 
concern which grew even stronger by the 1980s. President Reagan, after unexpectedly 
announcing his endorsement in 1984 during a campaign speech, finally received the advice 
and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1986. (ibid. , 181) Speaking to the assumption of 
human rights treaties being controversial or even dangerous, after thirty-eight years of 
Senate consideration the consent rendered was so laden with "advice" in the form of 
reservations, understandings and declarations, as to restrict the ability of the President to 
formally deposit this human rights treaty with the United Nations/or two more years. 
From Past to Present to Future? 
Kaufman concludes her book with an analysis of whether the opposition arguments 
against human rights treaties have continued to influence Senate consideration and 
debates, beyond the United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and through the final 
passage of the Genocide Convention. Kaufman presents "additional data" supporting the 
view that, stated in the extreme, the Bricker Amendment may just as well have been 
passed in the 1950s. This data is drawn from two studies which employ comparative 
analysis, interviews with ten Senate staff members who were granted anonymity, and the 
application of Kaufman's typology of arguments to Senate hearings. (ibid., 175-176) 
Kaufman's first investigation utilizes testimony from the 1979 hearings on four 
human rights treaties, sent to the Senate on February 23, 1978 by President Carter, to 
analyze the extent to which the opposition arguments have changed when compared to the 
testimony favoring the Bricker Amendment in the Senate hearings of 1953. (ibid., 176) 
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Kaufman limits the "content analysis" of this first investigation to " ... the testimony of 
those witnesses who either supported the Bricker Amendment in the 1953 hearings or 
opposed any of the treaties discussed at the 1979 hearings. n (ibid.) Eleven categories 
were identified by two independent coders and additional review was arranged for 
inconsistencies. (ibid., 177) 
Kaufman's results supported that the arguments of the 1953 hearings on the 
Bricker Amendment were substantially consistent with the arguments presented during the 
1979 hearings on the four human rights treaties transmitted by President Carter. She 
reports a 93.5% correlation between the arguments of 1953 and 1979. Additionally 
Kaufman notes: 
The two principle arguments in both periods-- that the treaties would diminish 
basic rights and violate states' rights-- held the same rankings and together 
accounted for a substantial proportion of the total arguments (38.2 percent in 1953 
and 56.1 percent in 1979). (ibid., 178) 
Kaufman's results support the view that little has changed with respect to opposition 
arguments since 1953. (ibid.) Kaufman does, however, note the emergence of two new 
arguments in 1979. The first addressed a "covenant provision on permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources." (ibid.) Of interest, the second argument was that American 
women would be deprived of"important protections," and is described by Kaufman as 
arising from "domestic opposition to the women's movement, particularly the Equal 
Rights Amendment." (ibid.) 
The second investigation combined information gleaned from interviews with 
Senate staff members, their ranking of five factors viewed as inhibiting Senate action on 
human rights treaties, and the application of Kaufman's typology of arguments to the 
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1980s Senate debates concerning the Genocide Convention. Speaking to the factors that 
were assessed by the ten Senate staff members in January of 1984, a nonpartisan analysis 
revealed the following ranking: 
( 1) Support . of administration, 
(2) Internal Senate politics, 
(3) Public opinion, 
(4) Content of treaties, and 
(5) Current international situation. (ibid., 180) 
In light of President Reagan's unexpected endorsement of the Genocide Convention, the 
swift approval of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and its formal enactment two 
years later, Kaufman concluded that the opinions provided by the Senate staff members 
were validated with respect to the need for the support of an administration. (ibid., 181, 
193) 
Upon reviewing the Senate hearings on the Genocide Convention in the 1980s, 
Kaufman confirms the continued use of opposition arguments which corresponded to both 
the Bricker Amendment hearings and the 1979 Senate hearings on four human rights 
treaties transmitted by President Carter. The typology developed by Kaufman cites nine 
basic arguments made against the ratification of human rights treaties. These arguments 
are identified as having the following impacts: 
(1) Diminish basic rights, 
(2) Violate states' rights, 
(3) Promote wodd government, 
( 4) Enhance Soviet / Communist influence, 
( 5) Subject citizens to trial abroad, 
(6) Threaten the US form of government, 
(7) Infringe on domestic jurisdiction, 
(8) Increase international entanglements, and 
(9) Create self-executing obligations. (ibid., 177) 
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In each instance, although not ranked for frequency, Kaufinan is able to show that these 
arguments persisted in the Senate hearings on the Genocide Convention in the 1980s. In 
addition, Kaufman notes that, "[W]hen the convention was approved, eight debilitating 
attachments were necessary to make the treaty acceptable to the necessary two-thirds 
majority in the Senate." (ibid., 182) 
Of particular note is the fact that Senator Jesse Helms staunchly opposed the 
Genocide Convention and he proved to be a major force in persuading the Senate that 
these extensive attachments, known as the Lugar-Helms Provisos of 1985, were 
necessary. (ibid., 145, 148, 184-193, 209-210) Further, despite taking an active role in 
drafting these attachments and advocating their acceptance by the Senate, Senator Helms 
remained among the eleven who voted against ratification. (ibid. , 148, 184) Kaufman's 
final conclusion is that ''the 1986 ratification of the Genocide Convention does not 
portend any significant change in the reception of human rights treaties in the United 
States Senate." (ibid., 5) While concurring with this assessment, it should also be noted 
that the outlook for human rights treaties such as CEDAW may have worsened since the 
1990 publication ofKaufinan's analysis. Indeed human rights may remain locked within 
the confines of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the years to come, under the 




In the preceding chapter, many questions were raised about the treatment of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women by the 
Senate in 1990. This, in turn, led to a more extensive review of the historically negative 
reaction of the Senate to human rights treaties in general, based primarily upon the work 
of Natalie Hevener Kaufman. Of note, however, CEDAW was not mentioned anywhere 
in Kaufman's analysis of action taken by Senate with respect to human rights treaties. 
Since determining the degree of information about CED AW available to the 
general public is a primary focus of the current analysis, it is important to examine or 
otherwise account for this omission. For example, it should be remembered that 
Kaufman's analysis primarily addressed the fate of human rights treaties which were 
subject to hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or had already been 
determined by the Senate. CEDAW, however, was not subject to a full hearing before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee until 1990, the year in which Kaufman's book was 
published. This being the case, any extensive discussion of CEDA W might be reasonably 
dismissed as inappropriate within the context of Senate action established by Kaufman. 
It should be noted, however, that despite the overall quality of Kaufman's work, 
CED AW was nevertheless omitted from her citation of the human rights treaties signed by 
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by President Carter. In discussing the results of interviews with ten Senate staff members, 
Kaufinan wrote: 
Respondents often referred to the Carter administration, which did sign three 
human rights treaties and formally supported their passage in the Senate [ emphasis 
added]. (Kaufinan 1990, 180) 
Kaufinan identified these three treaties as the United Nations Human Rights Covenants 
(i.e. consisting of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and the American Convention on 
Human Rights. (ibid., 176) 
Since it has been reasonably established that CEDA W was also among the human 
rights treaties signed by President Carter, what would account for this omission? First 
(and perhaps most likely), is the fact that Kaufinan's interviews were limited to the 1979 
Senate hearings on the package of four human rights treaties (including the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination signed in 1966) 
which were transmitted by President Carter to the Senate in 1978. There is, however, 
another possible explanation for the omission of CED AW. 
The reader will note that Kaufman's description of the treaties discussed in the 
interviews conducted includes the caveat that the treaties were ''formally supported" for 
passage by the Senate. Similar to the State Department terms ''under review" and 
"concluded by the Executive," it is unclear what this term actually means. Since CED AW 
was sent to the Senate without specific reservations, understandings, or declarations but 
noted areas of potential concern, it may well be the case that the treaty was not considered 
to have ''formal" support. In addition, CEDAW was transmitted to the Senate after 
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President Carter was defeated in his bid for re-election, a factor which also might affect 
how CEDAW was perceived by the individuals interviewed, in terms of this treaty having 
the formal support of the Administration. 
Senate Reconsideration of CEDA W 
In a personal letter dated January 6, 1994, Senator Claiborne Pell expressed his 
continued support for the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All F onns of 
Discrimination Against Women and optimism that the Foreign Relations Committee would 
" ... consider the Convention and work towards its ratification during the coming year." 
(Pell, 1994) In addition, the Chairman wrote that he had recently " ... urged President 
Clinton to send [the Committee] the package of necessary modifications which would 
allow Congress to act on the Convention." (ibid.) By the fall of 1994, the hopes 
expressed by Senator Pell were partially realized. 
On September 27th of 1994, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held its 
second full hearing on CEDAW. Lasting fifty-three minutes and with only Chairman Pell 
and Senator Paul Simon representing the Committee, the hearing was small and brief, but 
nonetheless, significant. Five individuals publicly testified, including Jamison S. Borek in 
her capacity as Deputy Legal Adviser for the Department of State. In contrast to Alan 
Kreczko in 1990, Ms. Borek appeared fully prepared before the Committee, supporting 
ratification and offering a detailed legal analysis of CED AW as well a package of 
reservations, understandings, and declarations proposed by the Clinton Administration. 
Ms. Borek was accompanied by another State Department official as well as by an official 
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from the Department of Justice who were " ... available to answer questions if necessary." 
(US Congress, Senate Hearing 1994, 2) 
After noting Chairman Pell's "strong support over many years for ratification," 
Ms. Borek began her sworn testimony on CEDAW, stating: 
We are also aware that a majority of the members of this committee, and indeed of 
the Senate as a whole, are on record in support of ratification. The administration 
shares that view. (ibid., 2-3) 
The Deputy Legal Adviser continued by summing up the history and status ofCEDAW 
for the United States in 1994 as follows: 
As you know, this Convention was adopted by the United Nations in December of 
1979. The United States did participate actively in its negotiation, voted in favor 
ofits adoption and signed it in July 1980. Until now, however, there has not been 
a final review of the conformity of the Convention with US law and a definitive 
proposal for ratification. We have now conducted such a review, and on the basis 
of its conclusions believe it is time to ratify. (ibid., 3) 
Unfortunately, in keeping with Natalie Hevener Kaufman's predictions, support of the 
Clinton Administration contained nine extensive conditions, consisting of four 
reservations, three understandings, and two declarations. In essence, these attachments 
were designed to nullify the impact of CEDA W upon ratification such that the US would 
not be obligated to meet any of the Convention's provisions which potentially conflicted 
or were not already covered by the laws of the United States. (see Appendix B) 
Official and Symbolic Support for Ratification 
The official submission of the CEDAW for active consideration by the United 
States Senate came from Secretary of State Warren Christopher. In a letter to Chairman 
Pell dated September 13, 1994 he wrote: 
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On behalf of the President, I am writing to convey the Administration's strong 
support for prompt ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women. As you are aware, this important human rights 
treaty has been pending before the Senate since 1980, when the United States 
signed it. Despite the expression of strong support for ratification by a wide 
spectrum of the non-governmental community at several Congressional hearings, 
prior Administrations did not embrace the Convention. Consequently the process 
of ratification has languished. Over 130 States [of the United Nations] are now 
parties to the Convention; the United States is not. It is time to remedy this 
situation. (US Congress, Senate Report 1994, 8-9) 
The Secretary of State continued by pointing to various recent strides that the United 
States had made in the field of human rights with respect to the promotion of universal 
rights for women under the Clinton Administration and offered several reasons why the 
ratification ofCEDAW would be in the best interests of the United States. 
Warren Christopher specifically mentioned the Fourth World Conference for 
Women to be held in Beijing the following year as a reason "to ratify this treaty promptly." 
(ibid., 9) In addition to the testimony provided at the hearing, twenty statements and two 
letters were submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee for inclusion in the record. 
The same sentiment voiced by the Secretary of State regarding the United States 
participation in the 1995 Beijing Conference was reiterated by approximately half of the 
submitted public statements from various non-governmental organizations. (US Congress, 
Senate Hearing 1994, 60, 61, 63, 67, 70, 73, 74, 75) 
This occurrence echoes one of the factors mentioned by Kaufman, namely a 
corresponding international event to which ratification of a given human rights instrument 
can be symbolically linked. The reader will recall that in the case of the Supplemental 
Slavery Convention, ratification occurred prior to what was designated International 
Human Rights Year, 1968. Similarly, the Convention on the Civil and Political Rights of 
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Women of 1952 was ratified prior to International Women's Year and the 1975 First 
World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and 
Peace held in Mexico City. The question in 1994 was whether or not the 1995 Fourth 
World Conference for Women would provide sufficient motivation to ratify CEDAW, 
especially in light of guarantees which could potentially enhance the rights of women both 
in the United States and abroad. 
Senate Comments Regarding Ratification 
The report issued by the Foreign Relations Committee cited four purposes which 
would be served through the ratification of CEDA W by the United States. They are as 
follows: 
First, [ratification] will reaffirm the United States' commitment to the principle of 
equality between men and women and to the promotion and protection of 
women's rights at home and abroad. Second, it will enhance the credibility and 
effectiveness of US efforts to lead the international community's efforts to end 
discrimination against women. Third, it will enable the United States to shape 
those efforts through participation in the work of the committee established by the 
Convention. Fourth, it will allow the United States to participate in the upcoming 
Fourth World Conference on Women as a party to the Convention, rather than as 
the one Western state that has refused to ratify. (US Congress, Senate Report 
1994, 3-4) 
In addition, the report addressed certain areas of international concern, public support for 
the ratification of CED AW and opposition arising over the issue of abortion, clarification 
of this issue with respect to CEDA W, and the degree of consistency between CEDA W 
and US law. (ibid., 4) 
Specifically, the 1994 report mentioned the ''violent human rights abuses 
committed against women in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Haiti" as examples which pointed to 
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the need for international protection and promotion ofwomen;s rights. (ibid.) Speaking 
to public support for the ratification ofCEDAW, the report described the support 
expressed during the three Senate hearings on CEDAW since 1988 as being "substantial" 
and representing "a broad range" of organizations. (ibid.) In response to concerns raised 
over abortion, the report stressed that CED AW is "abortion neutral." (ibid.) Despite this 
stated rejection of the view that CEDAW "creates an international right to abortion and 
sanctions abortion as a means of family planning," the Committee was nevertheless 
compelled to make this assurance explicit by voting to accept yet another, added 
understanding proposed by Senator Helms. (ibid.) 
As for the consistency ofCEDAW with US law, the report concluded that US law 
is "largely consistent with the provisions of the Convention." (ibid.) However, once again 
fulfilling Kaufman's predictions, the report stated, "In those few areas where US law and 
the Convention differ, the administration has proposed a reservation or other form of 
condition ... . " (ibid.) The reader may recall that Kaufman identified the use of attachments 
to prevent any alteration in US law (regardless of whether or not such alteration would be 
beneficial to US citizens) as being based upon a fundamental, ethnocentric assumption of 
the superiority of the laws of the United States, even though the US could exercise the 
option to "accept the obligation to bring its legal system into compliance" with any 
provision contained in a given human rights treaty such as CEDAW. (Kaufman 1990, 173) 
Public Opposition and the Abortion Issue 
Public submissions for inclusion in the 1994 Congressional Record (i.e. excluding 
the Departments of State and Justice) totaled twenty-five in number. Of these twenty-five, 
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twenty-three expressed support for ratification. With respect to the remaining two, the 
Ethics and Public Policy Center offered no opinion regarding the ratification ofCEDAW 
but requested an understanding that CEDAW would not grant an internationally 
recognized "right to abortion" or sanction "abortion-on-demand" as an acceptable form of 
"family planning." (US Congress, Senate Hearing 1994, 60) 
The sole statement opposing the ratification ofCEDAW was issued during the 
hearing by Cecilia Acevedo Royals for the National Institute ofWomenhood. Voicing 
similar concerns with respect to abortion, Ms. Royals framed her entire statement within 
the context of the UN International Conference on Population and Development which 
was assumed by Ms. Royals to have a direct or binding relationship to CEDAW. (ibid., 
19) While acknowledging the concern expressed over abortio°' the remainder of Ms. 
Royals' testimony consisted of broad generalizations, speculation, and emotional appeals 
that addressed CEDA W a manner which served to preclude dialogue and failed to adhere 
to the standards of critical thinking. An examination of the fallacies contained in the 
statements of Ms. Royals would undoubtably be helpful in furthering a basic understanding 
of the application of critical thinking processes. However, as is the case when confronting 
fallacies, an attempt to examine them fully often diverts discussion away from the issue at 
hand, in this case identifiying full and conditional public support or rejection with respect 
to the ratification of CEDA W. 
Chairman Pell addressed the concerns raised by Ms. Royals during the hearing, 
asking whether she approved of certain parts or disapproved of the treaty in its entirety. 
(ibid., 54) Ms. Royals responded that she did not entirely disapprove of the provisions 
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contained in CEDAW but asserted that " ... the parts that are good are already protected by 
our laws and our culture." (ibid.) This assertion is at the very least questionable unless 
Ms. Royals objected to the provisions of CEDA W not recognized by US law, such as the 
health care and employment provisions that guarantee rights including paid maternity 
leave, child care, free health services ( e.g. during and after pregnancy), and protections 
designed to guarantee job security, senority, and benefits in the event of pregnancy and the 
birth of a child. 
Ms. Royals specifically objected to " ... the language that says the rights of women 
to determine the number and spacing of their children and the means to do so" on the basis 
" ... that it be considered the rights of couples." (ibid.) Contrary to Ms. Royals' assertion, 
this provision specifies the need for the equality of both men and women in making this 
determination and does not specify or sanction any means for achieving this most private 
and intimate decision of men and women with regard to having children or planning their 
families in any way which would undermine personal or religious beliefs and practices. 
(see Appendix A) 
Chairman Pell appropriately called upon Robert Drinan. who represented the ABA 
at the 1994 hearing, for his reaction to Ms. Royals' statement. As a Jesuit priest, Drinan's 
ultimate allegiance is to the Catholic Church which opposes abortion under any 
circumstances. This allegiance would essentially prohibit him from offering personal 
testimony, in defiance to the Pope, in favor of a document promoting abortion. While it is 
truly unfortunate that the Holy See has yet to ratify CEDAW, this reluctance can be easily 
understood in relation to a desire to preserve the traditional (male) preisthood. 
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Drinan's response reiterated the view of the Department of State that CED AW is 
"abortion neutral." (US Congress, Senate Hearing 1994, 55) He added, in response to 
Ms. Royals' citation of China being a signatory of the Convention and its sanctioning of 
abortion as a national policy, " .. . that the coercion that everyone agrees goes on in China 
would be, as I see it, forbidden by CEDAW." (ibid.) Although it was not brought forth in 
the hearing, it is extremely important to note that Ms. Royals' citation of China is an 
example of what is known as "special pleading." In other words, Ms. Royals fails to take 
into account or acknowledge countries in which abortion is illegal (such as Ireland, which 
is also predominantly Catholic) that have also ratified CEDAW. 
Public Support for Ratification 
All of the remaining twenty-three public submissions voiced strong support for the 
ratification of CEDA W. In addition, eight offered specific statements regarding the 
proposed reservations, understandings, and declarations of the Clinton Administration and 
three additional submissions alluded to these attachments. Of the latter three, Yale Law 
School, for example, appeared to support the proposed attachments with the statement, 
"It will remain for the Congress and state legislatures to reach appropriate decisions on 
these questions" in reference to issues such as '1he status of women in combat," 
"comparable worth," and '1he availability of paid maternity leave" which the faculty 
members considered to be inconsistent with US law. (ibid., 84) The General Federation of 
Women's Clubs also urged the acceptance of the Clinton Administration's proposed 
package, but provided the reason " .. . so that the Senate can ratify without delay." (ibid., 
62) In contrast, Amnesty International USA appeared to reject the attached reservations, 
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understandings, and declarations, stating that ''the United States should be prepared to 
confonn itself to the same standards as other countries .. .. " (ibid. , 73) 
However, while each of the organizations cited above expressed strong support for 
ratification, only indirect references were made to the proposed reservations, 
understandings, and declarations. As a result, it is unclear whether they fully or 
conditionally supported or rejected acceptance of the proposed attachments. On the basis 
of this ambiguity, none of the three were included in the analysis which follows. 
Public Reaction to Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations 
Over one-third of the public organizations submitting statements for inclusion into 
the Congressional Record in support of the United States ratification ofCEDAW 
specifically addressed the issues of proposed reservations, understandings, and 
declarations. Ironically, the majority of studies and statements, reflecting expert and 
public opinion, disagreed with almost all of the attachments proposed by the Clinton 
Administration. Indeed, the strong opposition of the public to the proposed reservations, 
understandings, and declarations can perhaps be viewed as the emergence of a new 
phenomenon with respect to the ratification of human rights treaties by the United States. 
This opposition may even reflect a growing awareness of the US public that such 
attachments may in fact be unnecessary or undesirable roadblocks in the path to securing 
universal human rights for women both at home and abroad. 
As noted above, over one-third or, more precisely, eight of the twenty-three 
organizations supporting the ratification specifically addressed the proposed reservations, 
understandings, and declarations. Four of the eight urged that CED AW be ratified with 
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minimal, modified, or no attachments. Two organizations, namely the Meiklejohn Civil 
Liberties Institute and the Women's Environment and Development Organization, both 
issued statements calling for the unconditional ratification of CEDAW. (ibid., 63, 75) 
While three other organizations issued similar statements, the International Human 
Rights Law Group suggested a Senate ratification statement for one understanding and 
suggested a revision of an understanding regarding the protections of the First 
Amendment. Similaly, a second organization, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 
expressed that it was "deeply troubled" by the attachments proposed by the Clinton 
Administration, with the exception of the understanding concerning First Amendment 
rights. (ibid.; 77) Lastly, the Minority Rights Group (which detailed its rejection of 
several of the attachments), did not provide a position on one reservation, three 
understandings and one declaration. (ibid., 64-7) The analysis provided by this 
organization, however, concluded with the statement, "The Minority Rights Group urges 
the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification with maximal speed and minimal 
reservations." (ibid., 67) 
In order to clarify the positions of the organizations which both supported the 
ratification of CED AW and offered statements concerning the proposed attachments, it is 
necessary to present the responses submitted to each of the proposed attachments for 
inclusion into the Congrssional Record. Of the eight organizations falling into this 
category, as noted above, two simply offered statements rejecting the proposed 
attachments. The remaining six, however, provided fairly detailed analyses and rationales 
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for the rejection of specific reservations, understandings, or declarations which may serve 
as a basis for identifying the issues of debate. 
Public Organizations Addressing Proposed Attachments 
As noted earlier, the Clinton Administration's proposed package of conditions for 
the ratification ofCEDAW consisted of four reservations, three understandings, and two 
declarations. The six organizations which provided detailed analyses to the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations regarding these attachments are as follows: 
1) B'nai B'rith Women, represented by the law firm of Morrison and Forster, 
2) The American Bar Association, represented by Robert F. Drinan, S.J. of 
Georgetown University, 
3) The International Human Rights Law Group, represented by Executive 
Director Gay J. McDougall, 
4) The Minority Rights Group, submitted by Director Bernard Hamilton, 
5) Human Rights Watch, submitted by Executive Director Kenneth Roth, and, 
6) The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, jointly submitted by Executive 
Director Michael Posner, Program and Policy Director Stefanie Grant, and 
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund's Legal Director, Deborah A. Ellis 
and Martha F. Davis, Senior Staff Attorney. 
Upon reviewing the conclusions made by the six organizations with respect to each 
attachment, it indeed becomes possible to identify issues of debate and expose concerns 
raised for public consideration. 
The American Bar Association was among the organizations that provided a 
framework labeling each attachment identifying the areas of US laws that could potentially 
be affected by the ratification of the Convention. Using this framework, the reservations 
proposed included one relating to Private Conduct, a second addressing Combat 
Assignments, a third regarding Comparable Worth, and a fourth concerning Paid 
Maternity Leave. (ibid., 23-24) In turn, the proposed understandings included one relating 
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to Federal-State Implementation, a second addressing Freedom of Speech, Expression, 
and Association, and a third regarding Free Health Care Services. Lastly, the proposed 
declarations consisted of one concerning the status of CED AW as a Non Self-Executing 
Treaty and a second related to Dispute Settlement. (ibid., 24-25) 
Public Opinion and Proposed Reservations 
With respect to Private Conduct, half of the six organizations cited above offered 
qualified support for this reservation and the other half opposed it. Of the former, the 
ABA offered its support "in principle" in 1994. (ibid., 23) Although the 150-page analysis 
prepared on behalf ofB'nai B'rith was placed on file with the Foreign Relations 
Committee, it was not included in the printed transcipt but the testimony also reflected 
qualified support. The testimony on behalf of B 'nai B 'rith expressed the belief that this 
concern could be addressed by a ''First Amendment declaration" but offered to support the 
reservation as proposed. (ibid. , 18) Lastly, Human Rights Watch found the proposed 
recommendation to be ''unnecessarily narrow" and recommended that it be modified. 
(ibid., 68) 
The Combat Assignments reservation met with almost unanimous opposition. 
Four of the six organizations provided statements regarding this attachment. The 
remaining two failed to clarify their positions with respect to this issue. The Minority 
Rights Group simply omitted any reference to the reservation and the ABA, while not 
rejecting the reservation outright, referred to its policy of equality for women established 
in 1972. (ibid., 24) 
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The third resevation concerns Comparable Worth, a term which is not even 
mentioned in the text ofCEDAW. According to the Foreign Relations Committee report, 
however, the reservation was attached for the following reason: 
In the view of the administration, this provision [ Article 11 ( 1 )( d)] reflects a 
potentially broad definition of the concept of equal pay for women, requiring equal 
compensation for jobs judged to be of comparable worth according to requisite 
knowledge, skill, effort and responsibility, and considering the conditions under 
which the work is performed ... . a broader view than would comport with existing 
US law. (US Congress, Senate Report 1994, 6) 
This reservation, as was the case regarding Combat Assignments, faced strong objection. 
Two-thirds of the organizations cited stood in opposition to this proposal. Human Rights 
Watch omitted discussing the reservation. As for the remaining organization, the ABA 
took no position but pointed out that in 1984 it had not proposed any attachments " .. .in 
the employment area.'' (US Congress, Senate Hearing 1994, 24) 
The public opposition to the proposed Paid Maternity Leave reservation was even 
stronger. There was almost unanimous objection to this reservation. The sole exception 
came from the ABA which took "no specific position." (ibid.) 
Public Opinion: Proposed Understandings and Declara,tions 
As was noted previously, the Clinton Administration proposed three 
understandings, one which addressed Federal-State Implementation, a second which 
concerned Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Association, and a third which covered 
Free Health Care Services. The two declarations proposed addressed the status of 
CEDAW as a Non Self-Executing Treaty and the issue ofDispute Settlement. Each ofthe 
proposed understandings and declarations were met with varying degrees of opposition. 
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The Federal-State Implementation understanding faced opposition equal to the 
support for this attachment. Human Rights Watch and the Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights stood opposed to the understanding. In contrast, B 'nai B 'rith and the ABA 
both voiced support. The International Human Rights Law Group took a separate course, 
stating: 
Although unnecessary, the Law Group would not oppose the insertion of an 
Administration statement in the record at the Senate ratification hearing that the 
United States will fulfill its obligations under the Convention through means 
appropriate to the federal system. (ibid. , 50) 
In tum, the Minority Rights Group did not provide a position statement on this matter. 
The understanding concerning Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Association 
which was designed to protect First Amendment rights did not face blanket rejection by 
any of the six organizations. The Human Rights Law Group did, however, offer a revised 
understanding that they believed would be acceptable in addressing First Amendment 
concerns raised by both the proposed Private Conduct reservation as well as the Freedom 
of Speech, Expression, and Association understanding. The Minority Rights Group did 
not state opposition, support, or qualification regarding this issue. 
The final proposed understanding addresses Free Health Care Services. Three 
groups, B 'nai B 'rith, the ABA, and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, all 
objected to the Clinton Administration's proposed understanding. The remaining 
organizations did not provide any position statements concerning this attachment. 
The first proposed declaration, recommending the status ofCEDAW upon 
ratification be that of a Non Self-Executing Treaty, received a mixed reaction. Only one 
organization, namely the ABA, went on record in full support of the declaration. The 
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statement for B'nai B'rith indicated that the organization was "prepared to accept" this 
attachment, but did not voice full support. (ibid., 18) The Minority Rights Group did not 
issue any statement regarding this issue and the remaining three organizations stood in 
opposition to the declaration. 
The second and last delaration regarding Dispute Settlement was met with even 
stronger opposition than the first. Once again, B 'nai B 'rith went on record as being 
"prepared to accept" this attachment but did not state that this declaration was one that 
the organization would have chosen to support. (ibid., 18) The remaining five 
organizations were both unanimous and strong in their opposition. The ABA even went 
as far as presenting a resolution passed by the House of Delegates in August of 1994, 
recommending " ... that the United States Government present a declaration recognizing as 
compulsory the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice" and provided the form 
that such a declaration should take. (ibid., 29-30) 
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CHAPTER VII 
CLOSING THE BOOK ON CEDAW? 
The first steps in the process for the ratification of a treaty are the responsibilities 
of Presidents. In sum, a treaty must be signed and then transmitted to the Senate for its 
advice and consent. When a treaty is sent to the Senate, it is accompanied by a review of 
its contents with respect to its consistency with the current laws of the United States. This 
review involves several government agencies and is coordinated by the Depattment of 
State. 
Once a treaty is received by the Senate, it is subject to three possible actions, in 
accordance with Rule XXX concerning Executive Session-- Proceedings on Treaties. 
Section I . (a) of this rule stipulates: 
When a treaty shall be laid before the Senate for ratification, it shall be read a first 
time, and no motion in respect to it shall be in order, except to refer it to a 
committee, to print it in confidence for the use of the Senate, or to remove the 
injunction of secrecy. (US Congress, Senate 1993, 56) 
It should be recalled that, in the case ofCEDAW, the injunction of secrecy was removed 
and it was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee upon its receipt on 
November 12, 1980. 
As it has already been shown, it is possible for a human rights treaty to remain 
within the confines of this Committee for decades without being subject to public hearings 
or further Senate action. In the case of CED AW, it was eight years before a Senate 
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subcommittee field hearing took place and ten years before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee first publicly addressed this treaty. In both instances, no action was taken by 
the Committee which would allow CEDAW to be subjected to a vote by the full Senate 
for its advice and consent to ratification. 
Record of Action? 
In 1994, however, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did take action on 
CEDA W which would allow for its consideration by the full Senate. Despite the 
acceptance of nine extensive ( and mostly unnecessary) conditions, CEDA W was favorably 
voted out of the Committee on September 29, 1994 and sent back to the Senate for the 
first time after nearly fourteen years. (US Congress, Senate Report 1994, 3) Although the 
vote of the Foreign Relations Committee was split, the recommendation that CEDAW be 
ratified retained a comfo11able simple majority, with thirteen in favor and five against. 
(ibid.) 
The Committee report issued to the Senate consisted of fifty-four pages divided 
into eleven sections. The repott on CEDA W contained statements on the following: 1) 
purpose, 2) background, 3) Committee action, 4) Committee comments, 5) Major 
provisions, 6) Relationship to US law, 7) Clinton administration conditions, 8) Clinton 
administration submission, 9) Cost estimate, 10) Text of the resolution of ratification, and 
11) Minority views. (ibid., 1) While most of the sections identified are self-explanatory, 
others are of particular interest, especially with respect to how they might affect the 
reception ofCEDAW by the full Senate and the requirement that two-thirds of the 
Senators present agree to its ratification. 
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In 1994, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee not only accepted the entire 
package of conditions proposed by the Clinton Administration, but also added another 
known as the "Helms understanding." (ibid., 3) It seems incredulous, in light of the 
predominantly negative public reaction to the proposed reservations, understandings, and 
declarations and long-standing public support of CED AW, that the Committee did not 
attempt to amend these conditions except to add another unnecessary declaration. This is 
as ironic as it is unfortunate, considering a reaffirmation was reported to have been made 
at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna that member States of the 
United Nations should limit ''the extent of any reservations * * * and regularly review any 
reservations with a view to withdrawing them." (US Congress, Senate Hearing 1994, 37) 
Further, there was reported to have been "voiced concern" regarding CEDAW, 
specifically concern over the "particularly large number of reservations to the 
Convention." (ibid.) 
Minority Views Opposing the Ratification of CEDA W 
The five-person minority of the Foreign Relations Comnuttee opposing the 
ratification of CEDA W wrote a two-page position statement for inclusion in the 
Committee's repott to the full Senate. Tlus statement consists of three principle 
arguments, entitled "Dilution of moral suasion," Diversion of resources" and ''Better 
approaches." (US Congress, Senate Repo1t 1994, 53-54) The latter two arguments rely 
on the basic rejection ofCEDAW on the grounds that: 1) focusing on ratification diverts 
"resources ( despite the estimate that ratification would cost notlung) and political will" 
away from promoting the standards CEDA W creates, and 2) that CEDA W is an 
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"unenforceable" treaty to which the United States need not become a party in order to 
"criticize or encourage other governments in their practices regarding women/' but offers 
nothing with respect to identifying ''better approaches." (ibid., 50, 54) 
The first argument regarding "dilution of moral suasion," however, is of particular 
interest. This section also received the highest degree of attention in the minority's 
position statement. Ironically, the points made in this argument could easily be applied to 
arguments in s1,pport of ratification and in rejecting extensive, unnecessary, or 
undesirable allachmenls. First, the minority contended that, 
Because the convention depends to a great extent on the voluntary compliance of 
States, we are hesitant to invest much hope that it will lead to real changes in the 
lives of women .. .. [and] it is unlikely to convince governments to make policy 
changes they otherwise would avoid. (ibid., 53) 
While volunta1y compliance is true for most member States of the United Nations, in 
accordance witl1 the Constitution of the United States, ratification would codify into 
national law the standards established by CEDAW. 
This being the case, it would become the responsibility of America to internally 
mandate progressive change with respect to viewing women's rights as human rights. 
Faced with such a challenge, perhaps United States would assume a position ofleadership 
in this area and provide a model for governments worldwide. It would seem that the best 
way to avoid this national challenge and global responsibility to over one-half of the 
population would be to either block the ratification ofCEDAW or dismantle its objectives 
through the attachment of extensive, unnecessary, and incompatible conditions prior to its 
acceptance. 
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Second, the minority asserted a need to "guard against treaties that overreach" in 
protecting and improving individual rights. (ibid.) An attempt was then made to connect 
this assertion with a grave moral risk. The minority argued that, 
We must take care not to promise more than we can deliver or we risk diluting the 
moral suasion that undergrids existing covenants on fundamental human rights. 
(ibid.) 
Multiple examples of ideas and goals can be cited throughout the history of the United 
States, and indeed the entire world, which undoubtedly were considered at the time of 
their pursuit to be "overreaching." They include everything from the abolition of slavery 
and securing the rights of women to speak, vote, or otherwise participate fully in society, 
to the exploration of space. Viewing human rights as unattainable and as something to be 
avoided, however, undermines even trying to facilitate progress toward actualizing ideals, 
as embodied by treaties such as CEDAW. 
Minority Views Regarding Attachments and Enforcement? 
Lastly, and most ironic of all of the statements offered in this section of argument 
offered in opposition to the ratification of CEDA W, the minority cited the attachments of 
both State parties to the convention, as well as those proposed by the United States, as a 
major reason not to ratify. (ibid., 53-54) Paradoxically, Senator Helms (who replaced 
Senator Pell as the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the following session 
of Congress), for example, pursued the acceptance of an additional understanding then 
joined with the minority in voting against the ratification of CED AW, citing the problem 
of attachments. Senator Helms joined the minority in making the argument that the 
adoption of conditions contrary to the intentions ofCEDAW are not subject to "serious 
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opposition," and thus, "cheapen the coin" of treaties addressing human rights. (ibid.) 
What makes this more bizarre is the fact that such complaints regarding a lack of 
opposition and enforcement against attaching conditions contrary to the "object and 
purpose" of CED AW would even be voiced by the Senate, let alone taken with any degree 
of seriousness. 
One need recall not only the Bricker Amendment, but also the historical aversion 
of the United States with respect to accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the World 
Court, i.e. the International Court of Justice, or ICJ. This aversion can be identified as 
early as 1946 by the Connally Amendment to the UN Charter which excluded the Court 
from having jurisdiction over "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United 
States of America [emphasis added]." (US Congress, Senate Hearing 1994, 31) Fear of 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ is also evidenced by the reaction to the Court's ruling of 1986 
against the United States in the case oflvlilitary and Paramilitary Aclivilies in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) which was brought before the 
Court in 1984. (United Nations 1986, 103-104) In response to the ruling, the United 
States withdrew its declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ that same 
year. (US Congress, Senate Hearing 1994, 30) Of note, despite the American Bar 
Association's recommendation in 1994 that the United States again submit a declaration 
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (ibid., 29-30), this recommendation 
was rejected in the report issued by the Foreign Relations Committee to the full Senate. 
(US Congress, Senate Report 1994, 49-50) 
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Speaking generally to the concern expressed by the minority over conditions 
attached to CEDAW, the position statement offered the following summation: 
The large number of reservations, understandings and declarations [S]tates found it 
necessaty to adopt with respect to this convention, combined with an appat·ent 
inability to prohibit even the broadest reservations, indicate that CEDA W may 
reach beyond the necessarily restrictive scope of an effective human rights treaty 
[emphasis added]. (ibid., 54) 
While the argument leading to this conclusion relied heavily on special pleading ( e.g. in its 
one-sided emphasis on Libya's conditions in becoming an official party to CEDAW), this 
fallacy is minor in comparison to the major flaws in reasoning contained in the minority's 
statement and conclusion as a whole. 
In truth, an entire book could be devoted to exposing the flaws of the minority's 
position through the application of critical thinking processes. In applying Perry Weddle's 
Argument: A Guide to Criticai Thinking to the views offered by the minority, for example, 
one finds flaws which are discussed in essentially every chapter of this book. These flaws 
range from the fallacies of oversimplification or diversion (in the form of improper 
questions, false dilemmas, straw man arguments, stereotyping, half-truths, black/white 
thinking, and appeals to ignorance) and "tu quoque" arguments appealing to authority, 
through errors of generality, comparison (e.g. through the improper use of analogical 
reasoning), and cause. (Weddle 1978, 17-188) 
In sum, what is presented by the minority is not an mgument at all. Rather, what 
is offered are unsubstantiated assertions which rely upon numerous fallacies to provide the 
appearance of an argument. Nothing is offered in evidence, for example, that a treaty 
must be "necessarily restrictive" in scope in order to be effective. Neither is it shown that 
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the alleged "apparent" inability to temper broad conditions made by parties to CEDAW is 
an actual inability. 
Lastly, and most disturbing of all, the minority criticizes the conditions of other 
nations as if the exceptions cited by one nation were common to all. In turn, this is 
utilized to represent a general concern that CEDAW is inherently flawed such that it 
cannot bridge cultural, political, and religious differences. Acknowledging the delicate 
balance necessary to incorporate the ideals of CEDAW internationally, the attachments 
offered by other nations can be more readily understood as reflecting idiosyncratic issues 
of different countries and, accordingly, differing views regarding how to best protect and 
address these domestic concerns. 
As a nation, however, we should not fall prey to attempts to obfuscate the issues 
raised by CEDA W through the unsubstantiated ( and unrealistic) assumption of a "common 
thread" of objections between nations. Rather, we must recognize and counter, through 
reason, attempts to raise the importance of the parts to the extent that they become more 
significant than the whole. Nor should we blindly accept the unfounded assertion that the 
United States must either present extensive conditions in order to ratify or reject CEDAW 
on the basis of what other nations have done. 
The Question of Conditions and Consent of the Senate 
As Chairman Pell had acknowledged four years earliet, "Obviously, without 
administration support, a treaty stands almost no chance of being approved by the 
Senate." (US Congress, Senate Hearing 1990, 1) Given that this is a reasonable 
assessment, the Senate would appear to have little choice but to accept the conditions for 
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ratification proposed by the Department of State and approved by the President. In tum, 
one would have to question, however, whether or not it would be possible for the 
President to obtain the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate for the ratification 
ofCEDAW without approving the conditions proposed in 1994. 
Of note, Robert Drinan's prepared testimony for the 1994 hearing before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee included both a brief summation of the history of 
CEDAW and mentioned action taken by members of the Senate the previous year. The 
relevant aspect of this testimony provides the following overview: 
The United States played a major role in drafting the Convention, as adopted by 
the United Nations on December 18, 1979. President Carter signed the document 
on July 17, 1980, and submitted it to the Senate on November 12, 1980. Although 
ten years later, in the summer of 1990, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
held hearings on the Convention, the Senate took no further action until the spring 
of 1993, when 68 members of the Senate signed a letter asking President Clinton 
to take the necessary steps to ratify the treaty. Last summer, at the United Nations 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, Austria, Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher stated that the Administration was prepared to move on the Women's 
Convention, as well as other human rights treaties. (US Congress, Senate Hearing 
1994, 21) 
While the support of sixty-eight Senators would meet the requisite two-thirds majority 
vote in order to ratify CED AW, the margin for success would rest upon only two votes. 
In sum, if only two of the Senators who signed the 1993 letter to the President reversed 
their supportive views and no other Senators were to vote affinnatively, CEDAW would 
be defeated and returned to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
Despite the fact that CEDAW was favorably voted out of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, the treaty was never voted upon by the full Senate. CEDAW was simply not 
placed on the agenda in 1994 prior to the close of the 103rd Congress. Thus, although 
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CEDAW was not defeated by failing to obtain an affirmative vote for ratification by two-
thirds of the Senate, the end result was the same. Without media attention or broad public 
debate, CEDAW was quietly and indefinitely returned to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. 
Many may wonder how this could possibly happen. The answer is as simplistic as 
it is unfortunate. In accordance with Rule XXX, section (2), such an event is automatic. 
The relevant section states: 
Treaties transmitted by the President to the Senate for ratification shall be resumed 
at the second or any subsequent session of the same Congress at the stage in which 
they were left at the final adjournment of the session at which they were 
transmitted; but all proceedings on treaties shall terminate with the Congress, and 
they shall be resumed at the commencement of the next Congress as if no 
proceedings had previously been had thereon [ emphasis added]. (US Congress, 
Senate 1993, 5 7) 
The Congressional Quarterly confirmed the Foreign Relations Committee triumph and, of 
the unceremonious "defeat" of CED AW, remarked, "However, the Senate did not take 
up the treaty before adjourning." (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994, 471) 
It is certainly possible that CED AW was never placed on the agenda to be voted 
upon because it would not have passed. It is equally possible that potential votes 
supporting the ratification of CED AW were "traded off' to carry the vote of the Senate 
on other issues. It is common that favors are owed between Senators and, unfortunately, 
votes become the bargaining chips. 
In the case of CED AW, it is unlikely that the public will ever definitively know 
what happened or why. What is known is that the process of ratifying CEDAW must 
begin all over again. Further, it can be asserted that this process will require a concerted 
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effort to protect this human rights treaty from being lost or buried, particularly by 
inattention on the part of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Indeed, deciding the 
issue of the ratification of CED AW now appears to rest upon the actions of concerned 
citizens to insure that this human rights treaty will be reconsidered by both the government 
of the United States and the American public as a whole. 
CEDA W and the Generation of Public Interest 
As has been shown throughout the preceding pages, CEDAW has not been made 
readily accessible for consideration by the general public. In one respect, this thesis is an 
attempt to fill a portion of this void. In another, it attempts to reveal the need for the 
public to approach ill-defined and vaguely understood issues, such as viewing women's 
rights as human rights, from a critical thinking perspective. 
One important factor regarding the apparent inaccessibility of CEDA W was 
identified as resulting from the failure of the mass media to inform the public. Another 
was the failure of the government to initiate action which would allow for the serious 
consideration of this treaty. These conditions may, however, be gradually changing. 
As recently as April 7, 1997, Newsweek carried an article which indicated a 
renewed interest in CEDAW. In discussing the First Lady's tour of Africa with a focus on 
the international plight of women, Matthew Cooper noted a shift in America's foreign 
policy directed toward the advancement of women. (Cooper 7 April 1997, 58-60) Cooper 
also noted that, ''The shift in policy has become only more pronounced under new 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright." (ibid., 58) The report continued with the 
following statement: 
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Just last week Albright traveled to North Carolina, the home state of Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee chairman Jesse Helms, to argue for approval of the 
United Nations' convention on women's rights. The international treaty, which 
compels signatories to battle sex discrimination, is languishing in the Senate. (ibid.) 
This may indicate a renewed interest in ratifying CEDAW on the part of the 
Adrninistration. Additionally, despite the fact that this treaty was still not clearly identified 
or named, the reference made to CEDA W may indicate a growing public awareness. In 
sum, while much progress stiU needs to be made in bringing CEDA W to the attention of 
the public, such references, however indirect, represent a beginning. 
In turn, the American public must respond when issues of such significance are 
opened for public consideration. For example, this thesis (while by no means exhaustive) 
is a product of pursuing numerous avenues for both gathering information and expressing 
opinions formulated over time. Among the most productive avenues for both purposes 
proved to be writing letters to various individuals, and writing again if the letters went 
unanswered. 
As individual citizens, it is our civic duty to question and to make our opinions 
known to those who represent us if, indeed, we are to maintain the ideals of a well-
informed democracy. As a nation, we should not stand idly by when issues such as human 
rights are left undisclosed and undecided. As one public official noted, for example, when 
looking for the Charter of the United Nations in the law library of the Department of 
State: 
We went to get the books off the shelves, and they were literally covered with 
dust. (Curtius 27 January 1992, 4) 
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One can only hope that after over a decade and a half, CEDAW will be among the books 
removed from these very shelves and opened for thorough public inspection and fair-
minded debate in accordance with the standards of critical thinking. 
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APPENDIX A 
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 
The Stales Parties to the present Convention, 
Noting that the Charter of the United Nations reaffirms faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and 
women, 
Noling that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the principle of the 
inadmissibility of discrimination and proclaims that all human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set 
forth therein, without distinction of any kind, including distinction based on sex, 
Noting that the States Parties to the International Covenants on Human Rights 
have the obligation to ensure the equal rights of men and women to enjoy all economic, 
social, cultural, civil and political rights, 
Considering the international conventions concluded under the auspices of the 
United Nations and the specialized agencies promoting equality of rights of men and 
women, 
Noting also the resolutions, declarations and recommendations adopted by the 
United Nations and the specialized agencies promoting equality of rights men and women, 
Concerned, however, that despite these various instruments extensive 
discrimination against women continues to exist, 
Recalling that discrimination against women violates the principles of equality of 
rights and respect for human dignity, is an obstacle to the participation of women, on 
equal terms with men, in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their countries, 
hampers the growth of the prosperity of society and the family and makes more difficult 
the full development of the potentialities of women in the service of their countries and of 
humanity, 
Concerned that in situations of poverty women have the least access to food, 
health, education, training and opportunities for employment and other needs, 
Convinced that the establishment of the new international economic order based 
on equity and justice will contribute significantly towards the promotion of equality 
between men and women, 
Emphasizing that the eradication of apartheid, of all forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, colonialism, neo-colonialism, aggression, foreign occupation and 
domination and intetference in the internal affairs of States is essential to the full 
enjoyment of the rights of men and women, 
Affirming that the strengthening of international peace and security, the relaxation 
of international tension, mutual co-operation and among all States irrespective of their 
social and economic systems, general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear 
disarmament under strict and effective international control, the affirmation of the 
principles of justice, equality and mutual benefit in relations among countries and the 
realization of the right of peoples under alien and colonial domination and foreign 
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occupation to self-determination and independence, as well as respect for national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, will promote social progress and development and as 
a consequence will contribute to the attainment of full equality between men and women, 
Convinced that the full and complete development of a countiy, the welfare of the 
world and the cause of peace require the maximum participation of women on equal terms 
with men in all fields, 
Bearing in mind the great contribution of women to the welfare of the family and 
to the development of society, so far not fully recognized, the social significance of 
maternity and the role of both parents in the family and in the upbringing of children, and 
aware that the role of women in procreation should not be a basis for discrimination but 
that the upbringing of children requires a sharing of responsibility between men and 
women and society as a whole, 
A ware that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in 
society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between men and women, 
Determined to implement the principles set forth in the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women and, for that purpose, to adopt the 1neasures 
required for the elimination of such discrimination in all its forms and manifestations, 
Having agreed on the following: 
PART I 
ARTICLE 1 
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "discrimination against 
women" shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which 
has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise 
by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of 
human rights and fundamental freedom in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or 
any other field. 
ARTICLE 2 
States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to 
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination 
against women and, to this end, undertake: 
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national 
constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, 
tlll'ough law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle; 
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions 
where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; 
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with 
men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the 
effective protection of women against any act of discrimination; 
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(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against 
women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with 
this obligation; 
(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by 
any person, organization or enterprise; 
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish 
existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against 
women; 
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against 
women. 
ARTICLE3 
States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic, 
and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full 
development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the 
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality 
with men. 
ARTICLE4 
I. Adoption by States Parties of temporaty spedal measures aimed at accelerating 
de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as 
defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the 
maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued when 
the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved. 
2. Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including those measures 
contained in the present Convention, aimed at protecting maternity shall not be considered 
discriminato1y. 
ARTICLE 5 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: 
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with 
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices 
which ai·e based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on 
stereotyped roles for men and women; 
(b) To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity 
as a social function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women 
in the upbringing and development of their children, it being understood that the interest 
of the children is the primordial consideration in all cases. 
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ARTICLE 6 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measure, including legislation, to suppress 
all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women. 
PART II 
ARTICLE 7 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure 
to women, on equal terms with men, the right: 
(a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to 
all publicly elected bodies; 
(b) To participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation 
thereof and to hold public office and pe1fonn all public functions at all levels of 
government; 
(c) To participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned 
with the public and political life of the country. 
ARTICLE 8 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to women, on equal 
terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their 
Governments at the international level and to participate in the work of international 
organizations. 
ARTICLE 9 
1. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or 
retain their nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor 
change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the 
nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the 
husband. 
2. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the 




States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of education 
and in particular to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: 
(a) The same conditions for career and vocational guidance, for access to studies 
and for the achievement of diplomas in educational establishments of all categories in rural 
as well as urban areas; this equality shall be ensured in pre-school, general, technical, 
professional and higher technical education, as well as in all types of vocational training; 
(b) Access to the same cunfoula, the same exaniinations, teaching staff with 
qualifications of the same standard and school premises and equipment of the same 
quality; 
( c) The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women at 
all levels and in all forms of education by encouraging coeducation and other types of 
education which will help to achieve this aim and, in particular, by the revision of 
textbooks and school programmes and the adaptation of teaching methods; 
( d) The same opportunities to benefit from scholarships and other study grants; 
(e) The same opportunities for access to programmes of continuing education, 
including adult and functional literacy programmes, particularly those aimed at reducing, 
at the earliest possible time, any gap in education existing between men and women; 
(f) The reduction of female student drop-out rates and the organization of 
programmes for girls and wotnen who have left school prematurely; 
(g) The same opportunities to participate actively in sports and physical education; 
(h) Access to specific educational information to help to ensure the health and 
well-being of families, including information and advice on family planning. 
ARTICLE 11 
1. States Pat1ies shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men 
and women, the same rights, in particulai·: 
(a) The right to work as inalienable right of all human beings; 
(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of 
the same criteria for selection in matters of employment; 
( c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, 
job security and all benefits and conditions of service and the right to receive vocational 
training and retraining, including apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and 
recurrent training; 
( d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in 
respect to work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the 
quality of work; 
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(e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement, unemployment, 
sickness, invalidity and old age and other incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid 
leave; 
(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including 
the safeguarding of the function of reproduction. 
2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage 
or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take 
appropriate measures: 
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of 
pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital 
status; 
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits 
without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances; 
(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to 
enable parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in 
public life, in particular through promoting the establishment and development of a 
network of child-care facilities; 
(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work 
proved to be harmful to them. 
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article shall be reviewed 
periodically in the light of scientific and technological knowledge and shall be revised, 
repealed or extended as necessary. 
ARTICLE 12 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men 
and women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning. 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, States Parties 
shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement 
and the post-natal period granting, :free services where necessary, as well as adequate 
nutrition during pregnancy and lactation. 
ARTICLE 13 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in other areas of economic and social life in order to ensure, on a basis of 
equality of men and women, the same rights in particular: 
( a) The right to family benefits; 
(b) The right to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit; 
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( c) The right to participate in recreational activities, sports and all aspects of 
cultural life. 
ARTICLE 14 
1. States Parties shall take into account the particular problems faced by rural 
women and the significant roles which rural women play In the economic survival of their 
families, including their work in the non-monetized sectors of the economy, and shall take 
all appropriate measures to ensure the application of the provisions of this Convention to 
women in rural areas. 
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and wome~ 
that they participate in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall ensure 
to such women the right: 
(a) To participate in the elaboration and implementation of development planning 
at all levels; 
(b) To have access to adequate health care facilities, including information, 
counselling and services in family planning; 
(c) To benefit directly from social security programmes; 
(d) To obtain all types of training and education, formal and non-formal, including 
that relating to functional literacy, as well as, inter alia, the benefit of all community and 
extension services, in order to increase their technical proficiency~ 
(e) To organize self-help groups and co-operatives in order to obtain equal access 
to economic opportunities through employment or self-employment; 
(f) To participate in all community activities; 
(g) To have access to agricultural credit and loans, marketing facilities, 
appropriate technology and equal treatment in land and agrarian reform as well as in land 
resettlement schemes; 
(h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, 
sanitatio~ electricity and water supply, transp01t and communications. 
PARTIV 
ARTICLE 15 
1. States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law. 
2. States Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical 
to that of men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, they 
shall give women equal rights to conclude contracts and to administer property and shall 
treat them equally in all stages of procedure in courts and tribunals. 
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3. States Parties shall agree that all contracts and all other private instruments of 
any kind with a legal effect which is directed at restricting the legal capacity of women 
shall be deemed null and void. 
4. States Parties shall accord to men and women the same rights with regard to 
the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and 
domicile. 
ARTICLE 16 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular 
shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: 
(a) The same right to enter into marriage; 
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with 
their free and full consent; 
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution; 
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital 
status in matters relating to their children; in all cases the interest of the children shall be 
paramount; 
( e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of 
their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them 
to exercise these rights; 
(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, 
ttusteeship and adoption of children, or similar institutions where these concepts exist in 
national legislation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount; 
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a 
family name, a profession and an occupation; 
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, 
management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of 
charge or for a valuable consideration. 
2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all 
necessary actio~ including legislation shall be taken to specify a minimum age for 
marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory. 
PARTY 
ARTICLE 17 
1. For the purpose of conside1ing the progress made in the implementation of the 
present Convention, there shall be established a Committee on the Elimination of 
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Discrimination Against Women (herein after referred to as the Committee) consisting, at 
the time of entry into force of the Convention, of eighteen and, after ratification of or 
accession to the Convention by the thirty-fifth State Party, of twenty-three experts of high 
moral standing and competence in the field covered by the Convention. The experts shall 
be elected by States Parties from among their nationals and shall serve in their personal 
capacity, consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the 
representation of the different forms of civilization as well as the principal legal systems. 
2. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list of 
persons nominated by States Parties. Ead1 State Party may nominate one person from 
among its own nationals. 
3. The initial election shall be held six months after the date of the entry into force 
of the present Convention. At least three months before the date of each election the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall address a letter to the States Parties inviting 
them to submit their nominations within two months. The Secretary-General shall prepare 
a list in alphabetical order of all persons thus nominated, indicating the States Parties 
which have nominated them, and shall submit it to the States Parties. 
4. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at a meeting of States 
Parties convened by the Secretary-General at United Nations Headquarters. At that 
meeting, for which two-thirds of the States Patties shall constitute a quorum, the persons 
elected to the Committee shall be those nominees who obtain the largest number of votes 
and an absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of States Parties present and 
voting. 
5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four years. 
However, the terms of nine of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the 
end of two years; immediately after the first election the names of these nine members 
shall be chosen by lot by the Chairman of the Committee. 
6. The election of the five additional members of the Committee shall be held in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this article, following the 
thirty-fifth ratification or accession. The terms of two of the additional members elected 
on this occasion shall expire at the end of two years, the names of these two members 
having been chosen by lot by the Chairman of the Committee. 
7. For the filling of casual vacancies, the State Party whose expert has ceased to 
function as a member of the Committee shall appoint another expert from among its 
nationals, subject to the approval of the Committee. 
8. The members of the Committee shall, with the approval of the General 
Assembly, receive emoluments from the United Nations resources on such terms and 
conditions as the Assembly may decide, having regard to the importance of the 
Committee's responsibilities. 
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9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the necessary staff 
and facilities for the effective performance of the functions of the Committee under the 
present Convention. 
ARTICLE 18 
1. States Parties undertake to submit to the Secretruy-General of United Nations, 
for consideration by the Committee, a report on the legislative, judicial, administrative or 
other measures which they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of the present 
Convention and on the progress made in this respect: 
(a) Within one year after the ent1y into force for the State concerned; 
(b) Thereafter at least every four years and further whenever the Committee so 
requests. 
2. Reports may indicate factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfillment 
of obligations under the present Convention. 
ARTICLE 19 
1. The Committee shall adopt its own mles of procedure. 
2. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years. 
ARTICLE20 
1. The Committee shall normally meet for a period of not more than two weeks 
annually in order to consider the reports submitted in accordance with article 18 of the 
present Convention. 
2. The meetings of the Committee shall normally be held at United Nations 
Headquarters or at any other convenient place as determined by the Committee. 
ARTICLE21 
1. The Committee shall, through the Economic and Social Council, repmt 
annually to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its activities and may make 
suggestions and general reconunendations based on the examination of reports and 
information received from the States Patties. Such suggestions and general 
recommendations shall be included in the report of the Committee together with 
comments, if any, from States Parties. 
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2. The Secretary-General shall transmit the reports of the Committee to the 
Commission on the Status of Women for its information. 
ARTICLE22 
The specialized agencies shall be entitled to be represented at the consideration of 
the imp]ementation of such provisions of the present Convention as fall within the scope of 
their activities. The Committee may invite the specialized agencies to submit reports on 
the implementation of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their activities. 
PART VI 
ARTICLE23 
Nothing in this Convention shall affect any provisions that are more conducive to 
the achievement of equality between men and women which may be contained: 
(a) In the legislation of a State Party; or 
(b) In any other international convention, treaty or agreement in force for that 
State. 
ARTICLE24 
States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures at the national level aimed 
at achieving the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Convention. 
ARTICLE 25 
1. The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States. 
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is designated as the depositary of 
the present Convention. 
3. The present Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification 
shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
4. The present Convention shall be open to accession by all States. Accession 
shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations. 
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ARTICLE26 
1. A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time 
by any State Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations. 
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the steps, if any, 
to be taken in respect of such a request. 
ARTICLE27 
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date 
of deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of 
ratification or accession. 
2. For each State ratifying the present Convention or acceding to it after the 
deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shalJ enter 
into force on the thirtieth day after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of 
ratification or accession. 
ARTICLE28 
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all 
States the text of reservations made by States at the time of ratification or accession. 
2. A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present 
Convention shall not be pennitted. 
3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification to this effect 
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall then inform alJ States 
thereof Such notification shall take effect on the date on which it is received. 
ARTICLE29 
1. Any dispute between two or more States Pruties concerning the interpretation 
or application of the present Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the 
request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of 
the request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the 
arbitration, any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of 
Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court. 
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2. Each State Party may at the time of signature or ratification of the present 
Convention or accession thereto declare that it does not consider itself bound by 
paragraph 1 of this article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by that paragraph 
with respect to any State Party which has made such a reservation. 
3. Any State Party which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 
of this article may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. 
ARTICLE30 
The present Convention, the Arabic, Chinese, English. French, Russian and 
Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations. 





PROPOSED RESERVATIONS, UNDERSTANDINGS Al'ID DECLARATIONS OF 
THE UNTIED STATES 
(US Congress, Senate Repott 1994) 
Private Conduct 
Reservation (1): The Constitution and laws of the United States establish ex.tensive 
protections against discrimination, reaching all fonns of governmental activity as well as 
significant areas of non-governmental activity. However, individual privacy and freedom 
from governmental inte1ference in ptivate conduct are also recognized as among the 
fundamental values of our free and democratic society. The United States understands 
that by its terms the Convention requires broad regulation of private conduct, in particular 
under Articles 2, 3 and 5. The United States does not accept any obligation under the 
Convention to enact legislation or to take any other action with respect to private conduct 
except as mandated by the Constitution and laws of the United States. (ibid., 10, 51) 
Combat Assignments 
Reservation (2): Under current US law and practice, women are pennitted to volunteer 
for mmtary service without restriction, and women in fact serve in all US armed services, 
including combat positions. However, the United States does not accept an obligation 
under the Convention to assign women to all militaty units and positions which may 
require engagement in direct combat. (ibid.) 
Comparable Worth 
Reservation (3): US law provides strong protections against gender discrimination in the 
area of remuneration, including the right to equal pay for equal work in jobs that are 
substantially similar. However, the United States does not accept any obligation under 
this Convention to enact legislation establishing the doctrine of comparable worth as that 
term is understood in US practice. (ibid.) 
Paid Maternity Leave 
Reservation ( 4): Current US law contains substantial provisions for maternity leave in 
many employment situations but does not require paid maternity leave. Therefore, the 
United States does not accept an obligation under Article 11(2)(b) to introduce maternity 
leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of fonner employment, 
seniority or social allowances. (ibid.) 
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Federal-State Implementation 
Understanding (1): The United States understands that this Convention shall be 
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction over 
the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments. To the 
extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal 
Government shall, as necessary, take appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of this 
Convention. (ibid.) 
Freedom of Speech, Expression and Association 
Understanding (2): The Constitution and laws of the United States contafo extensive 
protections of individual freedom of speech, expression and association. Accordingly, the 
United States does not accept any obligation under this Convention, in particular under 
Articles 5, 7, 8 and 13, to restrict those rights, through the adoption oflegislation or any 
other measures, to the extent that they are protected by the Constitution and Jaws of the 
United States. (ibid., 11, 51-52) 
Free Health Care Services 
Understanding (3): The United States understands that Article 12 permits States Parties to 
determine which health care services are approprjate in connection whh family planning, 
pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, as well as when the provision of free 
services is necessaiy, and does not mandate the provision of particular services on a cost~ 
free basis. (ibid., 11, 52) 
The Helms Understanding 
Understanding (4): That nothing in this Convention shall be construed to reflect or create 
any right to abortion and in no case should abottion be promoted as a method of family 
planning. (ibid., 52) 
Non-Self-Executing 
Declaration (1): The United States declares that, for purposes of its domestic law, the 
provisions of the Convention are non-self executing. (ibid., 11, 52) 
Dispute Settlement 
Declaration (2): With reference to Article 29(2), the United States declares that it does not 
consider itself bound by the provisions of Article 29(1). The specific consent of the 
United States to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice concerning disputes 




CEDAW: SENATE RECORDS OF SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing: 
27 September 1994 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
Statements of Executive Support 
Department of State 
Department of Justice 
Statements of Public Support 
B'nai B'rith 
American Bar Association 
International Human Rights Law Group 
American Jewish Committee 
International Women's Rights Action Watch 
Council of Presidents: 
National Committee on Pay Equity 
Clearinghouse on Women's Issues 
YWCA of the USA 
Center for the Advancement of Public Policy 
Medical Women's Association 
National Council of Women of the United States, Inc. 
National Hook-up of Black Women, Inc. 
Business and Professional \Vomen / USA 
National Women Conference Center 
Women's Legal Defense Fund 
The Women Activist Fund, Inc. 
National Abortion & Reproductive Rights Action League 
American Assodation of University Women 
MANA: A National Latina Organization 
Church Women United 
General Federation of Women's Clubs 
Natioual Association of Women Lawyers 
Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute 
National Women's Conference Committee 
Minority Rights Group 
Federally Employed Women, Inc. 
Human Rights Watch 
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Statements of Public Support (continued) 
Women's Zionist Organization of America, Inc. 
Soroptimist International of the Americas 
Amnesty International USA 
Georgia Coalition of Black Women, Inc. 
United Nations Association of the United States of America 
Women's Environment & Development Organization 
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) 
United Church of Christ 
Letters of Public Support 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
Yale Law School 
Statement of Qualified Public Support 
Ethics and Public Policy Center (abortion not a human right) 
Statement of Public Opposition 
National Institute ofWomenhood 
********** 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing: 
2 August 1990 
Convention on the Elimination of All Fonns of Discrimination Against Women 
Statements of Congressional Suppott 
Hon. Claiborne Pell, US Senate 
Hon. Paul Simon (with enclosures), US Senate 
Hon. Barbara Mikulski, US Senate 
Hon. Maiy Rose Oakar, US House of Representatives 
Hon. Nancy Pelosi, US House of Representatives 
Hon. Rudy Boschwitz, US Senate 
Hon. Paul Sarbanes, US Senate 
Hon. John Keny, US Senate 
Hon Daniel K. Anaka, US Senate 
Hon. John Edward Porter, US House of Representatives 
Hon. Claudine Schneider, US House of Representatives 
Hon. Patricia Saiki, US House of Representatives 
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Letter of Congressional Support June 11. 1990 
Hon. Claudine Schneider, US House of Representatives 
Hon. Patricia Saiki, US House of Representatives 
Hon. Marge Roukema, US House of Representatives 
Hon. Helen Delich Bentley, US House of Representatives 
Hon. Constance A Morella, US House of Representatives 
Hon. Susan Molinarl US House of Representatives 
Hon. Virginia Srnith, US House of Representatives 
Hon. Lynn Martin, US House of Representatives 
Hon. Rudy Boschwitz, US Senate 
Hon. Nancy L. Johnson, US House of Representatives 
Hon. Barbara F. Vucanovich, US House of Representatives 
Hon. Jan Meyers, US House of Representatives 
Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, US House of Representatives 
Letter Retracting Congressional Support August J? J 990 
Hon. Barbara Vucanovich, US House of Representatives 
Hon. Helen Deli ch Bentley, US House of Representatives 
Hon Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, US House of Representatives 
Statements of Public Support 
B'nai B'rith Women 
American Bar Association 
Atvonne S. Fraser, Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs 
International Women's Rights Action Watch 
Atnnesty International USA 
American Association of University Women 
Religious Network for the Equality of Women 
Public Support Listed by the American Bar Association 
American Society oflnternational Law 
Federal Bar Association 
Women's Bar Association of the District of Columbia 
Public Support Listed by B'nai B'rith Women 
Atnerican Association of Retired Persons 
Atnerican Association of University Women 
American Bar Association 
Americans for Democratic Action 
American Federation of Teachers 
American Jewish Committee 
Atnerican Jewish Congress 
American Nurses Association 
American Psychiatric Association 
Amit Women 
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Public Support Listed by B'nai B'rith Women (continued) 
Anmesty International 
Anti-Defamation League ofB'nai B'rith 
Association for Women in Psychology 
Association for Women in Science 
Black Women's Agenda 
B'nai B'rith Women 
B'nai B'rith International 
Church Women United 
Episcopal Church, USA 




League of Women Voters 
Na'amatUSA 
National Assembly of Religious Women 
National Association of Commissions for Women 
National Association of Women Judges 
National Association of Women Lawyers 
National Coalition of 100 Black Women 
National Conference of Christians and Jews, Inc. 
National Council of Jewish Women 
National Education Association 
National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs 
National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods 
National Ladies Auxiliary 
Jewish War Veterans 
National Jewish Relations Advisory Council 
National Organization of Women (NOW) 
National Spiritual Assembly ofBahai of the U.S.A. 
National Women's Conference Committee 
National Women's Political Caucus 
National Women's Studies Association 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America 
Presbyterian Church, USA 
Soroptirnist International 
St. Joan's Alliance 
United Presbyterian Church 
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee 
Unitarian U niversalist Association of Congregations 
United Methodist Church 
United Nations Association of the United States 
United States Conference of Mayors 
Women for International Peace and Arbitration 
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Public Support Listed by B'nai B'rith Women (continued) 
Women's American ORT 
Women's Branch, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America 
Women's League for Conservative Judaism 
World Federalist Association 
Young Women's Christian Association 
Zonta International 
Statements of Public Opposition 
Bruce Fein 
Concerned Women for America 
Phyllis Schlafly 
Hon. Barbara Vucanovich, US House of Representatives 
********** 
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Field Hearing: 
5 December 1988 
Boston, Massachuseits 
Issues Relating to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All 
Fonns of Discrimination Against Women 
Statements of PubJfo Support 
B'nai B'rith Women 
Massachusetts Department of Public Healt11 
Stone Center, Wellesley College 
Massachusetts Department of Social Services 
Lesley College 
Massachusetts Women's Bar Association 
Boston's Women's Health Book Collective 
Massaclmsetts Supreme Judicial Court 
Massachusetts Department of the Attorney General 
Greater Boston Lesbian and Gay Alliance 
Parents United for Child Care 
J. Stephen DuPJessie 
Boston YWCA 
Catherine E. Whynot, RN., B.S. 
League of Women Voters of Massachusetts 
Howard / Stein-Hudson Associates 
Hon. Marilyn Travinsky, Massachusetts House of Representatives 
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Statements of Public Support (continued) 
Hon. rvfary Jane Gibson, Massachusetts House of Representatives 
Letters of Public Support 
Helen B. Holmes, Ph.D. (with enclosure) 
Jennifer Breitenstein 
Statements ofindirect or Qualified Public Support 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (abortion is discrimination) 
The Project on Women and Disability 
Juliet F. Brudney "Living with Work" (article) 
Statement of Public Opposition 
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